

Rapid #: -13578261

CROSS REF ID: **5045888**

LENDER: **PUL :: Interlibrary Services, Firestone**

BORROWER: **HLS :: Widener Library**

TYPE: Book Chapter

BOOK TITLE: Readings on social movements : origins, dynamics and outcomes /

USER BOOK TITLE: Readings on Social Movements?: Origins, Dynamics and Outcomes

CHAPTER TITLE: "Introduction to Political Opportunities" and "Political Opportunities and African-American Protest, 1948-1997."

BOOK AUTHOR: Jenkins et al

EDITION:

VOLUME:

PUBLISHER:

YEAR: 2010

PAGES: 55-70

ISBN: 9780195384550

LCCN:

OCLC #:

PATRON NOTES: EndNotes Title/Verso Page(s)

Processed by RapidX: 8/22/2018 1:28:37 PM



This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code)

Readings on Social Movements

Origins, Dynamics and Outcomes

SECOND EDITION

Doug McAdam
Stanford University

David A. Snow
University of California - Irvine

New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2010

and occurs when groups assert the right to resources also claimed by another group. Proactive actions are those that claim resources that have not been previously enjoyed.

4. Environmental crisis is another factor that sometimes inspires reactive mobilization (Walsh 1981), but it is not relevant to our case.

5. The SPLC also includes Identity Churches in their definition, but we exclude these because it is not clear that all patriot/militia organizations are racist and, as we note in the text above, many patriot/militia organizations try to distance themselves from racist organizations.

6. Another potential data source for this project is Wilcox's (1995) *Guide to the American Right*. In order to verify that our findings from the SPLC data are robust, we obtained the 1995 version of this book and ran the same state-level analyses. The results are comparable to those that we present here. We present the results from the SPLC data analysis in this paper because these data are more readily available to the public. (The 1995 edition of the Wilcox book was extremely difficult to obtain, and the 1996 book is no longer available).

7. The economic structure of a state may be unique, for example, if the state offers tax-break incentives to lure corporations within its borders. And, of course, states are also important in setting policy (Earl and Soule 2001; Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; McCammon et al. 2001; Soule and Earl 2001; Soule and Zylan 1997; Zylan and Soule 2000).

8. We include only significant variables in the full model because of our small number of observations and limited degrees of freedom. We performed traditional regression diagnostics, including variance Inflation factor tests for multi-collinearity. We found no evidence of multicollinearity in the models presented in this article. We also examined whether outliers were driving the results by running the analyses excluding cases with very high numbers of patriot/militia groups, or with extreme values for important independent variables. Exclusion of outliers did not significantly alter the results.

9. Because patriot/militia members sometimes espouse anti-Semitic rhetoric (Abanes 1996; Berlet and Lyons 2000), we also ran models including three different measures of the Jewish population and organization in each state: the presence or absence of an Anti-Defamation League Office in the state, the number of Jewish Community Centers in the state, and an estimate of the total Jewish population in the state (and the change between 1980 and 1990). None of these

measures was ever significant, and we do not include them in the models we present here because of our small number of observations and limited degrees of freedom.

10. The use of dummy variables in place of continuous variables is appropriate in this case, as in many cases comparing geographic units. The coefficients on continuous measures are calculated at their means, but with this measure (as well as many others used in this paper) the relevant action is not at the variable's mean. Thus, in addition to reducing multicollinearity, using the dummy variable here makes more sense theoretically.

11. We control for the white population rather than the total population of the state for a second, practical reason: we experienced significant multicollinearity problems when controlling for the state's total population.

12. We speculated that gun control laws may be perceived as a threat by patriot/militia members and may therefore inspire their mobilization, however, this does not appear to be the case.

13. Because there is much greater variation in the change in the non-white population at the county-level, this dummy variable is defined differently than at the state-level, where 90% of the cases experienced an increase in their non-white population.

14. Because the vast majority of labor market areas lost manufacturing jobs between 1990 and 1993, we coded this variable "1" when the county's labor market area (LMA) lost an above average percent of jobs, rather than when it lost any manufacturing jobs. In other words, this variable is coded "1" when the county's LMA lost more than the mean value for all states. We should note that we obtain comparable results when we assign the dummy a value of "1" when the county's labor market area lost any manufacturing jobs.

15. We did obtain comparable results when using the continuous measure.

16. We use the change in farms from 1987 to 1992, rather than between 1990 and 1993, as we do in the state-level analysis because farm data were not available for counties for 1990 and 1993.

17. Because a large majority of counties lost farms, we assign this variable a value of "1" when the county lost an above average percentage of its farms. We should note that we obtain comparable results when we assign the dummy a value of "one" when the county lost any farms.

Part 2

Political Opportunities

Writing in 1970, the political scientist Michael Lipsky (1970: 14) urged scholars to be skeptical of:

system characterizations presumably true for all times and places.... We are accustomed to describing communist systems as "experiencing a thaw" or "going through of process of retrenchment." Should it not be at least an open question as to whether the American political system experiences such stages and fluctuations? Similarly, is it not sensible to assume that the system will be more or less open to specific groups at different times and at different places?

Lipsky believed that the answer to both questions was yes. He assumed that the ebb and flow of protest activity was largely a function of changes that left established authorities newly vulnerable and/or receptive to the demands of particular groups. Three years later, another political scientist, Peter Eisinger (1973: 11), used the phrase *structure of political opportunities* to help account for variation in riot behavior in 43 American cities. Consistent with Lipsky's argument, Eisinger found that "the incidence of protest is...related to the nature of the city's political opportunity structure," which he defined as "the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system" (Eisinger 1973: 5). In 1978, Charles Tilly elaborated on these fragmentary conceptual beginnings by devoting a full chapter of his landmark book, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, to the important facilitative role of "opportunity" in emergent collective action.

Within four years the key premise underlying the work of Lipsky, Eisinger, and Tilly had been incorporated as one of the central tenets into a new *political process* model of social movements (McAdam 1999

[1982]). Proponents of the model saw the timing and ultimate fate of movements as powerfully shaped by the variable opportunities afforded challengers by the shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power. Though not without its critics (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Polletta 2004), this central assumption and the related concept of political opportunities has become a staple of social movement research. The emergence and development of movements as diverse as the American women's movement (Costain 1992), liberation theology (Smith 1991), political movements in Central America (Brockett 2005), the nuclear power movement (Meyer 1993), protest waves in El Salvador (Almeida 2003), new social movement activity in Germany (Koopmans 1992), and the variable success of farm worker mobilization in California (Jenkins 1985) have been attributed to changes in the *political opportunity structure*.

