Transnational Protest and Global Activism

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Transnational Processes and Social Activism: An Introduction

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Modern social movements developed with the creation of the nation-state, and the nation-state has for many years been the main target for protest. Although social movements have often pushed for a conception of "direct" democracy, the institutions and actors of representative democracy have long structured movements' political opportunities and constraints within the boundaries of institutional politics. In fact, for most of the history of the modern national state, political parties were the main actors in democratic representation, linking the formation of collective identities with representative institutions. But at the turn of the millennium, nation-states face a host of new challenges:

- From without, there is the contemporary challenge of terrorism and the rejection of pluralistic and secular government on the part of broad sectors of the world's population;
- from within, there is both widespread disaffection from conventional forms of politics and disillusionment with the active state;
- linking these internal and external challenges are the uncertainties of new forms of internationalization and globalization that connect citizens to a global market but reduce their control over their own fates.

Although the power of the nation-state has by no means disappeared, since the 1960s, social, cultural, and geopolitical changes have begun to transform social movements' institutional and cultural environments. In particular, there has been a shift in the locus of political power—a shift symbolized by the growing use of concepts like "multilevel governance,"

"the world polity," and "global civil society," which point to the following internal and external developments. *Internally*, there has been a continuing shift in power from parliaments to the executive, and, within the executive, to the bureaucracy and to quasi-independent agencies. Power has moved from mass-parties to parties that have been variously defined as "catchall," "professional-electoral," or "cartel" parties (for a review, see della Porta, 2001), and therefore from party activists to the "new party professionals." *Externally*, there has been a shift in the locus of institutional power from the national to both the supranational and the regional levels, with the increasing power of international institutions, especially economic ones (World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Trade Organization [WTO]), and some regional ones (in Europe, the European Union [EU]; in the Western hemisphere, the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]).

Meanwhile, informal networks have spread across borders (such as international agreements on standards; nongovernmental organization [NGO] coalitions in the areas of human rights, the environment, and peace; and, in a darker vein, drug and human trafficking networks). Many see a shift in the axis of power from politics to the market, with neoliberal economic policies increasing the power of multinational corporations and reducing the capacity of traditional state structures to control them. Taken together, these changes have led to the development of a system of "complex internationalism," which provides both threats and opportunities to ordinary people, to organized nonstate actors, and to weaker states, as we shall argue in our conclusions.

How are social movements reacting to these power shifts in terms of their organizational structures, their collective action frames and identities, and their repertoires of action? At first, scholars assumed that international movements would be similar to those that had developed within the nation-state. More recently, a growing stream of research on social movements has identified three important processes of transnationalization: diffusion, domestication, and externalization. By *diffusion*, we mean the spread of movement ideas, practices, and frames from one country to another; by *domestication*, we mean the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally; and by *externalization*, we mean the challenge to supranational institutions to intervene in domestic problems or conflicts.

These processes are all important and appear to be widespread. However, the recent evolution of movements focusing on "global justice," peace and war, or both, suggests some additional processes. The most important of these, and the one that emerges most clearly from the chapters in this book, is what we call "transnational collective action"—that is, *coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against*

international actors, other states, or international institutions. In the first section of this introduction, we will rapidly survey findings on the three better-known processes of diffusion, domestication, and externalization. In the second section, we will try to specify how the process of transnational collective action has developed in recent years. In the third section, we will suggest some hypotheses about its forms and dynamics. In the fourth section, we will summarize the contributions to the volume.

DIFFUSION, DOMESTICATION, AND EXTERNALIZATION

Three broad processes link transnational politics today to the traditions of social movement studies in the past and lay the groundwork for the major changes that we see occurring in the contemporary world.

Diffusion

Diffusion is the most familiar and the oldest form of transnational contention. It need not involve connections across borders, but only that challengers in one country or region adopt or adapt the organizational forms, collective action frames, or targets of those in other countries or regions. Thus, the "shantytown" protests that were used to demand American universities' divestiture from South Africa were a domestic example of diffusion (Soule, 1999), while the spread of the "sit-in" from the American civil rights movement to Western Europe was a transnational one (Tarrow, 1989). Research on protest in Belgium, France, and Germany has also indicated the existence of important cross-national diffusion effects (Reising, 1999:333).

A variant on diffusion is what Tarrow and McAdam, in chapter 6, call "brokerage," through which groups or individuals deliberately connect actors from different sites of contention. This process was evident as early as the spread of the antislavery movement from England to the European continent in the late eighteenth century (Drescher, 1987) and, in more recent history, in the transfer of the American student movement's themes and practices to West Germany, through students who had studied in the United States in the 1960s (McAdam and Rucht, 1993). In their contribution, Tarrow and McAdam identify the brokerage elements that built the Zapatista solidarity network around the world after the Chiapas rebellion of 1994.

One of the factors that characterizes the new international system is the greater ease with which particular practices or frames can be transferred from one country to another through cheap international travel, the

knowledge of common languages, and access to the Internet (Bennett, 2003, and chapter 9 in this volume). But underlying these advantages lies a disadvantage. Every new form of communication both heightens ties between those who already know one another, and raises the walls of exclusion for those lacking access to the new medium of communication (Tilly, 2004). Not only that: although it is undoubtedly easier and faster for information about protest to be communicated across national lines today than it was fifty years ago, the Internet also creates the risk of diffuseness, as those with Internet skills learn to mount their own websites and set themselves up as movement entrepreneurs. In general, research indicates that sustained diffusion processes both require and help to produce transnational networks and identities, to which we will turn in the next section.

Internalization

By internalization, we mean the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally. Previous research on protest events, collected mainly from newspaper sources from Western Europe, stressed the small number of protests that target international institutions directly. A good part of this research focused on the EU. Using Reuters World News Service and the Reuters Textline, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001; also see 1999) found a limited (but growing) number of such protests. Similarly, in Germany, Dieter Rucht (2002a) observed a low (and declining) proportion of protests aimed at the international level (with the high point coming in 1960–1964) or at EU institutions. Meanwhile, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy (2002) noted how rarely protests on migrant rights targeted the EU, notwithstanding the increasing Europeanization of legal competences regarding border control. Even environmental action was rarely turned on Brussels: protests with EU targets ranged from 0.8 percent in Italy to 4.6 percent in Germany in the last decade, with no discernible increasing trend (Rootes, 2002). Similarly, few protest events have addressed international organizations other than the EU.

Protest events analysis, however, indicated that protest often addressed national governments regarding decisions that originated or were implemented at a supranational level. In their analysis of protest in Europe, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001) found that most EU related events (406 out of 490) were in fact cases of domestication—that is, conflict about EU decisions, but mounted at the national level. And processes of domestication in fact characterized many mobilizations of European farmers (Bush and Simi, 2001). Outside of Europe, as well, many important mobilizations against international institutions followed a similar dynamic. The anti-IMF "austerity protests" of the 1980s took a largely domesti-

cated form (Walton, 2001). Recent Argentine protests were similarly triggered by the pressure of international financial institutions but directed against domestic institutions (Auyero, 2003).

The low level of protest targeting the supranational level might be explained by the political opportunities available to collective actors at other territorial levels of government. In addition, the undeniable "democratic deficit" of international institutions—lacking both electoral responsiveness and accountability in the public sphere (Eder, 2000)—plays an important role. Such mobilizations might in fact be seen as proof of the continued dominance of the nation-state. However, a more careful look shows the emergence, in the course of these campaigns, of innovations both in the organizational structure and in the frames of the protest (della Porta, 2003a), as we will see below.

Externalization

A third area in which researchers have observed the emergence of clear transnational trends is in studies focusing on movement organizations that become active supranationally. Within this approach, scholars of international relations have analyzed informational and lobbying campaigns in which national and international NGOs attempt to stimulate international alliances with nationally weak social movements (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; see also chapter 7 in this volume). These researchers stress that organized interests and social movements look to international institutions for the mobilization of resources that can be used at the national level. A variant is the construction of transnational coalitions of international NGOs, which reach into these institutions to find allies on behalf of the claims of weak domestic actors in countries of the South (Fox and Brown, 1998).

The strategy of externalization (Chabanet, 2002) has often characterized the mobilization of national groups targeting the EU in attempts to put pressure on their own governments for material or symbolic resources. For instance, British environmental organizations paid increasing attention to the EU (even playing a leading role vis-à-vis other environmental groups) when political opportunities at home were poor (Rootes, 2002; see also Rootes in this volume). To give another example, with their Eurostrike in 1997, Spanish, French, and Belgian Renault workers protested at the EU level against the closing of the Renault factory of Vilvorde in Belgium (Lefébure and Lagneau, 2002).

Some international institutions have indeed emerged as arenas for the articulation of collective claims (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997). On the rights of indigenous populations or women, the United Nations seems able to produce international norms that, though weaker than

national regulation, can be used to strengthen and legitimize these groups' claims (see Soysal, 1994). In Western Europe, the European Parliament has worked as a main channel of access for various organizations, especially in areas like the environment, in which parliamentary committees are active. Feminists, environmentalists, and unions have also been able to obtain favorable decisions from the European Court of Justice, especially with the increasing competence of the EU with respect to environmental and social policies (Dehousse, 1998; Balme and Chabanet, 2002).

