

galvanised Arab nationalism. It had inspired a popular loathing and contempt for Britain best expressed by 'The Voice of the Arabs' on Cairo Radio. Even members of the Middle East's Anglophile intelligentsia were alienated by the crass ineptitude of Eden's adventure. As an Egyptian lawyer said to an English friend in Aden: 'You gave us Shakespeare, Oscar Wilde, Dickens . . . And all this spoilt, spat upon by Suez, by alliance with the Israelis. How, how could you do it?'¹¹⁷

An equally pertinent question was why, why did the British stay in Aden until 1967 when the base had lost its former *raison d'être*? The tiny colony had always been an outpost of India, valued for its fine natural harbour enclosed by two reddish volcanic peninsulas sticking 'into the sea like the claws of a lobster buried in the sand'.¹¹⁸ Aden was seized as a coaling station and a bastion in 1839, and for almost a century thereafter it was governed from Bombay. Admittedly, Calcutta, Delhi and London had also intervened. For a time, between the wars, the RAF was in charge of Aden's defence. And when the Colonial Office took control in 1937 (the year of Britain's last campaign of imperial conquest, in the Hadramaut region of South Yemen) it consigned the crown colony to its Central African Department. Yet the town, which had grown from a decaying cluster of hovels into a thriving free port, still seemed a suburb of the Indian subcontinent. Many of its buildings, notably in the white enclave at Steamer Point, resembled the Indo-Saracenic edifices of Bombay. The dusty cantonments built on cinders and clinker inspired Kipling's famous simile: Aden was 'like a barrick-stove/That no one's lit for years'.¹¹⁹ The lush public gardens boasted a two-ton bronze statue of Queen Victoria on a white marble throne surveying her first colonial acquisition. Parsee merchant houses flourished. *Dhotis* were almost as common as *futas* (Yemeni kilts) in the cosmopolitan old city of Crater. Here the gutters were stacked with *char-pays* (wooden rope beds, for outdoor sleeping) because 'no breath of wind disturbs the sweltering air, and the barren circle of morose grey rock stops the view and traps the sun, turning it into a bake-oven'.¹²⁰ The mud-brick bazaars, browsed by cows and goats, reeked of curry and spice. The khaki-clad police wore scarlet Punjabi turbans.

Furthermore, apart from restoring its ancient fortifications and the water tanks that had supported a city of 350 mosques in the time of Marco Polo, the Bombay Presidency subjected Aden to the hallowed process of salutary neglect. It remained a lava-strewn purgatory for adulterous officers and disgraced Indian regiments. But in 1947 Aden lost its vital strategic role as a link to India. By the time of Suez it had become a stagnant colonial backwater, sustained by past flummery more than present purpose. Under

a sun that struck like a scimitar, the senior British dignitaries still paraded in full-bottomed wigs or helmets crested with red and white cocks' feathers. Even ordinary civil servants had to turn out in white drill tunic with gilt buttons, high collar with oak-leaf gorgets of gold lace, medals, kid gloves, buckskin shoes and tasselled sword. It was garb reminiscent, one complained, of 'the stirring days of Omdurman or the annexation of Scinde'.¹²¹ The new Governor, Sir William Luce, thought the antique fustiness 'as depressing as stale tobacco smoke'.¹²² He tried to liven up Government House, dominated by another image of Queen Victoria, with games of bicycle polo played on its colonnaded terrace. But imperial Aden was moribund. After the liquidation of the Raj, as an ambassador wrote to Selwyn Lloyd in December 1956, British bases around the Arabian peninsula had become 'stations on the route to nowhere'.¹²³

Inside Aden, moreover, hostility to the British presence was crystallising. This was partly because few efforts had been made to improve social conditions. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) had offered meagre help since, as one minister acknowledged, it was 'little but a gesture'.¹²⁴ Local people also benefited little from the half-million pounds raised annually from a tax on imported *qat*, a narcotic leaf that plunged those who chewed it into an 'ecstatic torpor'¹²⁵ and turned the faces of addicts green. The state of public welfare could be measured by conditions in Crater's gaol, which as late as 1967 contained both criminals and lunatics. A visiting English lawyer was horrified by the way in which sane Christian men treated mad Muslim women: 'Like animals they were fed, their food being pushed to them between the bars; and like animals they were occasionally hosed down, together with their cells. The whole scene had, shut away under the brilliant blue sky, the quality of a nightmare'.¹²⁶ Labour relations were equally backward and, with British approval, an Aden Trade Union Congress was formed in 1956. It began by organising strikes and, as political progress was limited, soon became a focus for opposition to imperial rule.