The first selection by Craig Jenkins, David Jacobs, and Jon Agnone embodies the oldest tradition in the study of political opportunities and movements. Revisiting the canonical case of African American civil rights (McAdam 1999 [1982]), the authors show that over a 50-year period (1948-1997) the ebb and flow of black protest activity is strongly related to the expansion and contraction in political opportunities. Favorable opportunities in this period include: "divided government, strong northern Democratic Party allies, and, during the 1950s... Cold War foreign policy constraints." The latter factor corroborates narrative treatments of the period by Dudziak (2000;), Layton (2000;), McAdam (1999 [1982]: vii-xlii;), and Skrentny (1998).

In addition to the many studies that have sought to explain the emergence and subsequent development of a single movement on the basis of changes in the vulnerability or receptivity of authorities to

movement claims over time, the stress on political opportunities has also spawned a comparative tradition in which researchers have explained the fate of the same movement in a number of countries on the basis of more stable national-level differences in state structure. The aforementioned study by Eisinger exemplifies this tradition. So too does the second piece in this part by Hanspeter Kriesi and colleagues. In this selection, the authors argue that the variable timing, extent, and success of the "new social movements" that arose in most Western European countries in the 1970s and 1980s are largely explained by stable institutional differences that granted movement activists more or less access and influence across these national political systems.

If these two research emphases—changes in political opportunity keying the ebb and flow of movement activity over time and differences in institutional structure shaping cross-national variation in the strength of the same movement—are the oldest in the political opportunity tradition, exciting new lines of theory and research have developed in recent years. Tamara Kay's article

documenting an upsurge in cross-border labor mobilization in the wake of the North American Free Trade Agreement takes up the important issue of how globalization may be reshaping the locus of "political opportunities." Just as the European Union now affords activists any number of new venues in which to press their demands (Marks and McAdam 1996), Kay contends that NAFTA "catalyzed cross-border labor cooperation and collaboration . . . by creating a new opportunity structure at the transnational level."

Finally, in his detailed analysis of protest events in El Salvador between 1962 and 1981, Almeida assesses the simultaneous impact of "opportunity" and "threat" on movement activity. Traditionally, threat and opportunity have been seen as "either or" features of contention, as if movements were catalyzed by one or the other. Although some have speculated that threat and opportunity are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, might interact to shape movement activity (McAdam 1996), virtually no empirical analysis had been adduced to verify or confirm this view. Almeida's work addresses the longstanding neglect of this important issue.

4.

Political Opportunities and African-American Protest, 1948–1997*

J. CRAIG JENKINS, DAVID JACOBS, AND JON AGNONE

In response to the general concern that "social movements and the state are seldom treated together as interacting dimensions of the same political process" (Walton 1992, p. 1), a number of scholars have advanced arguments about political opportunities to account for the mobilization, strategies, and outcomes of social movements (Gamson 1990; Piven and Cloward 1977; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979; McAdam 1996, 1999; Jenkins 1985; Kitschelt 1986; Costain 1992; Kriesi et al. 1995; Koopmans 1995; Della Porta and Diani 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam and Su 2002). The underlying assumption is that protest is "simply politics by other means" (Gamson 1990, p. 139) and that, for politically excluded groups, new opportunities increase the perceived likelihood of success, thereby encouraging mobilization and collective action.

Political opportunity theory, however, has developed in an ad hoc fashion, in part because of the reliance on historical case studies that lack multivariate tests. This led to debates about the meaning of political opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996), whether opportunities can be distinguished from other factors that facilitate protest (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996), the mechanisms through which opportunities work (Della Porta and Diani 1999, pp. 213–25), and the importance of opportunities versus threats (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998, pp. 85–87; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Van Dyke 2003). Some question whether opportunities (or any other factors) can explain protest across time, arguing that protest can "only be predicted

from episode to episode" (Turner and Killian 1987, p. 255; Lofland 1993, p. 216). As one might expect from this lack of agreement, research findings sometimes have been contradictory as well.

We focus on how political opportunities affect the frequency of African-American protest between 1948 and 1997. Some contend that elite divisions created by electoral competition and divided government encourage protest (Piven and Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978, pp. 213–14), while others point to the effects of political allies in the form of strong left parties (Rubin, Griffin, and Wallace 1983; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1985, pp. 225–26; Minkoff 1997) or, alternatively, out-of-power left parties (Kriesi et al. 1995; Della Porta and Diani 1999, pp. 219–22). Other students of social movements and protest argue that political threats are important because, contrary to a simple rational choice calculus, protest is reactive (Goldstone and Tilly 2001).

In this study, we also pursue somewhat neglected topics by assessing the effects of collective grievances and indigenous group organization. While some argue that grievances are "secondary" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1215) or "relatively constant and pervasive" when protest by politically excluded groups is at issue (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, p. 265), others point to "fraternal" or group-based relative deprivation stemming from racial inequality (Geschwender 1964, 1973; Gurr 1970; Morgan and Clark 1973; Abeles 1976; Smith and Ortiz 2002) and to structural strains stemming from unemployment and the disorganization of everyday life (Piven and Cloward 1977; Useem 1980, 1998; Snow et al. 1998). Indigenous group organization, which provides leadership and organizers, collective solidarity, and social networks for the development and dissemination of injustice frames and tactical innovations (Morris 1984; McAdam 1999, pp. 98–106; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988), also should contribute

Jenkins J. Craig, David Jacobs, and Jon Agnone. 2003. "Political Opportunities and African American Protest, 1948–1997." *American Journal of Sociology* 109: 277–303. Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press. Notes have been renumbered and edited.

to protest frequency. Organized groups are better able to mobilize and act collectively, making protest more likely.

We use time-series analyses of yearly data to examine the frequency of African-American protest from 1948 through 1997. With the exception of Minkoff (1997), past work (McAdam 1983, 1999; Jenkins and Eckert 1986) on African-American protest events has focused on a relatively narrow period by limiting analyses to events between 1955 and 1980. Protest before and after the civil rights era was neglected. By analyzing a longer period, which includes the three decades after the major legal gains of the civil rights movement, we can determine if systematic factors produce these protests or if protest "can only be predicted from episode to episode" (Turner and Killian 1987, p. 255). The multivariate time-series approach we use in this study will furnish independent estimates of the explanatory power of opportunities, threats, collective grievances, and indigenous organization.

Explanations for Protest

We begin with political opportunities, not because we assume that this is the most central factor, but because there has been considerable debate about its definition and its influence on protest. By political opportunities we mean "the probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome" (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, p. 182). Opportunity theory assumes rational choice on the part of protesters, who evaluate their political environment and make calculations about the likely impact of their collective action or inaction. Analysts normally distinguish between dynamic and structural opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Tarrow 1996). In this analysis, we focus on three dynamic processes that varied over a 50-year period: (1) elite divisions; (2) the power of political allies; and (3) political threats. Our research design will not let us explore arguments about regime centralization, bureaucratization, and political institutions because these explanatory factors did not change during the period we study. Such explanations cannot be analyzed with a research design restricted to events in one nation within a 50-year period but instead require a longer time period or

cross-national comparisons (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995).