In their dealings with international institutions, some movement organizations receive material and symbolic resources, such as the financing of particular projects, or recognition of their legitimacy. On their side, international institutions benefit from low-cost work from voluntary associations; from the information they can provide; from access to local populations; and, of course, from legitimization (for instance, Mazey and Richardson, 1997:10). For the institutionally weak European Parliament, alliances with NGOs provide resources for legitimization vis-à-vis the more powerful European Commission and the European Council. Similarly for the United Nations, NGOs active on human rights help a weak bureaucracy to acquire specialized, and, in general, reliable knowledge, while development NGOs offer high-quality, low-cost human resources (for a summary, see della Porta and Kriesi, 1999).

Externalization processes have, however, some limits. First of all, "boomerangs" and "insider/outsider coalitions" are more likely to emerge when "(1) channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion a 'boomerang' pattern . . . (2) advocates believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks; and (3) conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks" (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:12). Moreover, they are potentially more effective for movements focusing on internationally established norms (such as human rights) than for those struggling against internationally hegemonic discourse (such as the liberalization of markets for goods and services).

To summarize: these three forms of transnational relations represent an important part of what some scholars have been calling "global social movements" and what others, more modestly, call "transnational politics." They are extremely important, and may be increasing in scope and scale, but they do not represent the most dramatic change we see in the world of contentious politics. This is what we call "transnational collective action," to which we turn in the following section.

TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION

Transnational collective action is the term we use to indicate coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions. Both in Western Europe, where it takes a more institutionalized form, and outside Europe, where more vigorous forms have developed in recent years, we see it developing out of the more traditional forms that we have outlined above. We can vividly illustrate this development of new forms from old with the example of anthropologist Hilary Cunningham, who has studied activism on the U.S./Mexican border for over ten years. She began in the early 1990s by studying the "border crossing" of a group of activists linked to the U.S. Sanctuary movement, who offered safe havens to Central American refugees. She compares this experience to more recent activism to reduce the negative effects of the NAFTA agreement (2001:372–79). Between these two episodes, both occurring on the same border and involving the same populations, Cunningham observed a shift from a state-centric movement to a transnational coalition (379–83). In fact, as the movement developed, the role of the state was transformed for its activists. This transformation developed out of environmental, cognitive, and relational changes. We can use these categories to examine the forces behind the development of transnational collective action.

Environmental Change

Since the late 1980s, three kinds of changes in the international environment have helped to produce a transnationalization of collective action. First, the collapse of the Soviet bloc encouraged the development of forms of nonstate action that had previously been blocked by Cold War divisions. This produced a wave of Western governmental support for NGO activity in both East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (Mendelson and Glenn, 2002), as well as the development of homegrown nonstate groups that might otherwise have been branded as "pro-communist" in the days of the Cold War. At the same time, the explosion of secessionist movements, border wars, and warlordism that followed the breakup of the Soviet bloc fed an increase of humanitarian aid movements around the world.

Second, the development of electronic communications and the spread of inexpensive international travel have made it easier for formerly isolated movement actors to communicate and collaborate with one another across borders. Related to this, there has been a massive increase in migration flows across borders, which has stimulated both benign forms of

immigrant activism (Guarnizo, Portes, and Landolt, 2003) and the more transgressive forms of diasporic nationalism that have exacerbated ethnic and linguistic conflicts (Anderson, 1998).

Finally, the importance of the international environment has been highlighted by the growing power of transnational corporations and international institutions, treaties regulating the international economy, and international events like the global summits of the World Bank, the Group of Eight, and especially the World Trade Organization. These are of course framed by activists as threats, which they indeed are for broad sectors of the world's population; but it is the internationalization of the global environment that produces opportunities for activists from both North and South to engage in concerted collective action. Together, these changes combine into what we call "complex internationalism," and will describe at greater length in our conclusions.

While some analysts appear to think that globalization is sufficient to produce global social movements, changes in the global environment are not sufficient to produce a transnationalization of collective action. Cognitive change within and relational changes between actors must be the active forces for such a fundamental change. The former can best be seen in the changing perspective of nonstate actors active on the international scene, while the latter can be observed in the formation of sustained networks of transnational activists.

Cognitive Change

Since social movements are "reflective" actors, their international experiences have been critically analyzed. Tactics and frames that appear to succeed in more than one venue have been institutionalized—for example, in the spread of the practice of demonstrating on the occasion of the periodic meetings of the great international institutions, first within Western Europe in the 1990s and then globally, against the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. The formation of the "World Social Forum," created to highlight the distortions of the annual Davos World Economic Forum, eventually produced regional social fora such as the European one that took place in Florence in 2002. Moreover, the tactical adaptation of governmental and police strategies to movement challenges at a transnational level demanded the common elaboration of plans for collective action on the part of activists.

With respect to domestication, although still mainly addressing national governments, many groups of protesters have learned from people like themselves in other countries. This was the case, for instance, for Italian farmers, during the struggle against the implementation of EU quotas on milk production (della Porta, 2003a). Similarly, the local move-

ments of the unemployed have learned to pay greater attention to their transnational connections (Chabanet, 2002; Baglioni, 2003). Though it was "domestic," the wave of attacks on McDonald's in France gave rise to a spontaneous wave of similar attacks in other countries and to the popularity of the theme of the "Americanization" of mass culture and commerce.

As for externalization, the "vertical" experience of individual national movements operating internationally has placed many actors in contact with others like themselves and thus encouraged them to develop a more globalized framing of their messages and their domestic appeals. We can see this in the indigenous peoples' movements throughout Latin America, which have adopted many of the same cognitive frames in countries with little else in common (Yashar, 2005).

Relational Changes

The most striking developments of the last decade have operated through the relational mechanisms that are bringing together national actors in transnational coalitions. The existence of international institutions as common "vertical" targets has helped to produce the "horizontal" formation of transnational coalitions through the networks of activists that form around them. For example, at the European level, networks of organizations of regionalist movements (Hooghe, 2002), women's organizations (Mazey, 2002), and labor unions (Martin and Ross, 2001) gained some success in the EU. In the same way, indigenous people and human rights organizations have coordinated their efforts and gained access to the United Nations (for a summary, see della Porta and Kriesi, 1999). In parallel, although more slowly, women's concerns and ecological issues advanced in the United Nations, as well as in the World Bank. National women's organizations that participated in the UN NGO conferences for women, especially in Beijing in 1995, encountered others like themselves and forged long-lasting transnational coalitions. The same is true of the "counter-summits" organized around the economic summits at Davos and elsewhere. According to a survey of NGOs, a major perceived advantage of the counter-summit is the consolidation of transnational and trans-thematic linkages between transnational movement organizations (Pianta, 2001).

Relations between movements and governments are a major source of change. Social movements do not act in a vacuum, and, in fact, the strongest influences on their behavior and tactics are the behavior and tactics of the governments they challenge. The last decade has shown that governments also imitate one another, therefore leading to increasing similarities in the contexts in which movement campaigns and protests take place.

Increasing interaction facilitates the growth of common identity, and therefore reduces national particularism. One of the major changes in the last half decade has been the adoption of new and more violent tactics on the part of the forces of order against international protesters. This came to a head in Genoa in 2001, but it has been evident since the 1999 protests in Seattle that police forces are following similar strategies in protecting international institutions and conferences.

In summary, reflecting on the successes, but also on the failures of transnational collective action, as well as the experience of working together on temporary campaigns, has led to the creation of transnational organizational structures and the framing of transnational identities. Certainly, social movements have retained their national character, remaining tied to the types of political opportunities present in individual states; but they have also increasingly interacted transnationally. As has been noted, if social movements are to work with success in supranational arenas, they must develop a base of cross-national resources and global strategies that will be significantly different from those deployed in national arenas (Smith, Pagnucco, and Romeril, 1994:126). These arenas offer activists of different world regions the opportunity to meet, form organizational networks, coordinate activity, and construct global frames and programs (Passy, 1999; Smith, 1999).

EMERGING FORMS AND DYNAMICS OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTENTION

All four forms of transnationalization described above facilitate the spread of movements targeting international institutions, practices, and relationships, producing a growing concern with global issues. In the last few years, research has begun to develop on the ways in which transnational collective action is organized and on how transnational conflict and alliance structures are formed. Knowledge has increased, for example, regarding the lobbying efforts of international NGOs or networks of NGOs, working patiently within the ambit of international institutions (O'Brien et al., 2000); on the construction of international treaties and agreements with the active participation of transnational actors (Klotz, 1996; Price, 1997; 1998); on the service or information-based politics of foreign NGOs or networks within individual societies that are not their own (Keck and Sikkink, 1998); on the framing of domestic protest activities against "globalization" without significant foreign participation (such as the 1995 Chiapas rebellion against the Mexican government, framed against the handy symbol of NAFTA [Olesen 2003]); on the actions of local movement actors active on global issues, such as local social fora

(Andretta et al., 2002 and 2003); and on transnationally organized contentious claims-making against international economic actors, institutions, and states (Andretta et al.; also della Porta, 2003b).

