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Political Process
and the
Development of
Black Insurgency
1930–1970

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3 The Political Process Model

The political process model represents an alternative to the classical and resource mobilization perspectives. The term “political process” has been taken from an article by Rule and Tilly entitled “Political Process in Revolutionary France, 1830–1832” (1975: 41–85).¹ It should, however, be emphasized that the model advanced by Rule and Tilly is compatible but not synonymous with the perspective outlined here. The name has been adopted, not because the two models are identical, but because the term “political process” accurately conveys two ideas central to both perspectives. First, in contrast to the various classical formulations, a social movement is held to be above all else a *political* rather than a psychological phenomenon. That is, the factors shaping institutionalized political processes are argued to be of equal analytic utility in accounting for social insurgency. Second, a movement represents a continuous *process* from generation to decline, rather than a discrete series of developmental stages. Accordingly, any complete model of social insurgency should offer the researcher a framework for analyzing the entire process of movement development rather than a particular phase (e.g., the emergence of social protest) of that same process.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL AND INSTITUTIONALIZED POLITICS

A point stressed repeatedly in this work is that theories of social movements always imply a more general model of institutionalized power. Thus, in Chapter 1, it was argued that the classical view of social movements is best understood as a theoretical extension of the pluralist model. By contrast, it was suggested, in Chapter 2, that the resource mobilization perspective implies adherence to the elite model of the American political system. The political process model is also based on a particular conception of power in America. In many respects this conception is consistent with the elite model. Like the latter, the perspective advanced here rests on the fundamental assumption that wealth and power are concentrated in America in the hands of a few groups, thus depriving most people of any real influence over the major decisions that affect their lives. Ac-

cordingly, social movements are seen, in both perspectives, as rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through noninstitutionalized means.

Where this perspective diverges from the elite model is in regard to the extent of elite control over the political system and the insurgent capabilities of excluded groups. While elite theorists display a marked diversity of opinion on these issues, there would seem to be a central tendency evident in their writings. That tendency embodies a perception of the power disparity between elite and excluded groups that would seem to grant the former virtually unlimited power in politico-economic matters. Excluded groups, on the other hand, are seen as functionally powerless in the face of the enormous power wielded by the elite. Under such conditions, the chances for successful insurgency would seem to be negligible.

By contrast, on both these counts, the political process model is more compatible with a Marxist interpretation of power. Marxists acknowledge that the power disparity between elite and excluded groups is substantial but hardly regard this state of affairs as inevitable. Indeed, for orthodox Marxists, that which is inevitable is not the retention of power by the elite but the accession to power by the masses. One need not accept the rigidity of this scenario, to conclude that it represents an improvement over elite theory insofar as it embodies a clear understanding of the latent political leverage available to most segments of the population. The insurgent potential of excluded groups comes from the "structural power" that their location in various politico-economic structures affords them. Schwartz explains the basis and significance of this power:

Since a structure cannot function without the routinized exercise of structural power, any threat to structural power becomes a threat to that system itself. Thus, if employees suddenly began refusing to obey orders, the company in question could not function. Or if tenants simply disobeyed the merchant's order to grow cotton, the tenancy system would collapse. . . . Thus, we see a subtle, but very important, relationship between structural power and those who are subject to it. On the one hand, these power relations define the functioning of any on-going system; on the other hand, the ability to disrupt these relationships is exactly the sort of leverage which can be used to alter the functioning of the system. . . . *Any system contains within itself the possibility of a power strong enough to alter it* (Schwartz, 1976: 172-73; emphasis in original).

A second Marxist influence on the model outlined here concerns the importance attributed to subjective processes in the generation of insurgency. Marxists, to a much greater extent than elite theorists, recognize that mass political impotence may as frequently stem from shared per-

ceptions of powerlessness as from any objective inability to mobilize significant political leverage. Thus, the subjective transformation of consciousness is appreciated by Marxists as a process crucial to the generation of insurgency. The importance of this transformation is likewise acknowledged in the political process model.

The perspective advanced here, then, combines aspects of both the elite and Marxist models of power in America. Central to the perspective is Gamson's distinction between "members" and "challengers": "the central difference among political actors is captured by the idea of being inside or outside of the polity. Those who are inside are *members* whose interest is vested—that is, recognized as valid by other members. Those who are outside are challengers. They lack the basic prerogative of members—routine access to decisions that affect them" (1975: 140). Gamson's distinction is not unique. Indeed, a similar notion is embodied in all versions of the elite model. What distinguishes this perspective from that advanced by most resource mobilization theorists, is the latter's characterization of the relationship between "challengers" and "members." Proponents of the resource mobilization model depict segments of the elite as being willing, at times even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency. By contrast, the political process model is based on the notion that political action by established polity members reflects an abiding conservatism. This conservatism, according to Tilly, encourages polity members to "resist changes which would threaten their current realization of their interests even more than they seek changes which would enhance their interests" (1978: 135). He goes on to state that these members also "fight tenaciously against loss of power, and especially against expulsion from the polity. They work against admission to the polity of groups whose interests conflict significantly with their own. Existing members tend to be more exacting in their demands of contenders whose very admission would challenge the system in some serious way" (Tilly, 1978: 135).

Tilly's remarks are reminiscent of Gamson's characterization of what he terms the "competitive establishment" in American politics (1968: 19). Gamson describes the competitive establishment as that "collection of represented groups and authorities" who control to a considerable degree the workings of America's institutionalized political system. According to Gamson, they are motivated by the same desires Tilly ascribes to established polity members. They seek to "keep unrepresented groups from developing solidarity and politically organizing, and . . . discourage their effective entry into the competitive establishment if and as they become organized" (Gamson, 1968: 20).

Tilly and Gamson's statements are instructive in view of the dominant resource mobilization characterization of member/challenger relations as facilitative of social protest activity. Their remarks serve to undermine

this characterization by forcefully asserting the contradictory notion that established polity members are ordinarily not enamored of the idea of sponsoring any insurgent political activity that could conceivably threaten their interests. This conservative bias extends not only to those insurgents who advocate goals contrary to member interests but also to those protest groups—regardless of how moderate their goals—who simply pressure for membership in the competitive establishment. For any change in the makeup of the polity is inherently disruptive of the institutionalized status quo and thus something to be resisted. As Gamson asserts, “the competitive establishment is boundary-maintaining” (1968: 20).