The Suez crisis showed that Britain was vulnerable. And the blocking of the Canal exacerbated animosity since it impaired the prosperity of one of the busiest oil bunkering ports in the world. Cairo Radio poured streams of molten propaganda into Crater. The British could produce nothing to compete with its 'appeals to Arab brotherhood and denunciations of colonialism'.¹²⁷ Pictures of Nasser smiled from every wall and urchins taunted Europeans by shouting his name. The nationalist animus was summed up in a letter sent to one of the most sympathetic (if old-fashioned) British officials. He was a future High Commissioner of Aden, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, who had long striven to eradicate the race prejudice which he

regarded as a 'cancer rampant throughout our imperial government'. The letter addressed Trevaskis as 'the infidel master of slaves'.¹²⁸

Aden's situation had worsened after the Second World War because its hinterland became a siege platform instead of a rampart. From time immemorial, as Gibbon wrote, 'Arabia Felix' had been almost immune from landward conquest. The centre of the incense trade in ancient days, it was a natural fortress rising in jagged steps from russet shore to amber massif. Protected by wilderness and desert, the fierce sons of Ishmael had not only kept Pompey and Trajan at bay, they had also denied the Turkish Sultan more than 'a shadow of jurisdiction'.¹²⁹ True, Ottoman forces did reach the outskirts of Aden, known as the Eye of Yemen, during the Great War. According to legend their mortar fire interrupted golf on the Khormaksar links, causing the Committee of the Union Club, 'the most powerful body in Aden', to impel the military 'to mount a long overdue counter-offensive'.¹³⁰ The scattered sheikhdoms in the arid wastes stretching from the Red Sea to the Empty Quarter took note of British weakness. But they could not exploit it since they lived by a 'system of anarchy'.¹³¹ Their fiefs might consist of little more than an oasis, a pass, a shrine or a hill-top fort set amid stunted acacia and parched tamarisk. Wider suzerainty was limited by intrigue, betrayal and blood feud, just as local authority had always been restricted by 'the domestic licence of rapine, murder and revenge'.¹³²

Britain took advantage of this Hobbesian condition to secure its Aden base. It signed dozens of treaties with disruptive neighbours, offering subventions and protection in return for collaboration. Otherwise it adopted a policy of 'masterly inactivity in Arabian politics'.¹³³ Between the wars the spread of modern rifles and the claims of the brutal Imam of Yemen to extend his medieval theocracy to the Gulf of Aden aggravated tribal turbulence. RAF bombers quelled it for a time and the British reached an accord with the Imam. This proved ambiguous, giving him ample scope to stir up trouble in the southern protectorates. By the 1950s armed incursions from the Yemen had become more frequent. At the same time, from the other end of the political spectrum a triumphant Nasser fomented revolution in what Cairo Radio provocatively called 'Occupied South Yemen'. In 1956 the British Commander-in-Chief failed to recognise that a guerrilla war was in the making and dismissed the clashes as 'military tiddlywinks'.¹³⁴

So the British kept Aden because they could and because they were conditioned by the past. Indeed, neither the death of the Raj nor the disaster of Suez prompted a fundamental readjustment of Britain's imperial policy. According to official opinion, the United Kingdom remained 'much too important a part of the free world'¹³⁵ to let itself sink into a passive role

like that of Sweden or Switzerland. No one in Westminster or Whitehall heeded Lord Curzon's prophecy, made half a century earlier, that once India and the great colonies had gone, the smaller dependencies would follow.

Your ports and coaling stations, your fortresses and dockyards, your Crown Colonies and protectorates will go too. For either they will be unnecessary as the toll-gates and barbicans of an empire that has vanished, or they will be taken by an enemy more powerful than yourselves.