Building on this knowledge, but adding new elements of research, the chapters collected in this volume pose one or more of the following questions:

- What are the organizational forms that have developed to connect very loose networks of activists ("movements of movements," as they have been called)? What is the role of the Internet ("the net of the networks")?
- How do repertoires of protest adapt to address institutions with low democratic accountability and transparency? To what extent are movements able to build new public spheres, or arenas, for critical political debates?
- Are movement identities undergoing changes in their content and structure as the result of transnational exposure and activism? Is there a return to "materialistic" concerns? Is tolerance for internal differences growing? Is the opposition to neoliberal globalization an emerging master-frame?
- What are the main resources (knowledge, capacity for disruption, legitimacy, links to institutional actors, etc.) that movements mobilize in order to address the political claims in a complex system of governance? Where do social movements find their "social capital"?
- How do national (or even local) political opportunities influence the strategies of social movements that are active on global issues? Are the political parties of the Left still perceived as potential allies? And what are the differences between movements' adaptation to multi-level governance at the center and at the periphery?

Looking at the effects of the development of conflicts over global issues at the domestic level, as well as at the transnational dynamics of contention, the contributions to this volume begin to provide responses to these questions.

With respect to organizational structure, they clearly indicate that recent forms of transnational contention are far from exclusively organized around transnational social movement organizations. Instead, they are rooted at the local and national level, turning simultaneously to various governmental levels. In particular, transnational mobilizations create linkages between different social and political actors: not only do domestic and international populations of movement organizations interact (see Johnson and McCarthy in this volume), but coalitions involving local groups are formed through local social fora and changes in the framing

of domestic political conflicts. New technologies reduce the costs of participating in transnational networks, even for small local groups, helping in the development of global protest campaigns.

Also at the local level, "global social justice" has become a masterframe of new mobilizations, including those addressing the environment and the conditions and rights of women and workers, native people, peasants, and children (see Diani in this volume). This in turn produces loosely coupled transnational networks that organize around particular campaigns or series of campaigns, using a variety of forms of protests, adopting and adapting repertoires of protest from the traditions of different movements. Specific concerns with women's rights, labor issues, the defense of the environment, and opposition to war survive, but are bridged together in the opposition against "neoliberal globalization." In order to keep different groups together, "tolerant" inclusive identities develop, stressing differences as a positive quality of the movement.

As for the repertoire of action, after years of using more moderate tactics, a new propensity for "taking people to the street" has developed, in particular, with the development of forms of civil disobedience. Yet, protest is also combined with educational campaigns, comic presentations, and attention to the mass media, stressing not only the power in numbers but also the importance of the presentation and diffusion of the message (on the importance of media work for ATTAC, see Felix Kolb's contribution to this volume). Whether a qualitatively new repertoire of contention has developed around transnational contention remains to be seen, but what is clear is that new targets, new frames, and new combinations of constituencies have produced major innovations in the existing repertoire. As we will see in this volume, this evolution modifies trends that have been observed in contentious politics at the domestic level in many countries:

- If social movement organizations appeared increasingly institutionalized and bureaucratic during the 1980s and 1990s, new types of loose organizational structures have emerged around the issue of global justice, with a capacity to penetrate the public sphere, bringing new issues into the public sphere;
- if movement strategies appeared increasingly moderate and contained, direct action and civil disobedience have combined with them, increasing the disruptiveness of protest;
- if social movement discourses appeared to privilege specialization, they have recently shown a taste for more general issues.

What do social movement scholars have to teach in response to these changes? Explanations for these new developments can be found in the

resources and opportunities available to movements—as the social movement literature suggests. But these changes can only be captured if we shift from a static to a more dynamic definition of resources and opportunities: for example, from resources and opportunities as "they are," to resources and opportunities as they are perceived and constructed by the activists; from specific collective action frames to the process of framing entire episodes, the actors, and the issues within them; and from studying individual forms of collective action to the process of innovation and interaction between challengers and their opponents (della Porta, 1995:9–14; della Porta and Diani, 1999:223–24; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: ch. 2).

In terms of the mobilization of resources, two emerging challenges for movements can be mentioned. First, the fragmentation in the social structure has increased social heterogeneity, in particular with a decline of the social groups (the working class, but also the "new middle class") that had provided the social bases for many previous movements. Second, an increasingly individualized culture has been read as reducing the bases for solidarity values in the society, therefore increasing a tendency to free-riderism and diminishing the propensity for collective action.

However, our findings suggest that transnational mobilization is facilitated by the adaptation of movement strategies to the changing environment (including a shift in the type of resources available to challengers). In particular, the flexible networks that have been encouraged by a looser and less crystallized social structure make it possible to connect heterogeneous social bases with movement organizations inherited from previous waves of protest. At the same time, a redefinition of political involvement that emphasizes diversity and subjectivity (see chapter 8 in this volume) taps into cultural changes—which some have called "postmodern"—that build on the thesis that "the personal is political." In this way, "apolitical" personal lifestyle changes that are becoming common to many young people across the globe have become an intangible but rich source of movement mobilization.

Similarly, if we look at political opportunities, both the supranational and the national levels appear to be quite closed in traditional terms. On the one hand, even the most developed among the international institutions lack the basic features of democratic responsiveness and accountability—granting at best informal and limited access to movement organizations or, more generally, to citizens. On the other hand, the traditional allies of social movements, the left-wing parties, have been far from supportive of recent protests, both in their content and forms. But here again, recent mobilizations have attempted to redefine the concept of politics, putting an emphasis on the role of "politics from below," and expressing a strong distrust of representative institutions. Addressing

public opinion directly, the activists seem to attempt (with some success) to create public spaces that are autonomous from the political parties, but also from the commercial logic of the mass media. That is, faced with few institutional opportunities, the activists aim at redefining politics.

THIS VOLUME

The chapters collected in this volume address these theoretical issues on the basis of empirical studies of contemporary social movements and their interactions with opponents, authorities, and international institutions. Global protest campaigns, counter-summits, cross-sectoral alliances among movements and NGOs, the refraction of transnational protest activity into the domestic arena: these are some promising research subjects that can help to better specify and operationalize the dynamics sketched above.

This volume builds on a rich tradition of scholarly collaboration that goes back over fifteen years to a meeting of social movement scholars at the Free University of Amsterdam in 1986. At that time, distinct research traditions divided social movement scholarship among Europeans and Americans, sociologists and political scientists, advocates of "new social movement theory" and of resource mobilization (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988). The Amsterdam meeting set out to bridge those gaps. It not only succeeded in producing a much-read volume (Klandermans et al., 1988), but it gave rise to an international book series, *International Social Movement Research*, and created a loosely linked international network of social movement scholars who met every few years, renewed and broadened their composition, and helped set the agenda for social movement research for years to come (Klandermans et al., 1988; McAdam et al., 1996; della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, 1999; Diani and McAdam, 2003). This volume is dedicated to the memory of our friend and colleague, Alberto Melucci, who was part of the first "Amsterdam" generation, and whose work has influenced many of us.

While some research focused in the past on transnational campaigns and, more recently, on the rise of a global justice movement, this volume aims at linking local and global conflicts by looking at the way in which global issues are transforming local and national movements, as well as at the interaction between local, national, and supranational movement organizations. Using recent cases of transnational contention—from the European Social Forum in Florence to the Argentinean human rights movement and British environmentalists, from movement networks in Bristol and Glasgow to the Zapatistas—the chapters presented in the volume adapt the concepts and hypotheses developed in the social move-

ment literature to what appears to be a new cycle of protest developing around the globe, after the "low ebb" of mobilization in the last decade.

Part I of the book contains two chapters devoted to the analysis of the effects of the emergence of a "global vision" of conflict at the local and national level. We will show how global justice issues affect local and national movement organizations, first by helping to structure local movement networks and then by widening the issue scope of national organizations. Next, we analyze how activists in transnational protest campaigns engage in collective action at the local level, developing a multilevel challenge to traditional politics. Finally, we show how transnational movement organizations adapt to national opportúnities, helping to diffuse concern over global injustice at home.

In particular, in chapter 2, Christopher Rootes discusses the degree and forms of transnationalization in the environmental movement. Using rich databases on the British case, the chapter assesses a limited transnationalization in terms of protest action as well as organizational structures. In-depth analysis of some movement organizations points, however, to the changing character of the British environmental movement as it wrestles with the challenges presented by its need to act locally while at the same time increasingly recognizing the growing importance of transnational economic and political institutions.