Tilly (1978, pp. 213–14) argues that closely divided, competitive political situations create opportunities for protest. Polity members normally oppose all political challenges by excluded groups, even moderates who are simply pressing for polity membership. For polity members "any change in the makeup of the polity is inherently disruptive of the institutionalized status quo and thus something to be resisted" (McAdam 1999, p. 19). Yet, in a closely divided and competitive situation, polity members may have to tolerate if not actively support political challengers. Several researchers argue that the close and highly competitive presidential elections, coupled with small congressional power margins, in the 1950s and early 1960s led to relaxed repression and civil rights proposals that encouraged African-American protest (Piven and Cloward 1977, pp. 213–21, 231–35; McAdam 1999, pp. 156–60, 169–72; Valelly 1993). Discussing the general protest wave in the 1960s and early 1970s, Jenkins (1985, p. 218) claims, "In the context of a series of closely contested (Presidential) elections, in which the margin of victory was often less than one percent, two swing voting blocs (African-Americans and the new middle class) became increasingly decisive in the electoral calculations of political elites." Costain (1992, pp. 22–24) argues that close presidential elections also created bipartisan tolerance and support for the early women's movement. In a time-series analysis of student protest between 1930 and 1990, Van Dyke (2003) finds that a closely divided federal government leads to greater protest.

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*Electoral competition and resulting elite divisions create opportunities for greater African-American protest.*

A second focus has been political allies. Some contend that strong left parties signal a responsive government that has the power to alter relevant policies, thereby encouraging leftist protest (Piven and Cloward 1977; Jenkins 1985, pp. 217–22). Others argue the opposite view, that out-of-power left parties have a greater stake in supporting protest that promises to strengthen their electoral position whereas strong left parties provide routine political access to challengers, thereby discouraging

protest (Katzenstein and Mueller 1987; Kriesi et al. 1995; Della Porta and Diani 1999, pp. 215–22). There is empirical support for both arguments. Studies have found that the congressional strength of the Democratic Party encourages African-American protest (Minkoff 1997) and industrial strikes (Rubin et al. 1983; Isaac and Christiansen 2002). In Japan during the 1960s, the election of environmentalists to the Japanese parliament encouraged the mobilization of local environmental movements (Almeida and Stearns 1998). On the other side, some argue that out-of-power left parties in Western Europe promoted "new social movement" protest in a bid to contest the next election (Koopmans and Rucht 1995, pp. 95–106; Kriesi et al. 1995, chap. 3; Maguire 1995). When researchers studied the U.S. feminist and African-American movements, Minkoff (1997, p. 790) found that Democratic congressional power reduced feminist protest but increased African-American protest, indicating opposite effects on these two movements. Soule et al. (1999) found that Democratic presidents reduce both feminist protest and conventional political action, while Van Dyke (2003) found that Democratic presidents reduce student protest.

A possible explanation for these inconsistent results concerns the initial political status of the challenging group. African-Americans were politically excluded when they began to protest, so the development of a powerful ally might promise to reduce repression and encourage successful protest. In contrast, the women's movement enjoyed strong political access to Congress and the White House from its early mobilization in the mid- and late 1960s (Freeman 1973; Costain 1992, chap. 2). This may have encouraged the movement to shun protest in favor of institutional methods (Costain 1992) and, when its Democratic Party ally was later out of power, to resort to protest (Soule et al. 1999). The initially excluded status of African-Americans thus leads to

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*Left-party strength creates opportunities for increased African-American protest.*

A related hypothesis focuses on political access. Once a previously excluded group obtains political power, less costly routine political action is favored

over more costly protest. Minkoff (1997) found that the growth of African-American congressional representation retarded protest.

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*Increased African-American representation in Congress provides routine political access and thus reduces African-American protest.*

A third political-ally effect may stem from external constraints on elites that lead them to adopt favorable policies. Several scholars argue that Cold War international competition with the Soviet Union for support of newly independent states made Jim Crow racism a major diplomatic liability. This led the Eisenhower administration to promote a civil rights bill in 1956, intervene in the Little Rock, Arkansas, school desegregation conflict in 1957, and promote diplomatic activities abroad that emphasized racial progress (Plummer 1996, pp. 269–73; Skrentny 1998, pp. 272–77). Since political incumbents should have "known" political records that movement supporters can use to gauge their willingness to respond favorably to protest, campaigns by Republican presidential incumbents during this period should signal opportunities. This should have held until 1968, by which time détente, the autonomy of the international nonaligned movement, and the passage of major civil rights laws dismantling Jim Crow eliminated this international diplomatic pressure and Republican presidents shifted to a "Southern strategy" by using symbolic racial appeals to conservative whites to solicit votes (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Skrentny 1998).

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*Campaigns by incumbent Republican presidential candidates between 1947 and 1964 signaled additional opportunities that increased African-American protest.*

Political opportunity theory assumes a rational choice premise that several have criticized for misrepresenting the calculus behind protest. Drawing on prospect theory (Quattrone and Tversky 1988), researchers have argued that negative rewards (or threats) are intrinsically more motivating than their positive counterparts (or opportunities) (Berejikian 1992; Goldstone and Tilly 2001). By threats, we mean "the costs that social groups will incur from protest, or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action" (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, p. 183). Tilly (1978, pp. 134–35) makes the additional point

that groups are more responsive to threats because they tend to inflate the value of resources already under control, overestimate the potential negative impact of threats, and can respond more quickly to threats by using existing networks and practices, while, on the other hand, responses to new opportunities demand time-consuming and expensive mobilization.

Several studies document the threat effects of repression and impending negative policies. Francisco (1995) found that state repression in a democratic context stimulates protest rather than reducing it by violating democratic accessibility norms. Rasler (1996) argues that, although repression had short-term negative effects, it also had long-term positive effects on rebellious protest in the autocratic context of the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. "Goading" events (Lofland 1993, p. 220), such as the threat of negative policies or impending governmental changes, may also stimulate protest. In the early 1980s, Reagan administration statements about "limited and survivable nuclear warfare" stimulated nuclear freeze protest, which subsided after Democratic allies adopted a watered-down freeze platform and the Reagan White House tempered its bellicose rhetoric (Meyer 1990, 1993). Van Dyke and Soule (2002) find that the threat of female state legislators mobilized the right-wing patriot/militia movement while Van Dyke (2003) finds that Republican presidents and state governors threatened student protesters, thereby provoking greater protest.

In the African-American case, we can isolate one threat to the movement. Following our earlier reasoning that presidential incumbents should have "known" records that are well understood by movement activists, Republican presidential reelection campaigns beginning in 1968, with the adoption of an anti-civil rights stance, should constitute a threat to the African-American movement.