Labour's former War Minister John Strachey did call for a revision of Britain's global strategy, which meant ceasing to 'behave as if we were still the leading world empire'.¹³⁶ But comprehensive plans gave way to piecemeal expedients. It was almost as though, having acquired the Empire in a fit of absence of mind and afterwards taken little interest in it, Britain refused to face its loss. Yet fears were expressed that abandoning imperial commitments would have a catastrophic domino effect. Handing over territory would reduce Britain's military reach, threaten its control of raw materials, damage its anti-Communist alliance with America, impair its prestige, weaken sterling, harm trade (especially invisible exports) and undermine the domestic standard of living. British politicians and civil servants therefore had reasons, persuasive in the short term but reflecting a long-term reluctance to acknowledge their country's diminished international position, for denying Aden independence.

At a time when Cyprus threatened to become 'a second Palestine',¹³⁷ Aden was hailed as a vital link in a chain of strongholds stretching from Gibraltar to Hong Kong. With Washington's approval, it guarded and serviced the Gulf. It gave Britain an enduring stake in the Middle East. Aden's hinterland might even contain oil and, as Harold Macmillan cynically observed, this possibility meant that Britain should continue to divide and rule. He thought that

it would be better to leave the local Sheikhs and Rulers in a state of simple rivalry and separateness, in which they are glad of our protection and can, where necessary, be played off one against the other rather than to mould them into a single unit which is most likely (and indeed expressly designed) to create a demand for independence and 'self-determination'.¹³⁸

However, in 1958 a state of emergency was declared after more Yemeni-inspired strife. London reluctantly concluded that Aden would best be secured by further modest advances towards democracy and by amalgamating the protected Arab states to form a *cordon sanitaire* – though, as one official wrote, it 'proved more like a chastity belt: uncomfortable but

not proof against impregnation'.¹³⁹ The merger was celebrated in 1959 by the lofty Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, who survived a welcoming salute of rifle fire that came perilously close to his head and 'dispensed charm like largesse'.¹⁴⁰ In 1963, after much haggling and a promise of self-government qualified by Britain's avowed determination to retain troops in Aden 'permanently', the colony itself joined the union. Its Governor would now be called the High Commissioner for Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia. This was, he observed mournfully, like replacing 'a classical Roman title, brief, lapidary and to the point, with a late Byzantine one, long, honorific and utterly ambiguous'.¹⁴¹ As his plaint suggests, the South Arabian Federation was doomed. Like the federations in Malaya, the West Indies and central Africa, it was form without substance, the worthless legacy of a senile Empire.

The South Arabian Federation was unable to unite its disparate elements. But its downfall was ensured by Colonel Abdullah Sallal, who in 1962 led a military coup in the Yemen which triggered a bitter civil war that crossed its southern border. Cairo and Moscow supported Sallal, whereas London and Riyadh backed his monarchist foes. Once again, therefore, the British Empire sided with feudal reactionaries against nationalist revolutionaries. Although riven by tribal and personal vendettas, Aden's own nationalist revolutionaries retaliated. In particular a militant new group called the National Liberation Front (NLF) belied the persistent British belief that the 'people of Aden Colony are, like most Arabs in other countries, coffee house politicians whose views change with the mood of the hour'.¹⁴² The NLF were responsible for a growing number of strikes, riots and assassinations in the city, which now contained nearly 250,000 inhabitants, many of them migrant workers from the Yemen. High Commissioner Trevaskis himself was wounded by a grenade, which killed his assistant. In October 1963 the NLF launched a full-scale rebellion in the wilds of Radfan, a mountainous region close to the Yemeni frontier. Its impoverished people had a long tradition of brigandage and they were skilled guerrilla fighters. Owing allegiance to no overlord, they called themselves the 'Wolves of Radfan'.¹⁴³ Against them the British deployed some of their most sophisticated armaments, including Centurion tanks, Wessex helicopters and Hunter ground-attack aircraft. Duncan Sandys, now Colonial Secretary and kitted out in an emerald green shirt, slacks and a straw hat, witnessed their assaults on a flying visit. The RAF not only fire-bombed villages but sprayed crops with poison 'in the hope of terrorising the rebels into submission'. Sandys's secretary later recalled, 'it was a pretty nasty policy, a real throwback to colonial times, and it didn't work'.¹⁴⁴