In chapter 3, Mario Diani addresses the general question of whether and to what extent transnational issues, such as North–South inequalities, third world debt, or globalization processes, affect local politics and the structure of local civil society in West European countries. On the basis of evidence coming from structured interviews conducted with 124 organizations in Glasgow and 134 organizations in Bristol, the author stresses the influence of global issues on the network structure of the groups, suggesting that interest in transnational issues does indeed shape the structure of civil society networks.

In part II, we turn to the processes through which domestic contention diffuses to other countries and to the international level. In chapter 4, Erik Johnson and John McCarthy look at the interactions between national and transnational social movement organizations. Comparing the coevolution of the populations of transnational environmental movement organizations with the national populations of environmental movement organizations in the United States (based on various issues of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, and the *Encyclopedia of Associations, National Organizations of the U.S.*), with particular attention to the timing of the founding of movement organizations, the chapter discusses the "top-down" versus "bottom-up" hypotheses, stressing the role of state-level movement organizations in stimulating the rise of transnational ones.

In chapter 5, Felix Kolb focuses on the role of social movement organi-

zations in shaping the European debate on global issues. On the basis of research on the successful anti-neoliberal group, ATTAC (combining a content analysis of newspaper coverage with archival sources), the chapter shows how transnational protest, mass media, and organizational strategy interacted in the making of the German branch of this important transnational movement organization.

In chapter 6, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam address the mechanisms and processes through which transnational contention is organized, and in particular on "scale shift," which signifies a shifting trajectory of contention from small to larger arenas (or, in contrast, from larger to smaller ones). The authors specify this process through four main mechanisms and two alternative paths ("brokerage" and "diffusion") and speculate about the properties and implications of each for the durability of trajectories of mobilization. Each of these paths is illustrated with well-known cases of scale shift, ranging from the American civil rights movement to the Zapatista network and the nuclear freeze movement.

Part III turns to various patterns of the internationalization of contentious politics. In chapter 7, Kathryn Sikkink addresses the question of how the interaction of national and international political opportunity structures influences the strategies of social movements that are active on global issues. On the basis of a series of case studies, especially in Latin America, the chapter discusses how activists, aware of the possibilities created by this dynamic interaction, choose strategies attuned to opportunities at both the international and domestic levels. Using the basic idea of closed and open structures at the domestic and international level as an analytical starting point, it suggests four different characteristic patterns of activism, linking them with different policy issues (such as human rights, trade, and money).

Donatella della Porta, in chapter 8, discusses the conception of democracy and politics in the movement for "globalization from below." Using data from a survey with 2,800 activists of different nationalities who took part in the European Social Forum in Florence, and focus groups of activists in Florence, it discusses the movement's responses to challenges related to various aspects of transnationalization, looking at some characteristics of "global activists," such as their involvement in complex political and social networks and their range of previous experiences of political participation. Finally, the chapter addresses the activists' definition of politics, looking both at their criticisms of representative democracy and their image of a democracy "in movement."

Lance Bennett, in chapter 9, contrasts "traditional" and "new" patterns of transnational activism. Looking at the movement organized loosely around "global justice" issues, the author suggests that it challenges ear-

lier accounts of transnational activism cast largely in terms of NGO-centered, single-issue policy networks that run centrally organized campaigns based on brokered coalitions, aimed mainly at policy reforms. The new transnational movement is instead described as composed of loose activist networks adopting self-organizing communication technologies and advocating multiple issues, multiple goals, and inclusive identities. The implications of the emerging organizational model for political effectiveness and democracy-building are discussed.

The conclusion addresses three main issues. First, we look at how the international environment intersects with globalization to produce a system that we call "complex internationalism," in which states, international institutions, and nonstate actors regularly interact around issues of global importance. Second, we turn to the progress that has been made in scholars' understanding of transnational contention since the first studies of the phenomenon appeared in the 1990s. Finally, we turn to some of the unresolved and recently opened issues in transnational contention, such as the rise of militant political Islam and the apparent turn of the United States to a more hegemonic project that threatens much of the progress in multilateral governance made over the last few decades.

NOTᴱˢ

1. See www.votenowar.org.
2. See www.internationalanswer.org/e
3. An inventory of these social technolᵒ   ocracy and
Internet Technology section of the Center f   ʳic Engage-
ment, www.engagedcitizen.org.
4. See www.stopwar.org.uk/.
5. See www.interwebnet.org/chasing_ᵇ
6. See www.infoshop.org/inews/ftaa_ʳ
7. See www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/ᵉ
8. This is precisely the model developᵉ   ʒanization
MoveOn. See www.moveon.org.
9. www.engagedcitizen.org.
10. www.govcom.org/publications/drafts/ruckus.html#1.
11. See the archives of campaigns and standards monitoring regimes at the Center for Communication and Civic Engagement (www.engagedcitizen.org) and the Global Citizen Project (www.globalcitizenproject.org).
12. See www.cokespotlight.org. Also, www.adbusters.org.
13. Dieter Rucht (in a personal communication) has noted the disproportionate reliance on interpersonal networks over Internet and web sources for learning about the demonstrations in the German survey. From WZB survey of German antiwar demonstrators.
14. See www.globalcitizenproject.org.
15. Consider the number of lists that went out in just one call to participate in the Global Governance Conference in Montreal, Oct. 13–16, 2002:

50 Years is Enough list on World Bank and IMF; Ad-Hoc List on the MAI; ATTAC's newsletter; BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest; Campaign for Labor Rights Action Alerts; Change-IMF, Bread for the World Debt and Development Project; Corporate Europe Observatory newsletter; Corpwatch action alerts; Corpwatch news; Drillbits and Tailings, on oil/gas/mining from Project Underground; Export Credit Agencies Watch; Eye on SAPs from Globalization Challenge Initiative; Focus on the Global South newsletter; Global economy network, Campaign for America's Future; Global environmental list with news updates; Global environmental news updates; Global Trade Watch list; Globalization Challenge Initiative list; International List on Challenges to the FTAA; Jubilee South updates and info; Jubilee USA Network news and information; List on WTO, MAI, and trade issues; News on the IMF, Essential Action; NGO forum on Asian Development Bank; Plan Puebla Panama Social Movements Organizing List; PRS-Watch (Eurodad), monitors World Bank PRSPS and civil society responses; Rights Action information list, commentary/analysis on globalization and Central America; Working group on International Finance Corporation; World Bank Bonds Boycott. Source: www.dasbistro.com/pipermail/nvgreen/2002-June/002437.html.

10

Conclusion: "Globalization," Complex Internationalism, and Transnational Contention

SIDNEY TARROW AND DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

On February 15, 2003, two and a half million people marched past the Coliseum against the impending American assault on Iraq. Those Romans were not alone: on the same day in Paris, 250,000 people demonstrated against the coming war. In Berlin, half a million marched past the Brandenburg gate; in Madrid, there were a million marchers; in Barcelona, 1.3 million, while, in London, 1.75 million people—the largest demonstration in the city's history—spread out across Hyde Park. Even in New York, in the face of rough post-9/11 treatment from the police, over 500,000 people managed to assemble on the East Side of Manhattan.

On that day in February, starting in New Zealand and Australia and following the sun around the world, an estimated sixteen million people marched, demonstrated, sang songs of peace, and occasionally small groupings—despite the strenuous efforts of organizers to restrain them—clashed with police. Even in the thin February sunshine of Ross Island in Antarctica, forty-six of the 250 residents of the McMurdo Sound station demonstrated against the American war on Iraq. This was probably the single largest international demonstration in history.

In some ways, the February 15 demonstration resembled the vast turnouts that swept across Western Europe against the Reagan arms program (Rochon, 1988). Those demonstrations, too, were mounted in a number of different capitals and attracted millions of people. But while the 1980s campaign was an isolated peak of protest during a period of movement quiescence, the antiwar movement of 2003 included activists from, and built on the momentum of, the concurrent movement against neoliberal

globalization. It was a classical case of "social movement spillover" (Meyer and Whittier, 1994).

For some, the anti-Iraq war movement was no more than that. We think not: for its immediate target was not one of the great international financial institutions, or even American or global neoliberalism. Nor was it primarily composed of activists with a global vocation, though many of these also took up the antiwar cause. Most were what we will call "rooted cosmopolitans": ordinary citizens, more commonly involved in domestic politics or movements, who reached beyond their own home bases to join with millions of others around the world.

What was truly new in this movement? We will argue that it reflects not only globalization, but also the partial internationalization of the sphere of political authority in today's world. Second, it reflects not only the risks of global power, but also the political opportunities that internationalization offers a new generation of activists. Third, we will focus on the strategies and behaviors of the stratum of activists we call "rooted cosmopolitans." We also think the February 15 campaign reflected important changes in the sphere of contentious politics, ranging from challenges from emerging social movements, to the macro-developments that have been variously described under the heterogeneous label of "globalization."

WHAT'S OLD AND WHAT'S NEW?