HYPOTHESIS 5.—*Beginning in 1968, Republican presidential incumbent campaigns constituted a political threat to African-Americans that stimulated additional African-American protests.*

What about collective grievances and group organization? As noted, there has been considerable debate about grievance explanations, with some

arguing that grievances are "secondary" (McCarthy and Zald 1977) or that they are too "constant and pervasive" to enhance protest by politically excluded groups (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, p. 265). Earlier research on African-American grievances emphasized "fraternal" or group-based relative deprivation involving negative intergroup comparisons by African-Americans who used whites as a reference group (Pettigrew 1964; Geschwender 1964, 1973; Gurr 1970; Abeles 1976). Although it is impossible to directly tap attitudinal processes in a study based on aggregate data, we can examine objective measures of group inequality that are likely to be interpreted as due to discriminatory treatment. Given the widespread African-American perception that racial discrimination is responsible for differences in the resources of blacks and whites (Jaynes and Williams 1989), racial economic inequality should fuel group relative deprivation and produce an increased willingness to engage in protest. Several studies have found a positive relationship between objective relative deprivation measures and individual protest activity (Geschwender 1964, 1973; Abeles 1976), while studies of the urban riots in the 1960s found a positive relationship between racial inequality and riot severity (Morgan and Clark 1973; Myers 1997, p. 107).

HYPOTHESIS 6.—*Increased economic differences between whites and blacks should produce more substantial African-American grievances and therefore stimulate protests.*

A second source of relative deprivation may be the Vietnam War, which after 1965 was framed by many movement leaders as a racial equity issue. Responding to the Vietnam War buildup in 1965, prominent movement leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. (Lewis 1978, pp. 302, 309-12, 359-60), James Farmer and Floyd McKissick of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE; Meier and Rudwick 1973, pp. 404, 414-15), and Robert Moses, Julian Bond, and Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC; Carson 1981, pp. 183-89, 220-21) publicly criticized the war and organized antiwar protests, including draft resistance. Some leaders, such as King, emphasized religious views that justified pacifism and nonviolence. King also stressed the economic costs of the

war and its negative effects on the War on Poverty, while others framed their opposition in terms of black nationalism. In 1965, Julian Bond, a SNCC staff member, was barred from assuming his seat in the Georgia state senate because of his antiwar views. These and other events prompted Martin Luther King, Jr., to make public speeches against the war, which gained considerable publicity after he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1966. In 1967, the heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali was stripped of his title after he refused military induction, claiming that his status as a Nation of Islam minister qualified him for a draft exemption. Vietnam War deaths were the major factor stimulating negative change in public opinion against the war, and African-Americans were significantly more antiwar than whites, with a consistent 10%-20% racial gap in public opinion polls on this issue (Mueller 1973, pp. 142-43). We therefore treat Vietnam War deaths as a source of racial grievances. Because these battle deaths may have varying salience with a greater influence at lower levels and then diminishing returns above a threshold, we test a quadratic function as well as the linear alternative.

HYPOTHESES 7a and 7b.—*The more Vietnam War deaths, the greater African-American grievances and thus protest. This effect may be greater at lower levels but diminish at higher levels.*

There has been a long-standing debate between disorganization theorists, who contend that unemployment creates strains and thereby protests and other civil disorders (Kornhauser 1959; Piven and Cloward 1977; Useem 1980, 1998), and resource mobilization theorists, who contend that unemployment reduces group resources and thus the cohesion required to mobilize protest (Tilly et al. 1975; Snyder and Tilly 1972). The evidence is mixed, with some studies finding no effects of black unemployment on 1960s riots (Spilerman 1976; Myers 1997), others finding positive relationships between (general) unemployment on homeless protests (Cress and Snow 2000) and right-wing patriot/militia mobilization (Van Dyke and Soule 2002), and still others finding negative effects on industrial strikes (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Hibbs 1976; Franzosi 1995, chaps. 2 and 3).

One possibility is that both theories are valid within specific ranges. Unemployment stimulates protest up to a point, but extremely high joblessness may reduce protest because of its effects on resources in protest prone but relatively poor communities. In addition to a simple hypothesis about linear effects, we also examine the nonlinear hypothesis that, while increased unemployment at low-to-middle levels stimulates protest, at extremely high levels unemployment undermines African-American protest.

HYPOTHESES 8a and 8b.—*African-American unemployment has a linear relationship with African-American protest—that is, African-American unemployment enhances African-American protest—as long as unemployment remains below an inflection point. But unemployment should reduce protest after it goes beyond this point.*

Indigenous African-American organization, ranging from informal networks to community organizations (Tilly 1978, p. 64) and formal social movement organizations (or SMOs), should enhance the incidence of protest by reducing free riding and providing social ties through which mobilizing frames are defined and diffused, leaders and organizers developed, collective incentives enhanced, and collective action coordinated. In general, "the greater the density of social organization, the more likely that social movement activity will develop" (McAdam et al. 1988, p. 793). Historical studies have identified two sources of indigenous organization as critical to African-American protest: (1) the African-American churches, which provided an autonomous institution that "served as the main repository of Black culture...capable of generating, sustaining and culturally energizing large volumes of protest" (Morris 1999, p. 424); and (2) the SMOs created by movement leaders to organize, coordinate, and promote protest. McAdam (1999, pp. 98-100) argues that "the institutional strength embodied in the urban black church...[was critical to] the outbreak of widespread black protest activity in the mid-1950s." Morris (1984) argues that the growth of the African-American church provided the primary networks behind the local movement centers of the protest movement, furnishing leadership, a

recruiting ground, and a coordination center for protest. Because the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was the national SMO most responsible for the long-term development of the African-American movement and because most activists associated with other SMOs were also NAACP members (McAdam 1999, pp. 125–28; Morris 1984), we use this membership.

HYPOTHESIS 9.—*The greater the membership of African-American churches and the NAACP, the greater the level of African-American protest.*

Methods

Research Design and the Dependent Variable

We use time-series estimation to analyze yearly counts of the number of African-American protests from 1948 to 1997. An analysis of a 50-year period provides an opportunity to see if similar factors produced the “rise” and the “decline” of protests. The mean number of protests in the sampled years is 27.66, with a peak of 240 in 1965. Because the log of this series is normally distributed, count estimation using Poisson regression is inappropriate. Such a normal distribution should not be surprising

when variable means reach this size (Cameron and Triviedi 1998). It follows that the Jarque-Bera test for a normal distribution does not reject the null hypothesis that the log of this dependent variable is normally distributed, so the factors that produce change in the log transformation of this series are best estimated with least squares. Least squares procedures can be readily corrected for autocorrelation with a generalized least squares (GLS) approach, making this estimator preferable to count alternatives. As we show below, GLS and negative binomial regression (the appropriate count estimator) give similar results.

We have data on the number of African-American protests from 1948 through 1997, so the maximum number of sampled years is 50. Most of our independent variables should have an immediate effect on protest, so, with two exceptions (discussed below), we use unlagged explanatory variables.