Nothing worked, least of all the bounty of two rifles which the army gave for each mine handed in by tribesmen, who could obtain a mine in the Yemen for one rifle. It proved impossible to eradicate resistance in Radfan, where at least eight thousand people were made homeless. Meanwhile, repressive emergency measures in Aden were ineffective against snipers, let alone bombs, bazookas and booby traps. In this campaign of sabotage and slaughter, the NLF's favourite targets were the oil pipeline leading to the British Petroleum refinery and the local 'running dogs of imperialism', especially broadcasters and intelligence agents. Eventually they murdered the entire Arab Special Branch. In 1965 the British suspended the constitution and imposed direct rule. To counter terror and obtain information, the army sent suspects to the Interrogation Centre set up in Fort Morbut at Steamer Point. Here the standard forms of brutality were employed but, as an official investigation later revealed, more scientific methods of torture were also secretly developed. Used in Kenya, Cyprus, Brunei, the British Cameroons, the Persian Gulf, Northern Ireland and elsewhere, these techniques included disorientation, electric shocks, 'wall-standing, hooding, noise, bread and water diet and deprivation of sleep'. The screams of Aden's victims could be heard in the nearby Corporals' Club, where they prompted jokes and comments such as, 'That's another cunt getting fucking done in'.¹⁴⁵

In response to pressure from President Lyndon Johnson, who was becoming embroiled in the Vietnam war, Harold Wilson's Labour government expressed its determination to hang on to Aden. Washington wanted its transatlantic ally to remain East of Suez in order to allay fears that the United States was intent on 'dominating the world by trying to become "another Rome"'.¹⁴⁶ Wilson himself had some feeling for the romance of the Empire. As a schoolboy he had hero-worshipped Baden-Powell and as a flag-wagging politician he was largely immune to Duncan Sandys's clandestine attempt to identify him with 'the best hated man in Britain', Colonel Nasser.¹⁴⁷ Wilson also valued American help in propping up the pound. But he and senior colleagues increasingly came to believe that sterling could only be saved by a drastic reduction in commitments. They dissembled, none more so than the Defence Minister, Denis Healey, who had privately wanted to get out of Aden 'from the word go'.¹⁴⁸ On 2 February 1966 Healey said that Britain had 'no intention of ratting' on its imperial obligations in the Middle East and fully intended 'to remain in a military sense a world power'.¹⁴⁹ Three weeks later Healey's Defence White Paper announced severe cuts in British forces east of Suez. All South Arabia would be abandoned including the base at Aden. The decision was confirmed by another financial crisis, which caused a general drawing in of horns. In

future, for example, no bases would be held in the face of local opposition – though this proviso was met in the case of the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia by deporting the entire population, to Britain's continuing shame and disgrace.

Furthermore, Wilson hoped to reorientate British foreign policy by joining the European Common Market. Finally, it had become clear that the Aden base was less of a shield than a target. This was certainly true once the White Paper appeared. Now friends of the Federation had nothing more to gain from the alien power, while its foes were encouraged by the assurance of victory. Unable to drum up local support, the British garrison in Aden felt betrayed. In the words of the last High Commissioner, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, 'When a Colonial Power turns its back, it presents its bottom to be kicked.'¹⁵⁰ The NLF duly mounted more assaults on the British Army, which suffered 369 casualties in 1967, forty-four of them fatal.¹⁵¹ It also struck at its main rival, the Nasserite Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), founded in January 1966. A visiting trio of UN representatives, described by the *Sunday Telegraph* as 'three stormy petulants',¹⁵² did nothing to keep the peace but much to discredit Britain's role in a colonial conflict growing more vicious by the minute. Race hatred charged the atmosphere of Aden like thunder. It was almost tactile, 'a palpable thing, seeping into one's skin, seeking to . . . take possession of one's senses'.¹⁵³