When we speak of "emerging social movements," we do not wish to revive the by-now tired debate about their intrinsic newness or the search for a new class actor that, in the literature of the 1980s, was thought to be substituting for the central role of the working class. We think it more fruitful to single out some specific characteristics of contentious politics at the turn of the millennium. Even with this more modest aim in mind, we should be cautious about claiming too much, for some aspects of the antiwar movement of 2003 were familiar from the history of collective action:

- *Diffusion:* Much like the antislavery movement in the early nineteenth century and Gandhian nonviolence, it demonstrates how forms of contention can diffuse across space and over borders (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: ch. 2; Chabot and Duyvendak, 2002);
- *Mobilization from Organized Actors:* Much as May Day was transmitted to Europe from the U.S. eight-hour-day campaign by the Socialist International, it shows how mobilization can take place through transnational organizations;

- *Modularity:* Much as Chinese revolutionaries styled themselves as Jacobins and constructed China in the image of the French Old Regime, it shows how movements can be linked across boundaries through the modularity of the forms and the framing of contention (Anderson, 1991);
- *Externalization:* And it showed how transnational movements can be formed as people reach beyond their own borders to face external or internal opponents.

New Challenges

But if diffusion, mobilization from above, modularity, and externalization are familiar social processes, what then is new in the emerging dynamics and characteristics of the contemporary wave of transnational contention? And how have scholars and practitioners been approaching them? Since the mid-1990s, a number of changes in the "real world" have combined to expand and extend the reach of transnational contention:

- The neoliberal economic orthodoxy summarized in the term *Washington Consensus* began to bear bitter fruit in the collapse of the Asian "tigers" and in the increasingly evident inequalities between North and South.
- International institutions that enshrined neoliberalism—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and, with some countertendencies, the European Union (EU)—began to take on a more central role as the targets of resistance.
- These institutions and their actions have provided a focal point for the global framing of a variety of domestic and international conflicts.
- Transnational campaigns and transnational movement organizations (like Jubilee 2000 and ATTAC) have resulted from this dynamic.
- New electronic technologies, and broader access to them, have enhanced the capacity for movement campaigns to be organized rapidly and effectively in many venues at once.
- Counter-summits and boycotts of big corporations have emerged as new repertoires for protest addressing international targets.
- Within transnational contention, tendencies can be seen for a shift from the internal expression of claims against external targets (domestication), to greater externalization and, ultimately, to the formation of transnational campaigns and coalitions.
- Partial but highly visible successes of campaigns by nonstate actors (often in coalition with some governmental and international offi-

cials) such as the international support for the liberation movement in South Africa, the anti-landmine campaign, the international solidarity movement with the Zapatista rebellion, and the now-stalled Kyoto process.

Macro- and Micro-Approaches

In attempting to understand these new challenges, observers first turned to macro-level phenomena, like globalization, and to micro-level changes, such as the spreading use of the Internet by social movements. Neither factor is unimportant, but globalization "explains" so much and has been given so many meanings that it fails as an explanation for any single form of transnational contention (Tarrow, 2002). As for the Internet, while it has sped up and increased the range of intramovement communication, its reach is unequal and it poses problems as well as advantages for movement organizers (see Bennett's chapter for the concept of "social technology").

Moreover, neither globalization nor the Internet explains, per se, the passage from structure to action. Social movement studies confirmed long ago that grievances are not sufficient to produce mobilization; both macroeconomic and microtechnological change must be processed by actors in social networks who respond to concrete threats and avail themselves of opportunities and resources they can perceive and cope with. This is why scholars like Diani (1995 and in this volume), Tilly (2004), and the present authors have insisted on the importance of networks of trust and strategic seizure of opportunities in their work on contentious politics.

For example, while much of the earlier literature on globalization singled out its negative effects on the capacity for collective action, the thickening of cross-national social networks that it produced was largely ignored. As for the Internet, although it has indeed reduced the costs of communication (this was also the case for print, the telephone, radio, and television), it has to be mobilized by committed individuals and organizations in order to serve as an instrument of collective action.

Our Approach

Without denying the importance of either macro-level structural change or micro-level technological change, we point to a middle range interpretation. In particular, we look at how the changing structure of the international system—what we call "complex internationalism"—not only poses new threats and imposes new inequalities, but offers a new generation of activists the opportunities and resources to form transnational coalitions

and movements. We derive this concept from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's (2001) concept of "complex interdependence" intending by our term not merely interdependence between states, but a triangular set of relationships among states, international institutions, and nonstate actors. We see this as the emerging structure in which multilevel opportunities appear for nonstate actors. And we see the latter both embedded in domestic political contexts, multiple memberships, and flexible identities. Rather than citizens in a not-yet-visible "global civil society," these "rooted cosmopolitans" are sustained by their domestic rooting, reaching out across borders to respond to threats using the opportunities of complex internationalism.

In order to accomplish this task, first, we want to sketch the tradition of social movement research out of which this book has come. Then we will survey available resources, both within and outside of that tradition. Third, we will put forward our own synthesis to help to answer the "what's new?" question. Fourth, we will examine new findings that emerge, both from this book and from recent work by other scholars. Finally, we will close with the knotty problems that social movement scholars face in confronting the new transnational contention, and with some new opportunities for research in this growing area of conflict and cooperation.

WHERE WE ARE COMING FROM

In 1995, a group of American and European social movement scholars met at Mont Pélerin, Switzerland, to discuss cross-national influences on social movements (della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, 1999:ix). In the book that came out of that conference, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, as two of the editors described it, "the underlying idea [was] that, in the contemporary world, social action in a given time and place is increasingly conditioned by social actions in very different places" (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999:3). In line with this idea, most of the contributors focused on "national mobilization within a globalizing world." A few of the contributors reached beyond the nation-state to examine transnational forms of collective action,[1] but even there, the focus was more on the interaction between the national and the transnational than on the autonomous dimensions of the latter (Rucht, 1999:206).

Moreover, much of the research reported in that volume was rooted in the countries of the North, where it was easiest for European and American scholars to observe the activities of transnational social movement organizations. In addition, much of it focused on the more routine forms of transnational contention mounted by nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), instead of on the more contentious transnational activities that have exploded on the international scene since the book appeared. In fact, the book reflected the institutionalization, taming, and normalization of movement organizations that was a widespread trend in the 1980s and early 1990s (Smith, 1999; Rucht, 1999). And it paid little attention to parallel efforts going on in international relations and international political economy research. Our focus in that volume hardly prepared us for the wave of transnational political contention that would sweep over the planet beginning in the late 1990s.

Those limitations reflected less a narrow vision on the part of social movement scholars, than the "real world" of the early- to mid-1990s. In particular, that research depicted a period of NGO specialization on single issues, a widespread "retreat from politics," and the hope that "epistemic communities" of experts could work with international institutions to build a cooperative new world order. Still in the future lay the movement against the WTO in the "Battle of Seattle"; North/South coalitions like Jubilee 2000; the transnational arena for social movements represented by the World Social Forum; and the savage attacks of September 11 and the belligerent response to them that originated the February 15 movement.

Existing Traditions

Not that there were no attempts outside the social movement tradition to provide theoretical resources to understand the new transnationalism. Two important traditions were growing up largely independent of social movement scholarship: "transnational relations" and "global civil society." But much of this research was poorly specified precisely where specification was most needed: regarding the linkages between transnational and local contention.

In the international relations tradition, "transnational relations" were explored in a series of works begun by Keohane and Nye (1972; 2001), whose inspiration was taken up by research on international "regimes," "epistemic communities," and normative change. Where Keohane and Nye's work cried out for attention to nonstate actors in transnational space, in the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, work in the tradition they founded specialized on the study of international political economy, with an almost obsessive focus on the multinational corporation. Attention to NGOs largely closed down until the late 1990s, when European political scientists like Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) and Americans like Kathryn Sikkink (1993) helped to reopen it, locating their work within a wave of "constructivist" research. They did international relations the service of "bringing norms back in" to its research agenda.[2]

A second stand of research came out of the "global civil society" and "transnational citizenship" traditions of the early to mid-1990s (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Wapner, 1995; Soysal, 1994). Here, in a mixture of macro-analytical theorizing and organizational case studies, there was a direct move from the idea that globalization was advancing, to the hope that a brave new world of "global social movements" was just over the horizon. But this concept was never clearly conceptualized. It tended to enlarge into the vague category of "global civil society," and it focused on a relatively narrow range of institutionalized "good" movements—that is, environmentalism, human rights, and solidarity with the third world. It also left poorly specified the relationship of "global civil society" to states and international regimes and institutions (Tarrow, 2001b).

In his conclusions to *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, Dieter Rucht was both more cautious and more empirical. In contrast to the international relations tradition, he focused on the domestic rooting of transnational phenomena; and in contrast to the utopian view of some proponents of a "global civil society," he pointed to the complex problems that transnational social movements face (1999:217–19).[3] But looking forward, Rucht also saw transnational SMOs becoming more significant, in part because the problems they address are increasingly international, and in part because of the opportunities for activism offered by international governmental bodies, which serve as both targets and frameworks for their activities (210–15).

AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND NEW APPROACHES

Since the Mont Pélerin conference, scholars from a variety of perspectives and disciplines have amply responded to Rucht's call for more research. Five areas of research and theorizing have been particularly creative:

- Students of social movements were quick to focus on the wave of international protest events that began to explode in 1999, the very year in which *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* was published.[4]
- At the same time, political economists and economic sociologists were offering broad interpretations of these events, emphasizing global capitalism, countermovements, and the shifting arenas of conflict between the forces of capital and labor.[5]
- "New" institutional sociologists were studying trends in global culture and using the growth of international institutions and organizations to draw a picture of a "world polity."[6]
- Focusing on microdynamics, anthropologists were tracking the rela-

tions between local actors and global trends, developing the concept of "cosmopolitanism" to describe transnational activists.[7]

- Students of international development, environmentalism, and human rights were focusing on the relations among NGOs, states, and international institutions in these important sectors of transnational activism.[8]

Social movement scholars began to reach out to scholars in international relations, comparative politics, law and development studies, and advocates and activists from the field.[9] Attention to specific transnational campaigns—such as those against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), or big dams financed by the World Bank—showed how networking occurred between very different types of associations, from environmental NGOs and indigenous people to unions from North and South (Ayres, 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, 2002; Shoch, 2000). And a series of methodological innovations began to adapt to the new realities of transnational contention. Three important ones are the use of original movement Internet sources to trace the activities and the characteristics of participants in international protest; the administration of on-site or near-site surveys of participants in international demonstrations; and comparative research designs.[10]

COMPLEX INTERNATIONALISM, MULTILEVEL OPPORTUNITIES, AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM

Drawing on these different strands of research and on the contributions in this book, we propose to add a synthetic approach at a middle range of generalization, developed around the categories of complex internationalism, multilevel political opportunities, and transnational activism.

Complex Internationalism

Our concept of complex internationalism draws upon a group of international relations theorists whose work derives from the landmark study by Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (2001). Keohane and Nye had separated themselves from the neorealism that dominated American international relations theory in the 1970s—which saw world politics hierarchically organized around state competition over security issues. They argued that this increasing international interdependence produces sustained interactions among states around many issues, leading to the cre-

ation of interstate and transgovernmental practices and institutions below and outside of the state level of international relations.

These authors made three cardinal assumptions: *first*, when multiple channels (and not only interstate relations) connect societies, then informal ties between governmental elites and transnational organizations develop below and beyond the state-to-state level; *second*, when there is no clear or consistent hierarchy of military and nonmilitary issues, a plurality of domestic actors are legitimized to participate in world politics; and, *third*, the multiplicity of ties in the international system lead to transnational and transgovernmental coalition building and political bargaining. These factors open an international space for transgovernmental relations and nonstate actors operating outside their own states (Keohane and Nye, 2001:35).

Keohane and Nye—like us—did not assume either the authority or the autonomy of international institutions (2001:240–41). Originally writing in the late 1970s (and well before the expansion in the authority of the EU), they saw these institutions more as fora for communication and coalition building than as supranational authorities. Also like us, they recognized the profound asymmetries of power between large and small states. But out of the communication and coalition-building role of international institutions, regimes, and practices, they saw a spillover effect that led to "the proliferation of international activities by apparently domestic agencies" (241).

We take Keohane and Nye's theory of "complex interdependence" a step further to deliberately include nonstate actors in the horizontal and vertical relations they posit among states and international institutions. By "complex internationalization," we mean *the expansion of international institutions, international regimes, and the transfer of the resources of local and national actors to the international stage, producing threats, opportunities and resources for international NGOs, transnational social movements and, indirectly, grassroots social movements*. Needless to say, these actors have widely varying levels of power and influence, with states the central actors, international institutions representing both state interests and their own bureaucratic claims, "insider" NGOs able to gain direct access to both states and institutions, and social movements attempting to operate from outside this structure to influence its policies. This takes us to the concept of "multilevel opportunity structure," and to the linkages between domestic and international levels of conflict and cooperation.

Multilevel Opportunity Structure

Many analyses of globalization tended initially toward a pessimistic forecast of the weakening of labor and other civil society groups as state pro-

tective legislation withers, leading to a presumed demise of classical social movements. For some observers, globalization was to blame for hindering the formation of collective subjects able to reverse or modify its course, and social movements were often seen as fragmented, single-issue and ephemeral (Castells, 1996:4). In the economic system, growing interdependence meant production being transferred to countries with lower wages, leading to a strengthening of multinational corporations and, especially, to the internationalization of financial markets. To prevent the hemorrhaging of capital, even left-wing governments would be obliged to swallow the bitter pill of "flexibilization" of the workforce and cuts in social spending. In the words of Susan Strange (1996), the "retreat of the state" and the "diffusion of power in the world economy" in the last quarter of the twentieth century, with the increasing role of private economic actors in global economic policies, has been the outcome of the political choices of an alliance of transnational corporations, financial international institutions, and the U.S. government.

However, alongside the costs of globalization, interdependence has had a dynamic effect on collective action. As the development of the EU, but also of the international financial institutions (WTO, World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF]) indicates, international institutions serve as a fulcrum for the formation of alliances of different state and nonstate actors. Such participation does not substitute for the power of states, but increases nonstate actors' visibility, their awareness of each other and, at times, even their power to influence events.

Access to supranational decision making by various collective actors is even more unequal than in national states with representative institutions. This is clearly the case for institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the G8, which have no democratic pretensions and grant formal access only to state representatives. But even in institutions like those of the EU, with its elected Parliament and mixed intergovernmental and supranational structure, business and professional groups have found it much easier "to go European"—that is, to gain access to these institutions—than has labor. Civil society groups active at the EU level—such as the Platform of the European Social NGOs, the European Anti-Poverty Network, the Human Rights Contact Group, the European Migrant Forum, United (against racism), and the European Network of Women—are usually poorly staffed and lack the access of well-established business and professional groups (Rootes, 2002:382).

This distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders" should not be overdrawn. What we suggest is that if complex internationalism represents obstacles to political participation, it offers resources and opportunities for nonstate actors to challenge elites and—on occasion—to collaborate with insiders, just as domestic movements sometimes cooper-

ate with political parties or interest groups. And as anticipated in *Social Movements in a Globalized World*, "supranational organizations increasingly provide *new arenas* for the articulation of claims and there is also a *new reference public* linked to them" (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999:16–17; della Porta, 2003b). In addition, some international institutions have been permeable to social movements that push for the establishment of general norms such as human rights or sustainable development. As the protests against the Iraq War showed, transnational movements can sometimes count on the support of sympathetic states.

The growth of international institutions, regimes, and practices provides multilevel targets—national, macroregional, international—for social movements. The protests at Seattle, Quebec, and Cancun showed that these international instances are perceived as co-responsible for increasing inequality and environmental disasters. If this does not increase the direct power of social movements, it increases their transnational visibility, their links to one another, and, on occasion, their ability to influence events.

A New Activist Stratum?

In our work (Tarrow, 2001b, 2003; della Porta, this volume), we have been struck by the growing importance of what we call "rooted cosmopolitans" with multiple belongings and flexible identities. These terms require some preliminary definition:

- By "rooted cosmopolitans," we mean *people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts;*
- By "multiple belongings," we refer to *the presence of activists with overlapping memberships linked within loosely structured, polycentric networks;*
- By "flexible identities," we mean *identities characterized by inclusiveness and a positive emphasis upon diversity and cross-fertilization, with limited identifications that develop especially around common campaigns on objects perceived as "concrete" and nurtured by search for dialogue.*

Let us walk briefly through these interlocking concepts and offer some examples to concretize them.

Rooted cosmopolitans. It was philosopher Anthony Appiah, writing of his Ghanaian father, who was the first to use the term *"rooted* cosmopolitan." "The favorite slander of the narrow nationalist against us cosmopolitans," he states, "is that we are rootless. What my father believed in,

however, was a rooted cosmopolitanism, or, if you like, a cosmopolitan patriotism" (1996:22). Appiah's essay emphasizes both the normality of cosmopolitanism (e.g., the cosmopolitan is not *rootless*), and its broad sweep (that is, it does not depend on involvement in any particular movement or campaign, but underlies a number of different sectors of transnational activity).

As we use the concept, it includes: immigrant activists who are involved regularly in transnational political activities in their home countries or internationally (Portes, 2000:265); labor activists from the South who forge ties with northern unions and NGOs (Anner, 2001); members of transnational advocacy networks who link domestic activists to international institutions through international NGOs (Keck and Sikkink, 1998); and the organizers and even occasional participants in transnational protest campaigns (Andretta et al., 2002 and 2003; Fisher et al., 2003).

Our view is that the unusual character of the contemporary period of globalization is not its greater international economic integration—that was true even at the beginning of the world system—but the growth of a stratum of people who, in their lives and their cognitions, are able to combine the resources and opportunities of their own societies with what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call "activism beyond borders" (1998).