Measuring African-American protest.—Figure 1 charts the annual frequency of African-American protests between 1948 and 1997. This series is constructed by combining McAdam’s (1983, 1999)




Figure 4.1 African-American protest events, 1947–97.

annual counts for protests for 1955–70 with our own coding of the comparable headings of the news story abstracts provided in the *New York Times Index* for 1948–54 and 1971–97 (*New York Times* 1948–97).¹ To insure coding consistency, we matched our coding for one year on each end of the McAdam portion of the series (1955 and 1970) and, for 1948–54 and 1971–97, used a “double-code” process in which two independent coders coded all events and resolved discrepancies by discussion and the assignment of a consensus code. We use only nonviolent protest by African-Americans, including public demonstrations and marches, sit-ins, rallies, freedom rides, boycotts, and other protest actions. We exclude riots, melees, and racial confrontations that lacked a clear protest quality as well as routine institutional actions (conferences, meetings, press releases, speeches) and *New York Times*-generated events (such as editorials, letters to the editor, news analysis stories). This means our counts differ from the total of “movement-initiated” events that McAdam (1999, pp. 120–25) focused on because he also included conventional political actions such as meetings and press releases. Media coverage is likely more reliable for protests (discussed further below), which favors this measure. We code discrete events, treating multiday protests as a single event unless reported as distinct events with different actors and initiation.

The use of the *New York Times* and news sources in general poses methodological questions. Analyses have shown that newspapers are more likely to cover protests that are large or involve political controversy and violence (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000). Our aim is to gauge the national trend in the frequency of African-American protest. Several considerations argue for treating this series as the best available method of measuring African-American protest. First, the *New York Times* is the only national newspaper “of record” for our complete period. Introducing multiple news sources for part of our period after 1972 when other national papers become indexed might create inconsistent coverage. Coding a single newspaper increases the likelihood that any selectiveness in reporting is consistent across time. Second, protests

are relatively newsworthy and thus more likely to be reported than conventional actions (Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000). Third, least squares is designed to handle random error in the dependent variable while the intercept eliminates the effects of constant errors in the regressand.

Why focus on 1948–97? Although the NAACP was founded in 1909–10 and there were scattered protests associated with Marcus Garvey’s Back to Africa movement of the 1920s along with welfare protests in the 1930s (Jaynes and Williams 1989), A. Phillip Randolph’s proposed march on Washington in June 1941 was the first planned mass African-American protest. When it became evident that the politically embarrassing march was going to happen, President Roosevelt issued an executive order banning racial discrimination in the defense industries, thus defusing the protest before it could occur (Garfinkel 1969). Our analysis therefore begins with the post-World War II protests, a series of “freedom trains,” bus boycotts, and legal actions contesting Jim Crow segregation. The Montgomery bus boycott in 1955–56 demonstrated that thousands of supporters could be mobilized for over a year, and the sit-in campaign in 1959–62 showed that hundreds of committed activists could dismantle Jim Crow laws. Protest peaked in the mid-1960s and then declined, continuing to “percolate” (Lofland 1993) after 1975 at levels roughly double those during the period prior to the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott (3.57 protests per year between 1948 and 1954 compared to an annual mean of 7.05 protests per year for 1976–97). We select 1997 as a cutoff because at the time of the coding it was the last available year of the *New York Times Index*. No years had zero protests. Because this measure is skewed, we use the log transformation in regression. Note as well that problems with simultaneity cannot bias the estimates as long as explanatory variables are lagged and autocorrelation has been removed.

Measuring Explanatory Variables

We assess electoral competition with two measures: (1) the presence of divided government (treated as a dummy variable as discussed below); and (2) the absolute value of the margin of presidential victory (the percentage of the popular

vote for the winner minus the percentage of the popular vote for the second major party candidate).² Divided government is measured by a dummy variable (0 = no; 1 = yes) representing the presence of divided party control over the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency.

We measure our political ally theses about left-party strength by the sum of northern or nonsouthern Democrats in the Senate and the House (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1982–2002; *Congressional Quarterly* 1947–78) multiplied by a dummy variable (0 = no; 1 = yes) representing the presence of a Democratic president. On questions of race, the Democratic Party has long been regionally divided, with southern Democrats aligning with Republicans on conservative positions. Multiplying the percentage of congressional northern Democrats by the presidential dummy captures the veto power of the president, who can block any effects of northern Democratic strength. This means that all years with a Republican president are scored “0” and the percentage of northern (i.e. non-southern) Democrats in Congress creates positive scores only when the president is a Democrat.

African-American congressional representation is measured by the sum of congressional seats held by African-Americans (Ornstein et al. 1982–2002). This explanatory variable assesses an institutional alternative to protest and therefore should have a negative effect.

During the period in question Republican presidents shifted from being allies of the African-American movement to becoming opponents. In the early part of the Cold War, Republican presidents responded to Cold War international competition by attempting to counter Jim Crow but, beginning in 1968, this became irrelevant as the Southern strategy became paramount. Because incumbents have “known” records, we use an annual dummy coded “1” for those reelection years when Republican presidential incumbents ran for reelection between 1947 and 1964, treating this as an ally effect. Beginning in 1968, this same dummy variable becomes a threat measure. We treat former vice presidents (Nixon in 1960; Bush in 1988) as incumbents, given their strong ties to the previous Republican presidency.

To tap the relative deprivation associated with racial inequality, we use the *ratio of black to white median family income* (USDOC 1948–99).³ This explanatory variable is reverse coded, so its coefficients should be negative. To capture the racial grievances and movement organizing targeted against the Vietnam War, we use the *number of Vietnam War battle deaths* (USDOC 1948–99, year 1980, p. 365). These deaths are skewed, so they are analyzed in natural log form and, to test the idea that there is a threshold beyond which these deaths have a diminished effect, we test a quadratic function.

To capture the strain and resource effects of unemployment, we use the annual rate of black unemployment in both linear and quadratic form (USDOC 1999). Inasmuch as lower unemployment levels may create grievances and therefore enhance protest, but extremely high levels may reduce resources and protest, we test a quadratic specification.

The organizational base of the African-American movement is measured by the annual membership of the NAACP provided in its *Annual Report* (1947–82) and, after it ceased publication in 1982, the membership reported in the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Research 1984–98).⁴ The NAACP was the main national SMO and most activists from the other SMOs were also NAACP members (McAdam 1999, pp. 125–28; Morris 1984). We use the membership of the National Baptist Convention, which was involved in early African-American protests, including those initiated by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (Branch 1988, pp. 101–92, 335–39, 500–503). The National Baptist Convention is the most complete denominational series for the African-American churches (Jacquet 1987–98). We use linear interpolation to fill in missing years. Both variables are in two-year moving average form to capture lagged and immediate effects. Appendix table A1 provides the annual values for all these variables in the period we study. To remove the effects of any unmeasured linear effects, we include a linear yearly count measure in all models and, where indicated by the augmented component-plus-residual plots, the square of the yearly count (Mallows 1986).