Gamson and Tilly’s discussion of the characteristic conservatism of established polity members implies an important point that is central to the political process model. If elite groups are unwilling to underwrite insurgency, the very occurrence of social movements indicates that indigenous groups are able to generate and sustain organized mass action. In positing the primacy of environmental factors, most resource mobilization theorists have seemingly rejected this point. This, of course, is not to suggest that such factors are unimportant. The strategic constraints confronting excluded groups should not be underestimated. The Tillys describe the rather unenviable position of the challenger:

the range of collective actions open to a relatively powerless group is normally very small. Its program, its form of action, its very existence are likely to be illegal, hence subject to violent repression. As a consequence, such a group chooses between taking actions which have a high probability of bringing on a violent response (but which have some chance of reaching the group’s goals) and taking no action at all (thereby assuring the defeat of the group’s goals) (C. Tilly, L. Tilly, R. Tilly, 1975: 283).

Thus, while excluded groups do possess the latent capacity to exert significant political leverage at any time, the force of environmental constraints is usually sufficient to inhibit mass action. But this force is not constant over time. The calculations on which existing political arrangements are based may, for a variety of reasons, change over time, thus affording certain segments of the population greater leverage with which to advance their interests. The suggestion is that neither environmental factors nor factors internal to the movement are sufficient to account for the generation and development of social insurgency. I agree with Gary Marx that “social movements are not autonomous forces hurling toward their destiny only in response to the . . . intensity of commitment, and skill of activists. Nor are they epiphenomena completely at the mercy of groups in their external environment seeking to block or facilitate them” (Marx, 1976: 1). The political process model rests on the assumption that

social movements are an ongoing product of the favorable interplay of *both* sets of factors. The specific mix of factors may change from one phase of the movement to another, but the basic dynamic remains the same. Movements develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek to change.

THE GENERATION OF INSURGENCY

The political process model identifies three sets of factors that are believed to be crucial in the generation of social insurgency. The first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population; the second, the collective assessment of the prospects for successful insurgency within that same population; and third, the political alignment of groups within the larger political environment. The first can be conceived of as the degree of organizational “readiness” within the minority community; the second, as the level of “insurgent consciousness” within the movement’s mass base; and the third, following Eisinger, as the “structure of political opportunities” available to insurgent groups (Eisinger, 1973: 11). Before the relationships between these factors are outlined, each will be discussed in turn.

Structure of Political Opportunities

Under ordinary circumstances, excluded groups, or challengers, face enormous obstacles in their efforts to advance group interests. Challengers are excluded from routine decision-making processes precisely because their bargaining position, relative to established polity members, is so weak. But the particular set of power relationships that define the political environment at any point in time hardly constitute an immutable structure of political life. As Lipsky points out:

attention is directed away from system characterizations presumably true for all times and all places, which are basically of little value in understanding the social and political process. We are accustomed to describing communist political systems as “experiencing a thaw” or “going through a process of retrenchment.” Should it not at least be an open question as to whether the American political system experiences such stages and fluctuations? Similarly, is it not sensible to assume that the system will be more or less open to specific groups at different times and at different places? (Lipsky, 1970: 14).

The answer offered here to both of Lipsky’s questions is an emphatic yes. The opportunities for a challenger to engage in successful collective action do vary greatly over time. And it is these variations that are held

to be related to the ebb and flow of movement activity. As Eisinger has remarked, "protest is a sign that the opportunity structure is flexible and vulnerable to the political assaults of excluded groups" (1973: 28).

Still unanswered, however, is the question of what accounts for such shifts in the "structure of political opportunities." A finite list of specific causes would be impossible to compile. However, Eisinger suggests the crucial point about the origin of such shifts: "protest signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also *in the political system itself*" (1973: 28; emphasis mine). The point is that *any* event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities. Among the events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes.

It is interesting to note that classical theorists have also described many of these same processes as productive of mass protest. In particular, industrialization and urbanization have been singled out as forces promoting the rise of social movements (Kornhauser, 1959: 143–58). The difference between the two models stems from the fact that classical theorists posit a radically different causal sequence linking these processes to insurgency than is proposed here. For classical theorists the relationship is direct, with industrialization/urbanization generating a level of strain sufficient to trigger social protest.²

In contrast, the political process model is based on the idea that social processes such as industrialization promote insurgency only indirectly through a restructuring of existing power relations. This difference also indexes a significant divergence between the two models in terms of the time span during which insurgency is held to develop. The classical sequence of disruption/strain depicts insurgency as a function of dramatic changes in the period immediately preceding movement emergence. By contrast, the perspective advanced here is based on the notion that social insurgency is shaped by broad social processes that usually operate over a longer period of time. As a consequence, the processes shaping insurgency are expected to be of a more cumulative, less dramatic nature than those identified by proponents of the classical model. The Tillys have nicely captured both these differences: "urbanization and industrialization . . . are by no means irrelevant to collective violence. It is just that their effects do not work as . . . [classical] theories say they should. Instead of a short-run generation of strain, followed by protest, we find a long-run transformation of the structures of power and of collective action" (C. Tilly, L. Tilly, R. Tilly, 1975: 254).

Regardless of the causes of expanded "political opportunities," such shifts can facilitate increased political activism on the part of excluded groups either by seriously undermining the stability of the entire political system or by increasing the political leverage of a single insurgent group. The significance of this distinction stems from the fact that the former pattern usually precipitates widespread political crisis while the latter does not.

Generalized political instability destroys any semblance of a political status quo, thus encouraging collective action by *all* groups sufficiently organized to contest the structuring of a new political order. The empirical literature offers numerous examples of this process. Shorter and Tilly, for example, marshal data to show that peaks in French strike activity correspond to periods in which organized contention for national political power is unusually intense. They note that "factory and white-collar workers undertook in 1968 the longest, largest general strike in history as student unrest reopened the question of who were to be the constituent political groups of the Fifth Republic" (Shorter and Tilly, 1974: 344). Similarly, Schwartz argues that a period of political instability preceded the rise of the Southern Farmers Alliance in the post-Civil War South. With the southern planter aristocracy and emerging industrial interests deadlocked in a struggle for political control of the region, a unique opportunity for political advancement was created for any group able to break the stalemate (Schwartz, 1976).