Israel's victory over Egypt in the Six Day War of June 1967 further inflamed the antagonism. Aden's Arabs chanted the slogan, 'A bullet against Britain is a bullet against Israel'. The security forces were assailed by rockets, mortars, grenades and bombs as well as small arms fire. One private had a narrow escape when a bullet entered the barrel of his rifle, 'peeling it back like a banana skin and knocking him across the room'.¹⁵⁴ Outside a wire-fenced picket post the Lancashire Fusiliers put up a sign saying, 'Please do not fire rockets at this structure, which is unsafe'.¹⁵⁵ The injunction was ignored. Later in June, the Federation disintegrated and its forces mutinied. NLF fighters seized Crater, looting, burning and murdering at will. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under the command of Colonel Colin Mitchell, an imperial throwback nicknamed 'Mad Mitch', reoccupied it. He and his men went in to the sound of a pipe band playing 'The Barren Rocks of Aden', putting on 'a bloody marvellous show'.¹⁵⁶ But they advanced only to cover Britain's retreat. Everywhere the NLF gained ground. It was dedicated to winning power through the barrel of a gun. So while negotiations took place in Geneva, fire-fights still raged in the streets of Aden. Leaders of the Federation fled to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, sending their limousines by sea.

The British left with as much dignity as they could muster. On the

dark, overcast evening of 14 November 1967 two hundred expatriates attended the final cocktail party at Government House presided over by Trevelyan, a tough little man with enormous ears which wiggled when he talked. All clutched their drinks and chattered with 'that especial, glassy frenzy found only on such occasions'.¹⁵⁷ The frenetic mood was tempered by nostalgia, best expressed in an official's pastiche of Gray's *Elegy*:

Now fades the glimmering heat haze from our view,
The Union Jack descends its downward track,
Far off explodes a hand grenade or two
And still is heard the sharp bazooka's crack . . .
The Flag is down, another flag is raised,
Gone is the symbol of the heir to Rome.
The Bedou stop and stare, amazed,
And, empty-handed, wander slowly home.¹⁵⁸

Two weeks later Trevelyan inspected a guard of honour drawn from all the services. Disdaining 'Auld Lang Syne', the band of the Royal Marines from HMS *Eagle* struck up 'Fings Ain't Wot They Used To Be'. The High Commissioner's Security Adviser was the last man to board the RAF Britannia, which stood with its engines idling on the tarmac at Khormaksar airfield. He climbed the steps backwards, holding a Walther PPK pistol in his hand.

Trevelyan was unhappy about transferring power to Marxist revolutionaries. But at least, he said, the British had not been forced to fight their way out of Aden leaving anarchy behind, as in Palestine. Some of his colleagues were equally sanguine. A future Foreign Secretary, David Owen, went so far as to extol 'our glorious decolonisation record'. But an old imperial hand, Sir Brian Crowe, sharply reminded Owen that 'there was the small matter of Aden, South Arabia, which we handed over to an unknown gang of violent thugs whose only credential was that they beat another gang of thugs in a civil war'.¹⁵⁹ Others who served in Aden saw Britain's involvement in the region as morally defective from start to finish. In his unpublished memoir Reginald Hickling, the High Commissioner's Legal Adviser, deplored the unprincipled dominion that Britons had exercised over Arabs for whom they had no sympathy. He speculated about what a

distant historian will make of Britain's last days of colonialism in the Arabian peninsula. I think he will see our whole exercise, from 1799 to 1968, as one of selfish power politics, overtaken in its decline by a casual interest in self-government. If he is something of a philosopher, he will also conclude that a nation cannot successfully govern a people it dislikes.¹⁶⁰

Towards the end, Trevelyan's predecessor complained, the colonial power had conducted its activities in Aden with an air of guilt. As Hickling's comments suggest, it lingered on in Britain after the evacuation, adding to the climate of anti-imperial feeling.

The abandonment of Aden took place at a time of acute anxiety about Britain's decline. During the fortnight between Trevelyan's valedictory cocktail party and his flight from Khormaksar, the pound was devalued by 14.3 per cent. Harold Wilson did his best to present this as a patriotic triumph, particularly when speaking to the bevy of tame journalists known as the 'White Commonwealth'.¹⁶¹ 'We're on our own now,' he told the nation, in a vain attempt to conjure up the Dunkirk spirit. 'It means Britain first.'¹⁶² It also meant an end to the Prime Minister's inflated rhetoric about being a world power or nothing. Admittedly he did try to safeguard the country's prestige by clinging to nuclear weapons. But aircraft carriers would be sacrificed to keep Polaris submarines. And there was no more talk about the frontiers of the United Kingdom being situated in the Himalayas. The change of heart was not just a matter of cutting Britain's commitments to fit its capacities. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States offered to subsidise a continuing British presence east of Suez. Wilson was now convinced that, despite the French veto, his country's future lay in Europe, which involved sloughing off imperial entanglements. In January 1968 he made the momentous announcement that Britain would withdraw from the Far East (except Hong Kong) and the Gulf region within three years.