Results

We begin by controlling for grievances, organization, and political opportunities. Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the regression analysis. We use the Prais Winsten least squares procedure in Stata (ver. 7) to eliminate the effects of autocorrelation because this procedure does not remove the first year.

Model 1 shows that divided government and the two “powerful ally” effects—northern Democratic strength and reelection campaigns by Republican presidential incumbents prior to 1968—increase protests. The results suggest that African-American congressional representation provides political access, thereby reducing protest. As Minkoff (1997) argues, these electoral gains constitute a significant success for the African-American movement and help to channel movement activity into institutionalized political influence methods. In addition to these “expanding opportunity” effects, collective grievances stemming from racial income inequality and Vietnam battle deaths both contribute to protest. We show the quadratic of Vietnam battle deaths, which indicates a positive effect up to a point and then a diminishing effect. In our best-fitting model 5 (below), this threshold is at the eighty-seventh percentile. The simple linear function was also positive and significant, confirming that Vietnam deaths stimulate protest. We find no evidence that the threats associated with reelection bids by incumbent Republican presidents after 1968 had any influence on protests.

Model 2 shows that black church membership does not contribute to protest. Although many of these protests were organized through church networks, the national growth of church membership did not bring about additional protests. Model 3 shows that the absolute value of the presidential vote margin does not matter either. This finding suggests that a divided government, not the margin of party victory in the most recent presidential election, is the key opportunity arising from electoral competition.⁵ Model 4 shows that these results hold net of a control for the square of the yearly count, indicated by the augmented component-plus-residual plot.

In model 5 we add black unemployment, but this variable does not account for protests when a linear

relationship is tested. Model 6, however, shows that the quadratic is significant. The inflection point is at 12.4%, indicating that unemployment up to that level enhances the likelihood of protest but that after this threshold is reached, the diminished resources emphasized by resource mobilization theorists reduce protest frequencies. The effects we have detected are consistent across a variety of specifications, suggesting that these models are relatively robust.

Robustness tests.—Model 7 shows that a period dummy coded “1” for all years after 1965 is not significant. We also tested a similar period dummy for 1971 onward and 1975 onward and both were non-significant. These findings suggest that a structural shift with effects limited to a particular time period is not present. In addition, Ramsey-Reset tests reject the null hypothesis that specification errors are present in the best equations. In the last analysis presented in model 8, we test the explanatory variables in model 1 using negative binomial count estimator. The results are almost identical to the findings based on least squares, except that reelection campaigns by incumbent Republican presidents have negative effects after 1968 (the reverse of the hypothesized direction) and lagged NAACP membership is just below significance ($P < .053$; $t = 1.62$).

Conclusions

Some students of protest have argued that these events are indeterminate or that they can “only be predicted from episode to episode” (Turner and Killian 1987, p. 255; Lofland 1993, p. 216). While there undoubtedly is a high degree of uncertainty and volatility involved in protest, our findings suggest that a relatively restricted set of hypotheses about political opportunity, collective grievances, and indigenous organization helps account for protest frequencies. We have focused on evaluating the core political process arguments about opportunities and threats, but this analysis also shows that collective grievances and indigenous organization are important. It is not a question of opportunities alone being important, or grievances or organization alone, but of all three contributing to protest.

These results point to the importance of political opportunities that are based on divided government,

Table 1 Annual Determinants of African-American Protest Events, 1948-97

Explanatory Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Divided government	.8504** (.3233)	.8186* (.3429)	.8767** (.3227)	.9375** (.3378)
Northern Democratic Party strength	.0293** (.0093)	.0289** (.0095)	.0313*** (.0095)	.0318*** (.0098)
N blacks in Congress	-.1183*** (.0204)	-.1213*** (.0230)	-.1207*** (.0204)	-.1018*** (.0272)
I if Republican incumbent in presidential election:				
1943-64 elections	2.4527*** (.4241)	2.4677*** (.4304)	2.4376*** (.4227)	2.3941*** (.4297)
1968-97 elections	-.3244 (.2818)	-.3246 (.2850)	-.3383 (.2811)	-.3356 (.2828)
Black/white median income	-6.3450* (2.6944)	-6.3294* (2.7184)	-6.5275** (2.6844)	-8.5380* (3.6104)
In Vietnam War deaths	.4444*** (.0933)	.4519*** (.0974)	.4828*** (.0990)	.4114*** (.1003)
In Vietnam War deaths ²	-.0316** (.0107)	-.0324** (.0111)	-.0361** (.0114)	-.0269* (.0119)
In NAACP members	1.6538** (.5990)	1.6794** (.6103)	1.4773* (.6168)	1.3111* (.7076)
In black church members	...	-.0000 (.0000)
% presidential vote margin (absolute value)0093 (.0084)	
Yearly trend variable	.0671*** (.0167)	.0749* (.0311)	.0708*** (.0170)	.0957** (.0354)
Yearly trend variable ²	-.0007 (.0008)
Intercept	-5.2658 (3.4224)	-5.1750 (3.4671)	-4.3175 (3.5101)	-2.4603 (4.5999)
R ² (corrected)	.910***	.908***	.911***	.909***
D-W	2.1556	2.1610	2.1774	2.1703

Note.—N = 50 years. NAACP and black church variables are in two-year moving average form. Numbers in parentheses are SEs.

* P ≤ .05, one-tailed tests.

** P ≤ .01.

*** P ≤ .001.

Table 2 Additional Models of Annual Determinants of African-American Protest Events, 1948-97

Explanatory Variable	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Divided government	.9476** (.3394)	.8753** (.3013)	.5916* (.3430)	.9091* (.4988)
Northern Democratic Party strength	.0318*** (.0098)	.0293*** (.0087)	.0191* (.0098)	.0282* (.0142)
N blacks in Congress	-.1000*** (.0274)	-.1024*** (.0242)	-.0562*** (.0121)	-.0926** (.0381)
I if Republican incumbent in presidential election:				
1948-64 elections	2.3073*** (.4476)	2.2881*** (.4085)	2.3510*** (.4802)	1.9592*** (.3621)
1968-97 elections	-.3258 (.2844)	-.3653 (.2596)	-.4494 (.3128)	-.5344* (.3002)
Black/white median income	-9.8472** (4.0174)	-8.1804* (3.6255)	-7.9141* (4.0310)	-7.5716* (4.1426)
In Vietnam War deaths	.3852*** (.1064)	.3436*** (.0944)	.3306*** (.1103)	.3745*** (.1193)
In Vietnam War deaths ²	-.0258* (.0120)	-.0163 (.0111)	-.0129 (.0136)	-.0253* (.0138)
In NAACP members	1.3710* (.7146)	.9329 (.6559)	1.7466* (.7336)	1.5111 (.9347)
% black unemployment	-.0303 (.0400)	.3217** (.1374)	.4462** (.1526)	...
% black unemployment ²	...	-.0130** (.0049)	-.0160** (.0058)	...
I if year = 1965-973840 (.4345)	...
Yearly trend variable	.1173** (.0457)	.0916* (.0415)1015* (.0464)
Yearly trend variable ²	-.0011 (.0009)	-.0007 (.0008)	...	-.0011 (.0010)
Intercept	-1.9919 (4.6609)	-2.1081 (4.1379)	-6.8753 (4.4493)	-3.8759 (5.6470)
R ² (corrected or pseudo)	.909***	.932***	.894***	.241***
D-W	2.2336	2.3849	2.0650	...