Such situations of generalized political instability can be contrasted to instances in which broad social processes favorably effect the opportunities for insurgent action of particular challengers. In such cases, long-term socioeconomic changes serve simply to elevate the group in question to a position of increased political strength without necessarily undermining the structural basis of the entire political establishment. The Jenkins-Perrow study cited earlier provides a good example of this latter process. In comparing the farm-worker movements of the 1940s and the 1960s, the authors attribute the success of the latter to "the altered political environment within which the challenge operated" (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977: 263). Moreover, this all-important alteration of the political environment originated, they contend, "in economic trends and political realignments that took place quite independent of any 'push' from insurgents" (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977: 266). Successful insurgency, the authors suggest, was born, not of widespread political instability, but of broad social processes that strengthened the political position of the challenging group. In Chapter 5, I will argue that a similar process facilitated the rise of black insurgency in the 1950s.

It remains only to identify the ways in which favorable shifts in the structure of political opportunities increase the likelihood of successful

insurgent action. Two major facilitative effects can be distinguished. Most fundamentally, such shifts improve the chances for successful social protest by reducing the power discrepancy between insurgent groups and their opponents. Regardless of whether the broad social processes productive of such shifts serve to undermine the structural basis of the entire political system or simply to enhance the strategic position of a single challenger, the result is the same: a net increase in the political leverage exercised by insurgent groups. The practical effect of this development is to increase the likelihood that insurgent interests will prevail in a confrontation with a group whose goals conflict with those of the insurgents. This does not, of course, mean that insurgent interests will inevitably be realized in all conflict situations. Even in the context of an improved bargaining position, insurgent groups are likely to be at a distinct disadvantage in any confrontation with an established polity member. What it does mean, however, is that the increased political strength of the aggrieved population has improved the bargaining position of insurgent groups and thus created new opportunities for the collective pursuit of group goals.

Second, an improved bargaining position for the aggrieved population raises significantly the costs of repressing insurgent action. Unlike before, when the powerless status of the excluded group meant that it could be repressed with relative impunity, now the increased political leverage exercised by the insurgent group renders it a more formidable opponent. Repression of the group involves a greater risk of political reprisals than before and is thus less likely to be attempted even in the face of an increased threat to member interests. For, as Gamson notes in summarizing the evidence from his survey of challenging groups, insurgents “are attacked not merely because they are regarded as threatening—all challenging groups are threatening to some vested interest. They are threatening *and* vulnerable” (1975: 82). To the extent, then, that shifting political conditions increase the power of insurgent groups, they also render them less vulnerable to attack by raising the costs of repression. Or to state the matter in terms of the insurgent group, increased political power serves to encourage collective action by diminishing the risks associated with movement participation.

Indigenous Organizational Strength

A conducive political environment only affords the aggrieved population the opportunity for successful insurgent action. It is the resources of the minority community that enable insurgent groups to exploit these opportunities. In the absence of those resources the aggrieved population is likely to lack the capacity to act even when granted the opportunity to do so. Here I am asserting the importance of what Katz and Gurin have

termed the “conversion potential” of the minority community (1969: 350). To generate a social movement, the aggrieved population must be able to “convert” a favorable “structure of political opportunities” into an organized campaign of social protest.

Conditioning this conversion is the extent of organization within the minority community. That indigenous structures frequently provide the organizational base out of which social movements emerge has been argued by a number of theorists. Oberschall, for instance, has proposed a theory of mobilization in which he assigns paramount importance to the degree of organization in the minority community. If no networks exist, he contends, the aggrieved population is capable of little more than “short-term, localized, ephemeral outbursts and movements of protest such as riots,” (Oberschall, 1973: 119). Likewise Freeman (1973, 1977b) stresses the importance of an established associational network in the generation of social insurgency. Echoing Oberschall, she argues convincingly that the ability of insurgents to generate a social movement is ultimately dependent on the presence of an indigenous “infrastructure” that can be used to link members of the aggrieved population into an organized campaign of mass political action.

I agree with the importance attributed to existent networks or organizations in these works. Specifically, the significance of such organizations would appear to be largely a function of four crucial resources they afford insurgents.

Members. If there is anything approximating a consistent finding in the empirical literature, it is that movement participants are recruited along established lines of interaction. This remains true in spite of the numerous attempts to explain participation on the basis of a variety of individual background or psychological variables.³ The explanation for this consistent finding would appear to be straightforward: the more integrated the person is into the minority community, the more readily he/she can be mobilized for participation in protest activities. The work of Gerlach and Hine supports this interpretation. They conclude, “no matter how a typical participant describes his reasons for joining the movement, or what motives may be suggested by a social scientist on the basis of deprivation, disorganization, or deviancy models, it is clear that the original decision to join required some contact with the movement” (Gerlach and Hine, 1970: 79). The significance of indigenous organizations—informal ones no less than formal—stems from the fact that they render this type of facilitative contact more likely, thus promoting member recruitment. This function can be illustrated by reference to two patterns of recruitment evident in empirical accounts of insurgency.

First, individuals can be recruited into the ranks of movement activists by virtue of their involvement in organizations that serve as the associational network out of which a new movement emerges. This was true, as Melder notes, in the case of the nineteenth-century women's rights movement, with a disproportionate number of the movement's recruits coming from existing abolitionist groups (1964). Curtis and Zurcher have observed a similar phenomenon in connection with the rise of two contemporary antipornography groups. In their study, the authors provide convincing data to support their contention that recruits were overwhelmingly drawn from the broad "multi-organizational fields" in which both groups were embedded (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973).

Second, indigenous organizations can serve as the primary source of movement participants through what Oberschall has termed "bloc recruitment" (1973: 125). In this pattern, movements do not so much emerge out of established organizations as they represent a merger of such groups. Hicks, for instance, has described how the Populist party was created through a coalition of established farmers' organizations (1961). The rapid rise of the free-speech movement at Berkeley has been attributed to a similar merger of existing campus organizations (Lipset and Wolin, 1965). Both of these patterns, then, highlight the indigenous organizational basis of much movement recruitment, and they support Oberschall's general conclusion: "mobilization does not occur through recruitment of large numbers of isolated and solitary individuals. It occurs as a result of recruiting blocs of people who are already highly organized and participants" (1973: 125).

Established Structure of Solidary Incentives. A second resource available to insurgents through the indigenous organizations of the minority community are the "established structures of solidary incentives" on which these organizations depend. By "structures of solidary incentives," I am simply referring to the myriad interpersonal rewards that provide the motive force for participation in these groups. It is the salience of these rewards that helps explain why recruitment through established organizations is generally so efficient. In effect, these established "incentive structures" solve the so-called "free-ride problem."