Some of these activists become permanent transnational advocates, moving from primarily domestic involvements into international institutions, transnational NGOs, or social movement networks. But the vast majority are engaged in both domestic networks and international activities. As della Porta's chapter shows, participants in Italy, in Genoa and afterwards, had previous or current experience of participation in associations of various types, often overlapping: from NGOs to voluntary work, from trade unions to religious groups, from parties to social movements.

We still lack the necessary panel data to determine whether transnational involvements permanently "subtract" such activists from these domestic commitments. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests the contrary: most of the activists from Seattle, Genoa, Quebec City, and Cancun returned to their domestic activism with the fruits of their international experiences. In fact, the long-term impact of the current wave of transnational campaigns may not be so much through externalization and transnational coalition formation, but through the implosion of international issues into domestic politics through the *multiple belongings* and *flexible identities* of these rooted cosmopolitans.

Multiple belongings. As for the next concept, overlapping membership and loose networks have long been considered typical of social movement activism (della Porta and Diani, 1999:119–27). Movement campaigns such

as those against nuclear plants or the deployment of nuclear missiles have remobilized networks of activists from previous cycles of protest, who had disappeared from the public sphere (della Porta and Rucht, 2002). Movement coalitions, or even coalitions of movement organizations with other collective actors such as political parties, have frequently emerged on various issues, places, and moments in history. What is special about contemporary transnationalism is the persistence of mobilization involving a heterogeneous social basis, as well as a heterogeneous range of protest entrepreneurs.

From Seattle to the February 15 campaign against the Iraq War, marches have been filled with people of different generations (in Italy, the media often spoke of "protest carried out by fathers and sons, mothers and daughters"). Although demonstrators usually come from well-educated backgrounds, temporary workers and the unemployed in the North and industrial workers in the South have been going into the street to demonstrate against neoliberal policies. Peasants and indigenous peoples have also participated. The hundreds of organizations that signed calls for counter-summits and for international campaigns came from quite different traditions. For example, since Seattle, reporters often presented as "unlikely bedfellows" ecologists and unionists, feminists and religious groups, young squatters and middle-aged lobbyists for public interest groups, anarchists and consumers associations, communist parties and hackers.

What is more, research indicates that this convergence is far from sporadic or merely tactical: more and more, activists are simultaneously members of various and heterogeneous associations and groups. The "movement of movements"—as the Italian activists define themselves—is glued together by the multiple belongings of its members. We do not have, in fact, just the coming together of members of the ecological movement with unionists, but more and more activists who are members of both and constantly bridge ecological and labor approaches to world problems (see della Porta, 2003a for an analysis of trade union and ecological activists at the Florence European Social Forum). Long-lasting experiences of collaboration in local, national and cross-national campaigns (see Gabriel and Macdonald, 1994; Ayres, 2001; Rothman and Oliver, 2001) have created those dense ties that are a condition for the creation of sustained social movements.

Flexible identities. Heterogeneous networks of networks require special types of identity. Traditionally, movements have been considered as relevant examples of "identity politics," substituting symbolic resources for the material ones they lack. Especially in some moments in history, the closing of political opportunities as well as escalation processes have produced exclusive forms of militantism. More in general, in the develop-

ment of protest cycles, loyalties tend to shift from the movement as a whole to single organizations, fueling processes of intramovement competition (della Porta, 1995). In the new transnational movements, the tensions among different individuals and organizations are reduced by the development of flexible identities. If past movements stressed equality—understood as "communities of equals"—activists in contemporary transnational mobilization stress diversity as a positive asset for collective actors. Concrete common campaigns are perceived not only as built upon a minimal common denominator, but as the basis for the development of a shared understanding of the external reality. Notwithstanding multiple belongings, activists stress the important role of "subjectivity" and individual involvement. Identification with global causes does not exclude other types of identifications.

To summarize: we think the combination of rooted cosmopolitans with multiple belongings and flexible identities, working within the structure of complex internationalization, offers new resources and opportunities for transnational social movements. Neoliberal globalization is one of the forces against which these movements mobilize, and the Internet is a tool they can use. But it is the nature and resources of the activists who link domestic and international institutions within the structure of the international system that provides both the challenges and opportunities for transnational contention.

OUR AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTIONS

We offer this approach as a middle-range synthetic framework for the analysis of the new transnational contention, but it is neither exclusive nor all-encompassing. We have brought together in this volume contributions from a variety of traditions to attempt to answer the questions we raised in our introduction. We turn to these different strands of research and to our contributors' work in the following sections. To this growing body of research, we think our colleagues have added both new and reinforcing elements.

In chapter 1, we asked five questions. Let us see to what extent our authors offer responses.

First, with respect to the *organizational forms* that have developed to connect loose networks of activists, the contributions to this volume reinforce our view that the modal unit of transnational contention is not the bureaucratic movement organization, but the loosely linked movement *campaigns*, social fora, or other types of weakly structured networks (Anheier and Themundo, 2002). Clearly, traditional forms of interpersonal network formation continue to be the main linkages in organizing

such campaigns, but the Internet has proved to be a major innovation—possibly even a new form of movement organization, as Lance Bennett argues.

National movement organizations have not disappeared as new transnational forms have emerged. On the contrary, evidence from Christopher Rootes's chapter indicates that the center of gravity of national movement organizations is still the nation-state. Yet, within national settings, as Mario Diani's chapter reports, mobilizations on global issues constitute the focal point of specific alliances, based on specific identity bonds within British civil society. Not only do transnational NGOs build vital coalitions on issues such as environmental protection (see Johnson and McCarthy's chapter); but new transnational organizations emerge, with the explicit agenda of forming a supranational public sphere (see Kolb's chapter).

Second, we asked how the *repertoire of contention* has adapted to address international institutions with low democratic accountability and transparency. Earlier studies (for example, Marks and McAdam, 1999) suggested that, as social movements shift their activities from the national to the international level, they experience a shift from more contentious to more contained forms of collective action. Most of the activists who agitated around the EU in Imig and Tarrow's edited volume *Contentious Europeans* (2001) used institutionalized forms of influence.

Our studies indicate that if this was true in the 1990s, it is no longer the case today. In fact, protest against major international institutions—like the demonstrations studied by della Porta and her collaborators in Europe—are bringing together outsiders and insiders in complementary forms of collective action. The Internet itself offers new forms of protest, like "hacktivism," and mobile telephony allows protesters to rapidly deploy and redeploy their forces in response to new contingencies and police tactics (Tilly, 2004:ch. 5). Even the framing of new campaigns, like the "consumerist" repertoire of action analyzed by Diani in his chapter, suggests a redeployment of the traditional form of the boycott to target international firms and marketing practices, but also the growth of various initiatives of "fair trade."

Third, we asked whether *movement identities* are shifting as the result of transnational exposure and activism. Della Porta provides evidence for this shift with respect to the "flexible identities" of transnational activists. Similarly, Diani, in his chapter, shows how reference to global issues structures movement identities, even at a local level. And in his study of national environmental organizations, Rootes discovered that their members were much more cosmopolitan and interested in global issues than expected. We see this not as the "identity opportunism" of activists as they shift from one venue to another, but the result of what we have called

"rooted cosmopolitanism"—the capacity of today's generation of activists to operate with equal ease on home ground and in the international arena.

The theme of global justice reflects this characteristic well: under that rubric, advocates of environmental justice, indigenous rights, North–South inequality, and labor rights find common cause. Whether this frame will give way to a new "master frame" in the form of a socialist alternative is a major open question.

Fourth, what are the major *movement resources* that movements mobilize in order to address political claims in a system of complex internationalism? Since we suggest, as Tarrow and McAdam argue in their chapter, that international activities *transpose* domestic movements, rather than transforming them, we believe that domestic networks and experiences continue to be important resources for transnational contention. But the converse is also true. As Tarrow and McAdam argued in their discussion of the American nuclear freeze movement, the need to tap into domestic resources and national movement traditions can also constrain movement organizations' capacity to form transnational coalitions.

Fifth, we asked how *national and local political opportunities* influence the strategies of social movements active on global issues. Because we do not believe in a distinct transnational sphere, we think these domestic factors are crucial determinants of the strategies of movements active transnationally. In work related to his chapter here, Rootes reports that although "a few mostly small and symbolic transnational demonstrations have been staged in Brussels or Strasbourg," "collective action occurs overwhelmingly *within* nation states in the form of mobilizations confined to the local or national level" (2002:383). Diani's chapter stresses the role of local opportunities in structuring mobilization on global issues. Della Porta's chapter suggests that, in spite of relevant similarities in the sociopolitical background of activists coming from different countries, national political opportunities still influence the configuration of the movement for global justice.

RESURGENT PROBLEMS AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES

Those are solid and exciting achievements in an area of social movement research that barely existed a decade ago. But we should not claim too much: major new problems have emerged and a number of old problems continue to plague transnational movement research, just as they did at the rebirth of domestic research several decades ago.