Note.—N = 50 years, model 8 is estimated with negative binomial count model. NAACP is in two-year moving average form. Numbers in parentheses are SEs.

* P ≤ .05, one-tailed tests.

** P ≤ .01.

*** P ≤ .001.

the political strength of northern Democrats, and Republican presidential incumbents who were pressured by the Cold War to take pro-civil rights stances. These opportunities worked together to expand African-American protest, which grew in response to these forces and contracted when these forces became weaker. At the same time, stronger African-American presence in Congress provided an alternative to protest, discouraging it. Our results also point to the importance of collective grievances and indigenous group organization, by indicating that all three components increase protest. We find that collective grievances stemming from racial income inequality, low-to-high Vietnam War deaths, and low-to-medium unemployment stimulate protest. At the same time, extremely high unemployment attenuates group resources, reducing protest, while greater NAACP membership enhances protest.

Our findings support the classic "expanding opportunity" argument that divided governments and left party strength promote protest. The presence of a divided government creates interparty competition and thus a greater willingness by elites to tolerate or support moderate political challengers who seek political access. Similarly, stronger left party power creates greater opportunities for protest by moderate challengers who seek political access. Yet our results do not support rival hypotheses that out-of-power left parties promote protest or that narrower electoral margins create interparty competition and produce greater support for protest. The first hypothesis may be more relevant in multiparty democracies, where coalition-formation is more complex and out-of-power left parties may have more to gain by playing a "spoiler" role by promoting protest. In a two-party system, however, an out-of-power left party means that excluded groups lack powerful political allies who could reduce repression and create tolerance if not support for protest. In any case, it is important to emphasize that these opportunities are limited to moderate challengers seeking access to a democratic political system. Such processes are unlikely to encourage the mobilization of more radical challengers and counter-cultural or identity movements, whose goals are not primarily political.

How do we reconcile these findings with earlier studies showing that Democratic congressional power reduces feminist protest (Minkoff 1997) and that Democratic presidents reduce both feminist (Soule et al. 1999) and student protest (Van Dyke 2003)? One possible explanation is that our Democratic strength measures differ. Our measure taps the power of northern congressional Democrats combined with Democratic control of the presidency. This measure therefore captures the intense regional divisions among congressional Democrats on racial issues and the importance of the presidential veto. The alternative studies used either the simple percentage of congressional Democrats or the presence of a Democratic president. We also tested these measures, but we find positive if nonsignificant effects.

An alternative possibility is that the "outsider" political status of African-Americans at the initiation of this protest wave created a different left party ally effect. At the start of these protests, African-Americans were politically disadvantaged nationally and, in the South, denied the franchise and basic civil rights. Protest was a critical tool for transforming such exclusions and northern Democratic political power was one of the factors that encouraged this protest. By contrast, at the outset the women's and students' movements enjoyed a degree of political access. Having political access at the start of a movement creates a different calculation about protest. In this circumstance, protest may be seen as challenging one's allies, which would be detrimental, so conventional actions should be less costly and more effective. But a movement that mounts an "outsider" challenge may benefit by having powerful left party allies. Stronger northern congressional Democrats gave African-American protesters a significant ally in their battles against conservative whites. It also meant that protesters were less likely to be repressed and that protest would be tolerated if not supported. This suggests that "outsider" movements respond to favorable opportunities with increased protests, but, for "insider" movements that enjoy political access at the outset, an out-of-power ally may produce more protest. Supporting this contention, as African-American representatives were elected to Congress, protest declined,

indicating that the availability of a lower-cost alternative channeled political action into conventional means. This issue deserves further empirical attention using data on diverse movements in different political systems.

The negative relationship between African-American congressional representation and protest raises the complex question of the effects of movement success. While the shift "from protest to politics" means less protest, it also means that African-Americans were more likely to vote (Lawson 1976), to have effective recourse to the courts, to lobby Congress, and to have a greater influence on public policy (Button 1989; Andrews 2001). Congressional representation indicates movement success, but it also reduces the incentives for further protest. Does political success invariably lead to reduced protest? Tarrow (1998, pp. 144-45) argues that minor victories signal greater opportunities, which incite protest (including its diffusion to less organized actors), while major victories that address widespread collective grievances are demobilizing. We have not attempted to deal with the complex question of movement success (see Giugni, Tilly, and McAdam 1999; Andrews 2001; Santoro 2002; McAdam and Su 2002; Jacobs and Helms 2001; and Jenkins and Form, in press), but it is obvious that a full account should examine the accelerating and decelerating effects of different types of movement victories on protest. This would require distinguishing minor from major victories across a wide range of relevant policy arenas, an undertaking for future analysis.

Our analysis also indicates that collective grievances stemming from racial income inequality, Vietnam War deaths, and low-to-moderate black unemployment contribute to African-American protest. These grievances may be "secondary" (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and, at least during the early period of our study, they may have been "relatively constant" (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, p. 265), but they were not constant over the entire period covered by our sample. Summarizing over 350 psychological studies, Smith and Ortiz (2002) found that "fraternal" or group-based relative deprivation has consistently significant effects on individual protest behavior. This influence is strongest in

settings where there is a history of intergroup conflict and discriminatory treatment by the advantaged group that is seen by the disadvantaged as responsible for group subordination. Our findings on the aggregate-level effects of racial income inequality support this explanation. Such results point to a need for further analysis of relative deprivation processes, properly specified in terms of relative group standing and synthesized with political opportunity and resource mobilization arguments (Pettigrew 2002).

We suspect a similar type of group-based relative deprivation may have been at work in the effects of Vietnam War deaths. Mueller (1973, pp. 142-43) shows that African-Americans were consistently more opposed to the Vietnam War than whites and, by the late 1960s, less than a third gave favorable responses toward the war to survey questions. Some saw the mounting casualties and draft call-ups as an "unfair" imposition that was racially discriminatory. African-American leaders also were early critics of the war, some claiming that it contradicted U.S. claims to promote the independence of the newly created "new nations." Others emphasized inconsistencies with their pacifist views and the financial constraints the war in Vietnam imposed on the War on Poverty.