First discussed by Mancur Olson (1965), the "free-rider problem" refers to the difficulties insurgents encounter in trying to convince participants to pursue goals whose benefits they would derive even if they did not participate in the movement. The fact is, when viewed in the light of a narrow economic calculus, movement participation would indeed seem to be irrational. Even if we correct for Olson's overly rationalistic model of the individual, the "free rider" mentality would still seem to pose a formidable barrier to movement recruitment. The solution to this problem

is held to stem from the provision of selective incentives to induce the participation that individual calculation would alone seem to preclude (Gamson, 1975: 66–71; Olson, 1965).

In the context of existent organizations, however, the provision of selective incentives would seem unnecessary. These organizations already rest on a solid structure of solidary incentives which insurgents have, in effect, appropriated by defining movement participation as synonymous with organizational membership. Accordingly, the myriad of incentives that have heretofore served as the motive force for participation in the group are now simply transferred to the movement. Thus, insurgents have been spared the difficult task of inducing participation through the provision of new incentives of either a solidary or material nature.

Communication Network. The established organizations of the aggrieved population also constitute a communication network or infrastructure, the strength and breadth of which largely determine the pattern, speed, and extent of movement expansion. Both the failure of a new movement to take hold and the rapid spread of insurgent action have been credited to the presence or absence of such an infrastructure. Freeman has argued that it was the recent development of such a network that enabled women in the 1960s to create a successful feminist movement where they had earlier been unable to do so:

The development of the women's liberation movement highlights the salience of such a network precisely because the conditions for a movement existed *before* a network came into being, but the movement didn't exist until afterward. Socioeconomic strain did not change for women significantly during a 20-year period. It was as great in 1955 as in 1965. What changed was the organizational situation. It was not until a communications network developed among like-minded people beyond local boundaries that the movement could emerge and develop past the point of occasional, spontaneous uprising (Freeman, 1973: 804).

Conversely, Jackson et al. (1960), document a case in which the absence of a readily co-optable communication network contributed to "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement." The movement, an attempted property tax revolt in California, failed, according to the authors, because "there was no . . . preestablished network of communication which could be quickly employed to link the suburban residential property owners who constituted the principal base for the movement" (Jackson et al., 1960: 38).⁴

These findings are consistent with the empirical thrust of studies of cultural diffusion, a body of literature that has unfortunately been largely overlooked by movement analysts despite its relevance to the topic.⁵ To

my knowledge, only Maurice Pinard (1971: 186–87), has explicitly applied the empirical insights of this literature to the study of social movements. He summarizes the central tenet of diffusion theory as follows: “the higher the degree of social integration of potential adopters, the more likely and the sooner they will become actual adopters . . . on the other hand, near-isolates tend to be the last to adopt an innovation” (1971: 187). The applicability of this idea to the study of social insurgency stems from recognition of the fact that a social movement is, after all, a new cultural item subject to the same pattern of diffusion or adoption as other innovations. Indeed, without acknowledging the theoretical basis of his insight, Oberschall has hypothesized for movements the identical pattern of diffusion noted earlier by Pinard: “the greater the number and variety of organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does mobilization into conflict groups occur” (Oberschall, 1973: 125).

Oberschall’s statement has brought us full circle. Our brief foray into the diffusion literature only serves to amplify the basic argument by placing it in a theoretical context that helps explain the importance of associational networks in the generation of insurgency. The interorganizational linkages characteristic of established groups facilitate movement emergence by providing the means of communication by which the movement, as a new cultural item, can be disseminated throughout the aggrieved population.

Leaders. All manner of movement analysts have asserted the importance of leaders or organizers in the generation of social insurgency. To do so requires not so much a particular theoretical orientation as common sense. For in the context of political opportunity and widespread discontent there still remains a need for the centralized direction and coordination of a recognized leadership.

The existence of established organizations within the movement’s mass base insures the presence of recognized leaders who can be called upon to lend their prestige and organizing skills to the incipient movement. Indeed, given the pattern of diffusion discussed in the previous section, it may well be that established leaders are among the first to join a new movement by virtue of their central position within the community. There is, in fact, some empirical evidence to support this. To cite only one example, Lipset, in his study of the Socialist C.C.F. party, reports that “in Saskatchewan it was the local leaders of the Wheat Pool, of the trade-unions, who were the first to join the C.C.F.” His interpretation of the finding is that “those who are most thoroughly integrated in the class through formal organizations are the first to change” (1950: 197). Regardless of the timing of their recruitment, the existence of recognized

leaders is yet another resource whose availability is conditioned by the degree of organization within the aggrieved population.

Existent organizations of the minority community, then, are the primary source of resources facilitating movement emergence. These groups constitute the organizational context in which insurgency is expected to develop. As such, their presence is as crucial to the process of movement emergence as a conducive political environment. Indeed, in the absence of this supportive organizational context, the aggrieved population is likely to be deprived of the capacity for collective action even when confronted with a favorable structure of political opportunities. If one lacks the capacity to act, it hardly matters that one is afforded the chance to do so.

Cognitive Liberation

While important, expanding political opportunities and indigenous organizations do not, in any simple sense, produce a social movement. In the absence of one other crucial process these two factors remain necessary, but insufficient, causes of insurgency. Together they only offer insurgents a certain objective "structural potential" for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations. This crucial attribution process has been ignored by proponents of both the classical and resource mobilization perspectives. As Edelman has pointed out: "our explanations of mass political response have radically undervalued the ability of the human mind . . . to take a complex set of . . . cues into account [and] evolve a mutually acceptable form of response" (1971: 133). This process must occur if an organized protest campaign is to take place. One of the central problematics of insurgency, then, is whether favorable shifts in political opportunities will be defined as such by a large enough group of people to facilitate collective protest. This process, however, is not independent of the two factors discussed previously. Indeed, one effect of improved political conditions and existent organizations is to render this process of "cognitive liberation" more likely. I will explore the relationship between this process and each of these factors separately.

As noted earlier, favorable shifts in political opportunities decrease the power disparity between insurgents and their opponents and, in doing so, increase the cost of repressing the movement. These are objective structural changes. However, such shifts have a subjective referent as well. That is, challengers experience shifting political conditions on a day-to-day basis as a set of "meaningful" events communicating much about their prospects for successful collective action.