Resurgent Problems

In 1986, when an international social movement group met in Amsterdam, they worried about an underlying lack of communication between North American and European social movement researchers (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988). European researchers were animated by a "new social movement" framework, while their American colleagues were more wedded to resource mobilization and political process perspectives. In the following decade, a remarkable set of interactions and convergences cross-fertilized these two sets of perspectives. But the parallel discovery of transnational contention since the mid-1990s has led to somewhat different trajectories and research subjects on the two sides of the Atlantic. As American researchers were making major advances in organizational studies, on the Internet, and on international relations-related research, European researchers were carrying out original research on counter-summits, social networks, and EU-related research. These efforts are not contradictory, but if we are not careful, there is a risk of re-creating the trans-Atlantic segmentation of the field that shackled research progress until the mid-1980s.

The different evolution of the recent movements in the United States versus Europe, as well as the increase in large cross-national projects financed by the EU involving only European countries, can account, in part, for the reduced interaction between European and U.S. scholars. Research on social movements has in fact increased significantly in Europe, and has produced a large number of publications in Italian, French, Spanish, and German, many of which are invisible to American scholars absorbed in their country's unique situation. And, as in the 1980s, European scholars appear to share a deeper preoccupation with the structural origins of conflict than for its concrete processes, and for a dialogue with normative theorists of democracy whose work is less well known or appreciated across the Atlantic.

A second recurring problem—also typical of research on domestic social movements—is the persistent absence of the South in research on transnational social movements. This is in part due to the weakness of training in social movements in universities in that part of the world (with the notable exception of India, parts of Latin America, and South Africa), partly to the language limitations of Northern researchers, but in larger part to the greater ease of doing research in countries in which liberal democratic politics is well established. Important exceptions are research efforts on human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999), on World Bank-related projects (Clark, Fox, and Treakle, 2003), and coming out of the international norms tradition (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, 2002). Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and movements in the Muslim world

(Fung and Wright, 2001; Souza, 2000; Baiocchi, 2001; Sintomer and Gret, 2002; Bannani-Chraibi and Fillieule, 2003) have increased attention to contentious politics in the South in recent years. Southern-based research centers are making their own contributions, until recently poorly appreciated by North American and Western European social movement researchers.

Finally, there is yet little systematic collection of information about the quantitative evolution of transnational contentious politics over time. In our introduction, we suggested a number of processes of transnationalization that we think will help to specify the overall process of internationalization. Some of our authors have posited other theoretical trends. Fine empirical studies, like those carried out by Boli and Thomas (1999); Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco (1997); and, more recently, Smith (forthcoming), trace the growth of transnational movement organizations. But few studies allow us to say definitively that a certain kind of transnational social movement campaign is increasing, declining, or stable, or that activists formed in domestic arenas are moving permanently into transnational forms of activism.

New Opportunities

Is transnational contention increasing? And, if so, around what issues, in which regions of the world, and in what form? Are the newer forms of transnational contention, like counter-summits or corporate campaigns, replacing older ones like transnational NGOs, or are new hybrid forms such as ATTAC developing out of the encounter between domestic movements and transnational mobilization? How do "pragmatic" and "radical" identities combine or interact? To what extent is anti-neoliberalism merely a replay of traditional socialist thought—or does it signal a new departure in this intellectual tradition?

There are more specific questions on the agenda as well. Is there a growing interaction among the different sectors of transnational activism—human rights, labor, global justice, and the environment—or will they be weakened by separate agendas and competition for funds, public attention, or support? Does the appearance on the agenda of a burning new issue, like the war in Iraq, displace movement activity from these by now traditional sectors, or will anti-imperialism merge with the already broad frame of "global justice?" How do transnational social movements solve the "transaction costs" of coalition formation over great distances and in the face of shifting global issues? Finally, how deeply will current transnational movements affect domestic politics and intersect with political parties and other institutionalized groups?

To these questions, we and our collaborators have offered some tentative, promising but partial answers. We hope the next generation of scholars of transnational contention now in the field will take the discussion further.

NOTES

The authors thank Jackie Smith for her helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.

1. Gary Marks and Doug McAdam focused on collective action in the EU (chapter 6); Florence Passy examined supranational opportunities to defend the rights of indigenous peoples of the South (chapter 9); Jackie Smith analyzed the transnational campaign against trade in toxic wastes (chapter 10); and Christian Lahusen described the structure and practice of international campaigns (chapter 11).

2. Particularly important was the inspiration of international relations theorist Peter Katzenstein (1996) and a group of his students, particularly Klotz, 1996; Price, 1997; and Thomas, 2001. For a summary of the constructivist tradition, see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998.

3. Other authors in the volume shared his caution. For example, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow pointed out in their chapter that much of what passes for "transnational" activity in the EU is actually aimed at national governments (chapter 7; also see Koopmans and Statham, 2000).

4. On international protest events, see della Porta and Mosca, 2003; Levi and Murphy, 2002; Lichbach and Almeida, 2001; and Smith, 2004. On transnational social movements, see Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, 2000b; and Smith and Johnston, 2002.

5. For different political economy perspectives, see Arrighi and Silver, 1999; McMichael, 1996; and Silver, 2003.

6. The work of new institutional sociologists is best reflected in the work by Boli and Thomas, 1999 and Soysal, 1994.

7. For anthropological perspectives, see Edelman, 1999; Hannerz, 1996; and Kearney, 1995.

8. For good examples of institutionally rooted studies of transnational activism in these sectors, see Fox and Brown, 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999; Clark, Fox, and Treakle, 2003; and O'Brien et al., 2000.

9. Here we can only mention a few landmark studies: Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's study of transnational advocacy networks in the areas of human rights, the environment and women's rights (1998), and the follow-up study for human rights networks (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999); O'Brien and his colleagues' (2000) detailed studies of the interactions of transnational NGOs with the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO within an overall social movement perspective.

10. The use of Internet-based sources can be seen in Almeida and Lichbach, 2003 and Bennett, 2003. On-site surveys have been used by Andretta et al., 2002

and 2003; della Porta, 2003a (see also www.unifi.it/grace); della Porta and Diani, 2004a; Bandler and Sommier, 2003; van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001; Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave, 2003; Walgrave and Verlust, 2003; and Fisher et al., 2003. Surveys have been combined with focus group techniques (for instance, della Porta, 2003b). Comparative designs have been used in research financed by the European Commission such as the TEA project on environmental activism (Rootes, 2003c); the UNEMPOL project on the contentious politics of unemployment (www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/euro/unempol); and the EUROPUB project on the Europeanization of the public sphere (www.europub.wz-berlin.de).

Appendix A

Organizational Consolidation

Differences in organizational consolidation were measured in reference to four indicators: amounts of budget; dependence on public funds, that is, public agencies being an organization's two most important income sources; level of formalization, corresponding to the sum of nine dummy variables measuring the presence of formal organizational properties such as a statute, chief executive, formal board, etc.; and years in existence. Given the strong correlations between these variables, a single factor summarizing them was generated through maximum likelihood analysis. The resulting factor scores have been used in the regression analysis, to prevent risks of multicollinearity.

	Factor
Formalization (0–9 scale)	.887
Budget Levels	.755
Public Funds as Major Source of Income	.656
Years in Existence	−.426
Explained Variance	62%

Appendix B

Repertoires of Action

Organizations were given a list of eighteen forms of action and asked whether they had used, or would consider using, any of them. Maximum likelihood analysis generated four rotated (Varimax solution) factors with eigenvalue above 1. They can be associated to a *protest repertoire*, a *pressure repertoire*, an *electoral repertoire*, and a *consumerist repertoire*. For the purpose of data analysis, 1–100 scales were constructed for each factor by calculating the percentage of the form of action, strongly correlated (r > .5) to one factor, which one group included in its possible repertoire, and multiplying the resulting scores by 100. The same logic was applied to data measuring orientations to issues (see table 3.1 in the text).

	Have Done/ Would Do	Pressure	Protest	Electoral	Consumerist
Contact a National Politician	79%	.766			
Contact a Local Politician	89%	.762			
Contact a Public Official	79%	.702			
Contact the Local Media	88%	.659			
Contact the National (UK) Media	65%	.555			
Promote/Support a Petition	70%	.534			
Contact a Solicitor or Judicial Body	60%	.497			
Promote/Support Occupations of Building Sites	19%		.884		
Promote/Support Blockades/Sit-ins	23%		.853		
Promote/Support Attacks on Property/Land	15%		.682		
Promote/Support a Strike	22%		.519		
Promote/Support Illegal Billboarding/Graffiti	13%		.562		
Promote/Support a Public Demonstration	55%	.402	.472		
Support Candidates in National Elections	10%			.968	
Support Candidates in Local/Regional Elections	11%			.857	
Promote/Support Ethical Trade/Investment	45%				.758
Promote/Support a Boycott of Certain Products	38%				.730
Promote/Support Cultural Performances	58%				
Explained Variance		18%	17%	10%	9%