Our findings also support the resource mobilization argument that NAACP organization increased protest. For excluded groups, organization building provides a critical vehicle for mobilization. Protest entails significant risks and leads to problems with free riders and discrepant strategies. Formal organization, especially when it is embedded in a broader set of diffuse informal networks, helps address these problems and thereby contributes to protest.

Our results on black unemployment suggest that the traditional debate between disorganization and resource mobilization is misguided. Instead of viewing this as an "either/or" situation, it may be better to think of it as "both/and." The effects of unemployment depend on its level, with low-to-moderate unemployment creating inducements to protest but high levels of unemployment decreasing resources and thereby reducing protest. Thus, while unemployment is a source of collective grievances, at higher levels it undermines protest. This departure

from linearity may account for the conflicting results in prior studies. Some have detected strain effects (Useem 1980, 1998; Cress and Snow 2000; Van Dyke and Soule 2002), while others have found resource effects (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Hibbs 1976; Franzosi 1995), but these investigators did not test nonlinear relationships.

Our study has significant limits. First, we cannot test arguments about political opportunities linked to the centralization of the state or the capacities of political institutions because such tests would require either a cross-national analysis or a longer time period to capture sufficient variation. Second, we must ignore subnational factors. Because of limitations in the information that is available, we instead treat these outcomes as due to national influences. The data required for a combined analysis of local and national protests would be extremely costly. We nevertheless acknowledge that African-American protest was initially centered in the South, suggesting that local processes are important. The absence of an available control for police violence is another important limitation, despite claims that such acts only encouraged protest in part because they provoked outside sympathizers (Garrow 1978; Barkan 1984). It is possible that the combined effects of national opportunities together with local repression stimulated these protests.

A final question concerns the generalizability of these results. In this study we show that political processes, collective grievances, and formal organization affected the frequency of African-American protest across a 50-year period in the United States. The political opportunities we have examined are most relevant to political challengers seeking moderate political change in a two-party democratic political system. These processes may differ for "insider" movements and in different political systems. Such opportunities are probably of little importance to the mobilization of countercultural and identity movements, whose primary goals are not political, and to movements seeking radical system change (see Kriesi et al. 1995). Political opportunities are expressed differently in nondemocratic

regimes, where harsh and arbitrary repression may produce different responses (Rasler 1996; Goodwin 2000). Our findings need to be reinvestigated with additional multivariate studies of protest in other places and times to assess the generality of the patterns we have uncovered. Such a research agenda should produce a more universal theory of political opportunities that better accounts for protest in a variety of conditions.

NOTES

* This article has benefited from the advice of Neila van Dyke, Jeff Goodwin, Pam Oliver, Richard Lundman, Bill Form, and the *AJS* reviewers and from the research assistance of Jessica Maguire, Lori King, Linda Powell, and Steve Boutcher.

1. Following McAdam (1999, pp. 235–38), we used the following *New York Times Index* headings: "Negroes, U.S." and "Education, U.S., Racial Issues" for 1946–54; "Blacks, U.S." and "Education and Schools, U.S., Equal Education Opportunities" for 1971–81; and "Blacks, U.S." and "Education and Schools, U.S." for 1982–97 (*New York Times* 1948–97).

2. Because past work (Piven and Cloward 1977, pp. 213–21, 231–35; McAdam 1999, pp. 156–60, 169–72; Valelly 1993; Jenkins 1985, p. 218) has emphasized the presidential vote margin, we focus on this. We also tested the margin of congressional control based on the mean percentage of House and Senate seats held by the congressionally dominant party minus those held by the second party, but this was nonsignificant.

3. The U.S. Census uses inconsistent racial categories across time, comparing "whites" against "nonwhites" from 1948–65 and "whites," "blacks," and "others" for 1966–97. To control for any inconsistency over time associated with the shifting composition of the "black" measure, we estimate the 1948–65 black median family income by multiplying the "non-white" score by the 1965 ratio of "black" to other minorities. Inasmuch as the major growth of the nonblack minorities begins after the mid-1960s, this should produce a consistently measured explanatory variable.

4. The NAACP ceased publication of its annual report in 1982 and the national office could not provide annual membership estimates for subsequent years (authors' phone contacts). We therefore used membership estimates for 1983–97 published in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*.

5. As noted in n. 3 above, we also tested a measure of the congressional margin of party control, but it never was significant.

5.

New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe

HANSPETER KRIESI, RUUD KOOPMANS, JAN WILLEM DUYVENDAK, AND MARCO G. GIUGNI

Introduction

The crucial contention of the so called "political process" approach to social movements is that social processes impinge indirectly on social protest, via a restructuring of existing power relations (McAdam, 1982). This contention has received considerable support from Skocpol's (1979) analysis of social revolutions. As she has shown, social revolutions are typically triggered by a political crisis that weakens the control on the population exercised by the political system. Similarly, the analysis of a century of collective violence in France, Germany and Italy by Tilly et al. (1975)¹ has indicated that the rhythm of collective violence did not so much depend on structural transformations of society, but was rather directly linked to shifts in the struggle for political power. More recently, the political context has also been shown to be of considerable importance for the mobilization and the impact of different types of new social movement. Thus, in what has probably been the first systematic study of the impact of the political context on the fate of a new social movement, Kitschelt (1986) has shown how the impact of the anti-nuclear movement varied according to specific characteristics of the political context of the countries he studied.

For the systematic analysis of the political context that mediates structural conflicts given as latent political potentials, the notion of *political opportunities structure* (POS) has become fashionable. First introduced by Eisinger (1973), it has been elaborated by Tarrow (1983, 1989). We shall employ a modified version of this concept to show the importance of the

political context for the mobilization of new social movements (NSMs) to Western Europe. Following the conceptualization of Kriesi (1991), we distinguish three broad sets of properties of a political system: its formal institutional structure, its informal procedures and prevailing strategies with regard to challengers, and the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the challengers. The first two sets of properties provide the general setting for the mobilization of collective action; they also constrain the relevant configurations of power. Together with the general setting, the relevant configuration of power specifies the strategies of the "authorities" or the "members of the system" with regard to the mobilization of the "challengers." These strategies, in turn, define (a) the extent to which challenging collective action will be facilitated or repressed by "members of the system," (b) the chances of success such actions may have, and (c) the chances of success if no such actions take place, which may be either positive if the government is reform-oriented, or negative if the government in power is hostile to the movement (Koopmans, 1990a).

In other words, the country-specific mix of facilitation/repression and chances of success and of reform is, in part at least, the result of strategic calculations of the authorities. However, it is not exclusively determined by such strategic calculations, since the general setting also restricts this country-specific mix in a way that is independent of the concrete strategies devised by the authorities. Finally, this country-specific mix determines the set of strategic options available for the mobilization of the "challengers." It provides the crucial link between the POS and the challengers' decision to mobilize or not, their choice of the form of mobilization, the sequence of events to be organized, and the target of their campaign. Figure 1 presents a graphical

Kriesi Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni. "New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 22: 219–244.