Sometimes the political significance of events is apparent on their face as when mass migration significantly alters the electoral composition of

a region. Thus, as early as the mid-1930s black leaders began to use the fact of rapidly swelling black populations in key northern industrial states as bargaining leverage in their dealings with presidential candidates (Sitkoff, 1978: 283). However, even when evolving political realities are of a less dramatic nature, they will invariably be made “available” to insurgents through subtle cues communicated by other groups. The expectation is that as conditions shift in favor of a particular challenger members will display a certain increased symbolic responsiveness to insurgents. Thus, in a tight labor market we might expect management to be more responsive to workers than they had previously been. Or, as regards the earlier example, should internal migration significantly increase the proportion of a certain population residing in a region, we could expect area politicians to be more symbolically attentive to that group than before.

As subtle and substantively meaningless as these altered responses may be, their significance for the generation of insurgency would be hard to overstate. As Edelman notes, “political actions chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting or withholding their stable substantive demands, but rather by changing the demands and the expectations” (1971: 7). In effect, the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of “cognitive cues” signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge. Thus, by forcing a change in the symbolic content of member/challenger relations, shifting political conditions supply a crucial impetus to the process of cognitive liberation.

The existent organizations of the minority community also figure prominently in the development of this insurgent consciousness, lending added significance to their role in the generation of insurgency. Earlier the relevance of the diffusion literature for the study of social movements was noted. Based on the main finding derived from that literature, the argument was advanced that the importance of indigenous organizations stemmed, in part, from the fact that they afforded insurgents an established interaction network insuring the rapid and thorough diffusion of social insurgency throughout the minority community. But that insight can now be extended even further. It is not simply the extent and speed with which insurgency is spread but the very cognitions on which it depends that are conditioned by the strength of integrative ties within the movement’s mass base. As summarized by Piven and Cloward, these “necessary cognitions” are threefold:

The emergence of a protest movement entails a transformation both of consciousness and of behavior. The change in consciousness has at least three distinct aspects. First, “the system”—or those aspects of the system that people experience and perceive—loses legitimacy.


Large numbers of men and women who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements come to believe in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are unjust and wrong. Second, people who are ordinarily fatalistic, who believe that existing arrangements are inevitable, begin to assert "rights" that imply demands for change. Third, there is a new sense of efficacy; people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot (Piven and Cloward, 1979: 3-4).

It is important to recognize, however, that these cognitions "are overwhelmingly not based upon observation or empirical evidence available to participants, but rather upon cuings among groups of people who jointly create the meanings they will read into current and anticipated events" (Edelman, 1971: 32). The key phrase here is "groups of people." That is, the process of cognitive liberation is held to be both more likely and of far greater consequence under conditions of strong rather than weak social integration. The latter point should be intuitively apparent. Even in the unlikely event that these necessary cognitions were to develop under conditions of weak social integration, the absence of integrative links would almost surely prevent their spread to the minimum number of people required to afford a reasonable basis for successful collective action. More to the point, perhaps, is the suspicion that under such conditions these cognitions would never arise in the first place. The consistent finding linking feelings of political efficacy to social integration supports this judgment (Neal and Seeman, 1964; Pinard, 1971; Sayre, 1980). In the absence of strong interpersonal links to others, people are likely to feel powerless to change conditions even if they perceive present conditions as favorable to such efforts.

To this finding one might add the educated supposition that what Ross (1977) calls the "fundamental attribution error"—the tendency of people to explain their situation as a function of individual rather than situational factors—is more likely to occur under conditions of personal isolation than under those of integration. Lacking the information and perspective that others afford, isolated individuals would seem especially prone to explain their troubles on the basis of personal rather than "system attributions" (Ferree and Miller, 1977: 33).

The practical significance of this distinction comes from the fact that only system attributions afford the necessary rationale for movement activity. For movement analysts, then, the key question becomes, What social circumstances are productive of "system attributions"? If we follow Ferree and Miller, the likely answer is that the chances "of a system attribution would appear to be greatest among extremely homogeneous people who are in intense regular contact with each other" (1977: 34).

Figure 3.1 A Political Process Model of Movement Emergence



This point serves to underscore the central thrust of the argument: the significance of existent organizations for the process of movement emergence stems from the expectation that cognitive liberation is most likely to take place within established interpersonal networks.

To summarize, movement emergence implies a transformation of consciousness within a significant segment of the aggrieved population. Before collective protest can get under way, people must collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action. The likelihood of this necessary transformation occurring is conditioned, in large measure, by the two facilitating conditions discussed previously. Shifting political conditions supply the necessary “cognitive cues” capable of triggering the process of cognitive liberation while existent organizations afford insurgents the stable group-settings within which that process is most likely to occur.

It is now possible to outline in broader fashion the alternative model of movement emergence proposed here. That model is shown in figure 3.1. As the figure shows, the generation of insurgency is expected to reflect the favorable confluence of three sets of factors. Expanding political opportunities combine with the indigenous organizations of the minority community to afford insurgents the “structural potential” for successful collective action. That potential is, in turn, transformed into actual insurgency by means of the crucial intervening process of cognitive liberation. All three factors, then, are regarded as necessary, but insufficient, causes of social insurgency.

THE DEVELOPMENT/DECLINE OF SOCIAL INSURGENCY

The generation of social insurgency presupposes the existence of a political environment increasingly vulnerable to pressure from insurgents. Specific events and/or broad social processes enhance the bargaining po-


sition of the aggrieved population, even as insurgent groups mobilize to exploit the expanding opportunities for collective action. Over time the survival of a social movement requires that insurgents be able to maintain and successfully utilize their newly acquired political leverage to advance collective interests. If they are able to do so, the movement is likely to survive. If, on the other hand, insurgent groups fail to maintain a favorable bargaining position vis-à-vis other groups in the political arena, the movement faces extinction. In short, the ongoing exercise of significant political leverage remains the key to the successful development of the movement.

What is missing from the above discussion is any acknowledgment of the enormous obstacles insurgents must overcome if they are to succeed in this effort. This is not to say that social movements are doomed from the outset or that they are an ineffective form of political action. History contradicts both notions. Just the same, the fortuitous combination of factors productive of insurgency is expected to be short-lived. Even as insurgents exploit the opportunities this confluence of factors affords them, the movement sets in motion processes that are likely, over time, to create a set of contradictory demands destructive of insurgency. Of principal importance in this regard are two dilemmas on whose horns many movements seem to have been caught. (After a brief review of the factors shaping the ongoing development of insurgency, I will address these dilemmas.)