Wilson was widely reckoned to have signed the death warrant of the British Empire. And he caused shock and upset from Amman to Bahrain, from Singapore to Canberra, from Wellington to Washington. When George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, crossed the Atlantic with prior news of his country's retreat, the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was 'bloody unpleasant'. The soft-spoken Rusk much resented 'the acrid aroma of the fait accompli' but said that he would leave it to Brown, who was vociferous as well as bibulous, 'to add several decibels' when reporting his comments to London. Rusk 'could not believe that free aspirins and false teeth were more important than Britain's role in the world'. He deplored its withdrawal into a 'little England' isolationism and urged, 'for God's sake be Britain'. It was ironic that the United States, which had once repulsed and often reviled the British Empire, should officially regard its current contraction as 'a catastrophic loss to human society'.¹⁶³ Rusk feared that the United States would have to face the cost of taking over as the global policeman, since it would be impossible for Britain to play an effective part from its European base. He was right. Britain's power vanished with its

eagles. Yet America had long regarded the process as inevitable and quickly resigned itself to filling the vacuum. Lyndon Johnson was not above mocking Harold Wilson musically, once ensuring that his mendicant guest was serenaded with 'Buddy, Can You Spare a Dime?' But Wilson was happy that the only reference to Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez on his visit to the White House in February 1968 was baritone Robert Merrill's after-dinner rendition of 'The Road to Mandalay'.

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CHAPTER 17

'The Destruction of National Will'

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68. Lord Egremont, *Wyndham and Children First* (1968), 84.
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102. M. Amory (ed.), *The Letters of Ann Fleming* (1985), 188.
103. M. Foot, *Aneurin Bevan*, Vol. II, 1945-69 (1973), 521.
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121. Foster, *Landscape with Arabs*, 164.
122. G. Balfour-Paul, *The End of Empire in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1991), 69.
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125. F. Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans* (Harmondsworth, 1974), 89.
126. CAC, HICK 2, 95.
127. R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule 1839-1967* (1975), 333.
128. K. Trevaskis, *Shades of Amber* (1968), xii and 80.
129. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, III, 159.
130. D. Ledger, *Shifting Sands* (1983), 200.
131. Trevaskis, *Amber*, 9.
132. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, III, 162.
133. Balfour-Paul, *End of Empire*, 56.
134. D. Holden, *Farewell to Arabia* (1966), 49.
135. F. Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963* (2002), 172.
136. P. Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968* (1973), 1 and 49.
137. R. Hyam and W. R. Louis (eds), *BDEEP*, Series A, Vol. 4, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1957-1964*, Pt I, *High Policy, Political and Constitutional Change* (2000), xlix.
138. Murphy, *Lennox-Boyd*, 192.
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140. Trevaskis, *Amber*, 143.
141. Johnston, *Steamer Point*, 194 and 117.
142. Hyam and Louis (eds), *Conservative Government*, 619.
143. J. Paget, *Last Post: Aden 1964-1967* (1969), 39.
144. CAC, BDOHP, Denis Doble, 9.
145. Halliday, *Arabia*, 206 and 204. According to Reginald Hickling (CAC, HICK 2, 119 and 279), there was 'a substantial body of evidence' that detainees were also tortured in al-Mansoura Gaol. Yet, he concluded, 'without being unctuously dishonest, I think no other armed forces, faced with the intense bitterness and fury of South Arabia, could have behaved with such restraint'.
146. M. Jones, 'A Decision delayed: Britain's withdrawal from South-East Asia reconsidered 1961-8', *EHR*, CXVII (June 2002), 582-3. George Ball, American Under-Secretary of State, made this remark to Harold Wilson on 8 September 1965. Two days later the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, announced that Britain had acquired a short-term stabilisation loan of one billion dollars.
147. CAC, DSND, 8/16, Julian Amery to Sandys, 7 May 1964.
148. K. Pieragostini, *Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire* (1991), 114.
149. *The Times*, 3 February 1966.
150. Ashton and Louis (eds), *East of Suez*, 248.
151. But according to an undated sheet of figures in Duncan Sandys's papers (CAC, DSND 14/1, File 1), British casualties from terrorism in Aden numbered 111 per month during 1967.
152. Paget, *Last Post*, 194.
153. CAC, HICK 2, 282.
154. Paget, *Last Post*, 202 and 205.
155. Ledger, *Shifting Sands*, 180.
156. BCEM 2003/208, De Heveningham Baekeland Papers, 20.