Conditioning the development of the movement over time is the same mix of internal and external factors that shaped the generation of insurgency. Indeed, with a few important modifications, the general causal model outlined in the previous section affords a useful framework for analyzing the ongoing development of insurgency. These modifications are reflected in figure 3.2.

Perhaps the most significant change evident in figure 3.2 is the emergence of the movement as an independent force shaping its own devel-

Figure 3.2 A Political Process Model of Movement Development/Decline



opment. In analyzing the generation of insurgency, one considers the movement only as the end product of a specified causal sequence. Once under way, however, the pace and character of insurgency come to exercise a powerful influence on the development of the movement through the effect they have on the other factors depicted in figure 3.2. For example, the opportunities for insurgency are no longer independent of the actions of insurgent groups. Now the structure of political alignments shifts in response to movement activity, even as those shifts shape the prospects for future insurgency.

Much the same dynamic is evident in regard to the relationship between organizational strength and insurgency, with the pace, character, and outcome of collective protest shaping the availability of those organizational resources on which further movement activity depends. Reciprocal relationships also hold in the case of insurgency and the other two factors shown in figure 3.2. With the outbreak of insurgency, then, the movement itself introduces a new set of causal dynamics into the study of collective protest activity that are discontinuous with the process of movement emergence.

At the same time, however, there is a basic continuity between the generation and ongoing development of insurgency. The reader will note that all three factors discussed earlier in connection with the generation of insurgency are included in figure 3.2 as well. To these three factors I now add a fourth: the shifting control response of other groups to the insurgent challenge posed by the movement.

Little needs to be said about two of the original factors. It is enough simply to note that "the structure of political opportunities" and the process of "collective attribution" are expected to influence the development of the movement in much the same ways as they did in the generation of insurgency. The former conditions the ongoing vulnerability of the political system to pressure from the movement, while the latter determines the extent to which insurgents continue to share the particular mix of cognitions needed to sustain insurgency. As explained earlier, these cognitions involve the perception that conditions are unjust yet subject to change through group efforts.

The remaining two factors require more explanation. Though discussed earlier, the determinants of "organizational strength" are expected to shift, following the generation of insurgency, in accordance with an anticipated transformation of the movement's organizational structure. For that reason, the factor will be discussed anew. Finally, as the only factor set in motion by the emergence of the movement, "level of social control" merits attention if only because it has not been discussed previously. The importance of these remaining factors also results from their relationship to the two critical dilemmas alluded to above. That is, both factors index

a set of cross-cutting pressures that must be carefully negotiated if the movement is to survive. In discussing these factors, then, I will not only be analyzing the ongoing process of movement development but also emphasizing the difficulties inherent in sustaining any insurgent challenge.

Sustaining Organizational Strength

Although social insurgency is expected to develop out of the established organizations of the aggrieved population, the movement cannot rely on such groups to sustain an ongoing protest campaign. It must be remembered that these organizations were not intended to serve as insurgent vehicles in the first place. Indeed, more often than not, the actual leadership of the burgeoning movement is supplied by ad hoc committees and loosely structured working coalitions with ill-defined and often indirect connections to these established organizations. The latter may function as sources of support and resources vital to the generation of insurgency but rarely as protest organizations per se.

For the movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring organizational structure to sustain insurgency. Efforts to do so usually entail the creation of formally constituted organizations to assume the centralized direction of the movement previously exercised by informal groups. This transfer of power can only occur, however, if the resources needed to fuel the development of the movement's formal organizational structure can be mobilized. Accordingly, insurgent groups must be able to exploit the initial successes of the movement to mobilize those resources needed to facilitate the development of the more permanent organizational structure required to sustain insurgency. Failing this, movements are likely to die aborning as the loosely structured groups previously guiding the protest campaign disband or gradually lapse into inactivity.

This view is obviously at odds with Piven and Cloward's contention that organization is antithetical to movement success (1979: xxi-xxii). The authors base their pessimistic conclusion on a view that equates the development of movement organization with certain processes destructive of insurgency. The problem with their conclusion is in the inevitability they ascribe to these processes.

If Piven and Cloward overstate the negative effects of organization on insurgency, theirs is nonetheless an important thesis that indexes a major dilemma confronting movements. Without the minimal coordination and direction that organizations (informal no less than formal) afford, insurgency is nearly impossible. This is true even in the case of the most disruptive forms of insurgency (riots, strikes, etc.) as the work of the Tillys and others makes clear (Feagin and Hahn, 1973: 48-49; C. Tilly, L. Tilly, R. Tilly, 1975). At the same time, the establishment of formal

movement organizations does have the potential to set in motion any one (or some combination) of three processes ultimately destructive of the effectiveness of the movement as a social change vehicle.

The first process is that of oligarchization. One need not accede to the rigidity of the Weber-Michels view of this process to acknowledge the potential danger it poses.⁶ Quite simply, the establishment of formal movement organizations *may* create a certain class of individuals who come to value the maintenance of that organization over the realization of movement goals. In such cases, the insurgent potential of the movement is sacrificed to insure the survival of its organizational offshoot.

The creation of formal movement organizations also increases the likelihood of a second danger: co-optation. Having mobilized the resource support needed to create a formal organizational structure, insurgents still face the challenge of sustaining that structure over time. In this effort the resources of the movement's mass base are likely to be found wanting. The more impoverished the aggrieved population, the more likely this will be the case. In such instances, supplementary support must be drawn from outside sources. The establishment of external support linkages, however, grants considerable control over movement affairs to the source from which the resources are obtained. Of course, the control embodied in these support linkages need not be exercised in any particular case. If the movement organization uses the resource(s) in a manner consistent with the interests and goals of its sponsor(s), then support is likely to continue without interruption. Therein lies the dilemma. Owing to the impoverished state of the mass base, insurgents are likely to experience grave difficulties in trying to sustain insurgency solely on the basis of the limited resources of the movement's "beneficiary constituents." On the other hand, the establishment of external support linkages threatens to tame the movement by encouraging insurgents to pursue only those goals acceptable to external sponsors. The latter course of action may insure the survival of the movement—or at least of its organizational offshoots—but only at the cost of reducing its effectiveness as a force for social change.

The final danger inherent in the creation of formal movement organizations is the dissolution of indigenous support. What amounts to a virtually inevitable by-product of the establishment of external support links, this process has been largely ignored by movement analysts. The dynamic is simple. As insurgents increasingly seek to cultivate ties to outside groups, their indigenous links are likely to grow weaker. The potential negative consequences of this process are threefold. First, it may encourage oligarchization as movement leaders are increasingly insulated from the indigenous pressures that would tend to insure their responsiveness to the original goals of the movement. Second, the process in-

creases the movement's dependence on external sources of support, thus rendering co-optation more likely. Third, and most important, the weakening of indigenous ties deprives the movement of the "established structures of solidary incentives" that earlier supplied the motive force for movement participation. Insurgents now face the difficult task of inducing participation through the provision of the sort of selective incentives that have been shown to correlate with movement success (Gamson, 1975: 66-71).

To summarize, sustained insurgency depends, in part, on the level of organizational resources that movement forces are able to maintain over time. Efforts to insure a routinized flow of resources usually lead to the establishment of formal organizations to supplant the indigenous groups out of which the movement emerged. Although necessary, if the movement is to attain a degree of permanence, this transformation is nonetheless likely to set in motion several processes ultimately destructive of insurgency. Specifically, the creation of formal organizations renders the movement increasingly vulnerable to the destructive forces of oligarchization, co-optation, and the dissolution of indigenous support. Should insurgents manage somehow to avoid these dangers while maintaining an adequate flow of resources the movement is likely to endure. However, the long list of movements that have failed to negotiate these obstacles attests to the difficulties inherent in the effort.

The Social Control Response to Insurgency

The identification of this response as a crucial factor affecting movement development only serves to reemphasize the reciprocal relationship that exists between the movement and its external environment. If the likelihood of movement emergence is partly conditioned by shifting political conditions, the movement itself introduces new pressures for change into the political system. Other organized groups are expected to respond to these pressures in a fashion consistent with their own interests. Over time, the development of insurgency is expected to be profoundly affected by these responses.

Two factors are of principal importance in shaping these responses. The first is the strength of insurgent forces. In different ways, both Gamson and Tilly have argued as much in asserting that weakness encourages repression (Gamson, 1975: 81-82; Tilly, 1978: 111-15). When one reflects on it, the proposition, although not completely intuitive, makes sense. Quite simply, both the costs and risks involved in repressing a weak target are minimal when compared with those associated with the repression of a powerful opponent. Quite apart from the degree of threat each poses, the latter must be handled with greater caution because of the potentially graver repercussions associated with an unsuccessful attempt at repres-

sion. In part, then, the strength of insurgent forces conditions the responses of other groups to the movement by determining the costs associated with various alternative control strategies.

The second factor affecting the response of other parties to insurgency is the degree to which the movement poses a threat or an opportunity to other groups in terms of the realization of the latter's interests. In this regard, most movements confront an elite divided in its reaction to the insurgent challenge. Some components of the elite usually perceive the movement as a threat and seek through their actions to neutralize or destroy it. Others see in it an opportunity to advance their interests and thus extend cautious support to insurgents. Still others perceive their interests as little affected by the challenge and remain uninvolved. The mix of these three responses determines, for any particular movement, the relative balance of supporting and opposing forces it must confront at any given point in time. To oversimplify matters a bit, if the movement is to survive, it must retain (in consort with its allies) sufficient strength to withstand the control responses of the opposition.

What is absent in the above discussion is the element of time. The point to be made is that the level of threat or opportunity embodied in a movement is not constant over time. Not only are the interests of elite groups likely to change, but so are important characteristics of the insurgent challenge itself. Specifically, it is the goals and tactics of insurgents that are of crucial importance, since together they largely define the degree of threat/opportunity posed by the movement.

Tactics. The myriad tactics available to insurgents communicate varying degrees of threat to other organized groups in the political environment. The key distinction is between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized tactics. Even if used to pursue "radical" goals, the former implicitly convey an acceptance of the established, or "proper," channels of conflict resolution. Such tactics are, thus, viewed as nonthreatening by elite groups, both because they leave unchallenged the structural underpinnings of the political system and because it is within these "proper" channels that the power disparity between members and challengers is greatest.

Reliance on noninstitutionalized tactics represents the converse of the above situation and, as such, poses a distinct challenge to elite groups for at least two reasons. At a symbolic level, it communicates a fundamental rejection of the established institutional mechanisms for seeking redress of group grievances; substantively, it deprives elite groups of their recourse to institutional power. For both these reasons, elite groups are likely to view noninstitutionalized tactics as a threat to their interests. Thus, any significant shift in tactics on the part of insurgents will generally

condition a commensurate shift in the response of elite groups to the movement. A greater reliance on noninstitutionalized forms of protest is likely to broaden opposition to the movement while decreased use of such tactics will usually diminish the intensity of movement opposition.

Goals. Much the same dynamic applies to the goals of the movement. That is, substantive shifts in the goals embraced by insurgents profoundly effect the response of elite groups to the movement. The central distinction here is between those goals that embody a fundamental challenge to the existing political and economic structures of society (revolutionary goals) and those that merely call for piecemeal reform of those structures (reform goals). By virtue of their narrow focus, *reform* goals stand to engender the opposition of only those few elite groups whose interests are directly effected by the proposed changes. Moreover, such goals usually facilitate the mobilization of limited support from those components of the elite who stand to benefit either from the reforms themselves or from the defeat they would spell for their opponents. Thus, reform movements are frequently aided in their efforts by their ability to exploit existing divisions among the elite.

Truly *revolutionary* goals, on the other hand, are rarely the object of divided elite response. Rather, movements that emphasize such goals usually mobilize a united elite opposition whose minor conflicts of interest are temporarily tabled in deference to the central threat confronting the system as a whole. In terms of this discussion, then, shifts from reform to revolutionary goals will almost surely be accompanied by an intensification of movement opposition while a change in the reverse direction will usually diminish the strength of opposition forces.⁷

This indicates a second critical dilemma confronting insurgents. Although recourse to institutionalized tactics and moderate goals is likely to diminish opposition to the movement, it will just as surely reduce the overall impact of the movement. Indeed, with respect to tactics, it was their fundamental powerlessness *within* institutionalized channels that led insurgents to abandon "proper channels" in the first place. Accordingly, insurgents must chart a course that avoids crippling repression on the one hand and tactical impotence on the other. Staking out this optimal middle ground is exceedingly difficult. Yet failure to do so almost surely spells the demise of the movement.