157. CAC, HICK 2, 276
158. M. Crouch, *An Element of Luck: To South Arabia and Beyond* (1993), 5–6.
159. CAC, BDOHP, Sir Brian Crowe, 17.
160. CAC, HICK 2, Introduction – which Hickling wrote in haste after leaving Aden ‘while I felt strongly upon many of the issues’ but subsequently deleted.
161. B. Pimlott, *Harold Wilson* (1997), 482.
162. BBC TV (audiotape), 19 November 1967.
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CHAPTER 18

‘Renascent Africa’

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3. Pembroke College, Cambridge, Storrs Papers, Reel 11, Storrs to E. Marsh, 17 December 1930.
4. D. Rooney, *Sir Charles Arden-Clarke* (1982), 5.
5. Gallagher, *Decline, Revival and Fall*, 142.
6. Albertini, *JCH* (January 1969), 33.
7. D. Fieldhouse, ‘Decolonization, Development and Dependence: A Survey of Changing Attitudes’, in P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds), *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940–1960* (New Haven, CT, 1982), 489.
8. Hyam, *Labour Government*, I, xxxv.
9. Leith-Ross, *Stepping-Stones*, 117.
10. J. S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley, CA, 1971), 152.
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12. N. Azikiwe, *My Odyssey* (1970), 254.
13. R. Robinson, ‘Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power in Tropical Africa, 1940–1957’, in W. H. Morris-Jones and G. Fischer (eds), *Decolonisation and After* (1980), 54.
14. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Africa in the Colonial Period*, III: *The Transfer of Power* (Oxford, 1979), 15. The words were those of Sir Hilton Poynton, who added later that he disliked the word ‘decolonisation’ because it was ‘flavoured with the garlic of guilt’. (*Ibid.*, 65.)
15. A. Creech Jones, ‘British Colonial Policy with Particular Reference to Africa’, *IA*, 27 (April 1951), 177.
16. Grimal, *Decolonization*, 121.
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20. Perham, *West African Passage*, 62.
21. A. W. Cardinall, *The Natives of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast* (1921), 82.
22. Kimble, *Ghana*, 132 and 134.
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25. R. E. Wraith, *Guggisberg* (1967), 100.
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27. Wraith, *Guggisberg*, 216.
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30. K. Bradley, *Once a District Officer* (1966), 146.
31. M. Perham, *The Colonial Reckoning: the End of Imperial Rule in Africa in the Light of Experience* (1961), 114.
32. Burns, *Civil Servant*, 322.
33. Bing, *Whirlwind*, 48.
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41. *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (1957), 91.
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49. Rathbone (ed.), *Ghana*, Pt I, 403.
50. Rooney, *Arden-Clarke*, 212.
51. *Daily Telegraph*, 17 October 1950. The article accused the CPP of carrying out violent intimidation and concluded: ‘We should make it quite plain to the Gold Coast and to the world that the British mission is not yet finished and that in no circumstances will we allow the country to relapse into chaos or to become a Russian outpost on the equator.’
52. *CHA*, 8, 52.
53. Austin, *Ghana*, 126.
54. *AA*, 57 (January 1958), 33.
55. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 136.
56. *Scotsman*, 15 October 1999. Julius Nyerere observed this phenomenon among Ghanaian students abroad.
57. Lapping, *End of Empire*, 382.
58. Rathbone (ed.), *Ghana*, Pt I, 373, and Pt II, 4.
59. Gunther, *Inside Africa*, 801.
60. *Ghana Evening News*, 1 May 1957.
61. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, 142.