SUMMARY

The political process model represents an alternative to both the classical and resource mobilization perspectives. Rather than focusing exclusive attention on factors internal or external to the movement, the model

describes insurgency as a product of both. Specifically, three sets of factors are identified as shaping the generation of insurgency. It is the confluence of expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and the presence of certain shared cognitions within the minority community that is held to facilitate movement emergence. Over time these factors continue to shape the development of insurgency in combination with a fourth factor: the shifting control response of other groups to the movement.

at clarification is, I think the retention of the resource mobilization label will only serve to confuse the issue further by suggesting a degree of theoretical compatibility that, in fact, is lacking in the two versions of the model he outlines. The basic distinction between these two theoretical perspectives is, however, sound and is evident in this work. That is, many of the ideas of the theorists that Perrow groups under the heading of RM I have been incorporated into the alternative “political process” model of insurgency outlined in the next chapter. What is more, the critique of resource mobilization offered in this chapter is aimed at a version of the mobilization model that roughly corresponds to what Perrow has termed RM II.

3. While not himself a proponent of the resource mobilization model, Michael Schwartz has perhaps most succinctly summarized the “rationalist” view of movement participation when he writes that “people who join protest organizations are at least as rational as those who study them” (1976: 135). More generally, Schwartz’s discussion of the rationality/irrationality issue, with respect to movement participation, is as thorough and useful a one as can be found in the literature (1976: 135–45).

4. For several general discussions of the exchange perspective, see Blau (1964); Eisenstadt (1965: 22–49); and Gouldner (1960).

5. Though not specifically concerned with movement organizations, numerous studies have stressed the importance of interorganizational linkages as a means of obtaining resources. For examples of such studies see Esman and Blaise (1966); Levine and White (1961); and Zald (1969).

6. Recent theoretical developments in social psychology have rendered any straightforward link between conditions and behavior increasingly problematic. In place of theories based on unconscious drives and the various mechanistic reinforcement models that for so long dominated the field, social psychologists are beginning to stress the analytic utility of cognitive models that depict the individual as an active participant in the “meaning making” process that continually shapes his or her behavior (see Neisser, 1967).

CHAPTER 3

1. Besides the Rule-Tilly piece, other writings by political theorists have had considerable influence in shaping the perspective outlined here. Indeed, a rapidly growing body of literature on social movements has emerged in recent years and precipitated something of a conceptual revolution in the field. The political process model draws heavily on that literature, even as it reflects a critical stance toward much that has been written. Of those contributing to the literature, the following theorists have advanced specific insights that have been incorporated into the model proposed here: Aveni (1977); Edelman (1971); Ferree and Miller (1977); Freeman (1973); Gamson (1975); Gerlach and Hine (1970); Jenkins (1981); Jenkins and Perrow (1977); Marx (1976); McCarthy and Zald (1973); Oberschall (1973); Pinard (1971); Piven and Cloward (1979); Schwartz (1976); and Wilson and Orum (1976).

2. Even such perceptive analysts as Piven and Cloward seem to echo this line of argument. They assert, for instance, “that it not only requires a major social dislocation before protest can emerge, but that a sequence or combination of dislocations probably must occur before the anger that underlies protest builds to a high pitch, and before that anger can find expression in collective defiance” (Piven and Cloward, 1979: 8). Consistent with the classical model, the image is that of disruptive social change, triggering a rise in aggregate discontent which eventually erupts into collective protest. For reasons noted in Chapter 2, this causal sequence remains problematic.

3. Indeed, the search for micro-level correlates of individual participation has frequently provided evidence of the central importance of existent associational networks. Orum, in his analysis of protest participation among black college students, compared nonparticipants

and participants on a number of background variables such as family income, father's education, incidence of parental desertion, and size of place of residence. In general, the variables tested failed to produce any significant association with protest participation. There was, however, one exception. The variable that best distinguished participants from non-participants was simply the student's integration into the campus community, as measured by number of memberships in campus organizations (Orum, 1972: 27–50).

4. Judging from the passage of Proposition 13 in California we can be reasonably sure that the lack of a "pre-established communication network" was remedied in the twenty-odd years that intervened between the earlier tax revolt and the successful 1978 version.

5. For a general review or introduction to the literature on cultural diffusion, see Brown (1981), Lionberger (1960), or Rogers (1962).

6. Zald and Ash (1970) were but the first to challenge the inevitability ascribed to the process by Weber and Michels (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 297–301; Michels, 1959). Moreover, there now exists impressive empirical evidence supportive of the facilitating, rather than retardant, effect of organization on insurgency (Gamson, 1975: esp. chap. 7; C. Tilly, L. Tilly, and R. Tilly, 1975). Accordingly, current research in the field has shifted from describing the process of oligarchization to specifying the conditions under which movement organizations can be expected to develop in conservative or radical ways (Beach, 1977; Gillespie, 1980).

7. These observations are not made to suggest that insurgent groups should avoid goals and tactics that are likely to be seen by the political establishment as threatening. Indeed, my earlier assertion that the strength of insurgent forces is also a determinant of other groups' responses to the movement carries with it the implicit suggestion that insurgents can pursue any goal or tactic so long as they maintain the strength needed to withstand the social control response these choices produce. Instead, my aim has simply been to discuss the relationship between these various choices and the level of movement opposition they engender. The key point is that movement groups largely determine, by means of the goals and tactics they adopt, the level of opposition they must confront. As Schwartz notes, "in choosing movement activities, a protest group can attain a degree of control over who the opposition will be, and to what degree it will be mobilized" (1976: 162). It therefore behooves insurgents to base their choice of tactics and goals on some realistic assessment of their strength. If they are to survive, movement groups must avoid mobilizing an opposition that is capable of successfully repressing the movement.

CHAPTER 5

1. Actually the compromise is more accurately viewed as a symbol of the close of Reconstruction rather than an absolute return to regional rule on racial issues. Exclusive southern dominance over the "Negro question" was only truly achieved in the period from 1896 to 1932. The years 1876–96 are more properly seen as a crucial transition period in which the foundations of the South's later hegemony on racial matters were laid (Hirshson, 1962). In this view, the Compromise of 1876 merely demarcates the beginning of this transition period.

2. In fact, insofar as planters no longer had to maintain a slave population, it could be argued that their actual capital outlay was less under the tenant system than under slavery.

3. Nor did the antipathy of the northern industrial elite to the "war issues" diminish with the reestablishment of economic stability. Rather, most industrialists retained, throughout the period, their aversion to such issues, fearing a reoccurrence of sectional strife and the economic disruption characteristic of Reconstruction. As a consequence, the dominant segment of the industrial elite consistently opposed any program designed to benefit southern blacks. The following statement from an 1879 *New York Journal of Commerce* story ex-