

POLYARCHY
Participation and Opposition

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1. DEMOCRATIZATION AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION

Given a regime in which the opponents of the government cannot openly and legally organize into political parties in order to oppose the government in free and fair elections, what conditions favor or impede a transformation into a regime in which they can? That is the question with which this book is concerned.

Concepts

Since the development of a political system that allows for opposition, rivalry, or competition between a government and its opponents is an important aspect of democratization, this book is necessarily about one aspect of democratization. But the two processes—democratization and the development of public opposition—are not, in my view, identical. A full description of the differences could lead us into a tedious exploration of a semantic bog. To avoid this detour, I hope I may be allowed to indicate rather summarily some of my assumptions without much in the way of defense or elaboration.

I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. What

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other characteristics might be required for a system to be strictly democratic, I do not intend to consider here. In this book I should like to reserve the term "democracy" for a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. Whether such a system actually exists, has existed, or can exist need not concern us for the moment. Surely one can conceive a hypothetical system of this kind; such a conception has served as an ideal, or part of an ideal, for many people. As a hypothetical system, one end of a scale, or a limiting state of affairs, it can (like a perfect vacuum) serve as a basis for estimating the degree to which various systems approach this theoretical limit.

I assume further that in order for a government to continue over a period of time to be responsive to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals, all full citizens must have unimpaired opportunities:

1. To formulate their preferences
2. To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
3. To have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference

These, then, appear to me to be three necessary conditions for a democracy, though they are probably not sufficient. Next, I assume that for these three opportunities to exist among a large number of people, such as the number of people who comprise most nation-states at the present time, the institutions of the society must provide at least eight guarantees. These are indicated in table 1.1.

I am going to make the further assumption that the connections between the guarantees and the three fundamental

opportunities are sufficiently evident to need no further elaboration here.¹

Table 1.1. Some Requirements for a Democracy among a Large Number of People

For the opportunity to:	The following institutional guarantees are required:
I. <u>Formulate preferences</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 5. Alternative sources of information
II. <u>Signify preferences</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Eligibility for public office 5. Right of political leaders to compete for support 6. Alternative sources of information 7. Free and fair elections
III. <u>Have preferences weighted equally in conduct of government</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of expression 3. Right to vote 4. Eligibility for public office 5. Right of political leaders to compete for support <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes 6. Alternative sources of information 7. Free and fair elections 8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference

Now from examination of the list of eight institutional guarantees, it appears that they might provide us with a theoretical scale along which it would be possible to order

1. Some of the relationships are discussed in my *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 63-81, and in Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), chaps. 10 and 11.

different political systems. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that the eight guarantees might be fruitfully interpreted as constituting two somewhat different theoretical dimensions of democratization.

1. Both historically and at the present time, regimes vary enormously in the extent to which the eight institutional conditions are openly available, publicly employed, and fully guaranteed to at least some members of the political system who wish to contest the conduct of the government. Thus a scale reflecting these eight conditions would enable us to compare different regimes according to the extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition.² However, since a regime might permit opposition to a very small or a very large proportion of the population, clearly we need a second dimension.

2. Both historically and contemporaneously, regimes also vary in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government: to participate, so to speak, in the system of public contestation. A scale reflecting the breadth of the right to participate in public contestation would enable us to compare different regimes according to their inclusiveness.

The right to vote in free and fair elections, for example, partakes of both dimensions. When a regime grants this right to some of its citizens, it moves toward greater public contestation. But the larger the proportion of citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime.

Public contestation and inclusiveness vary somewhat independently. Britain had a highly developed system of public contestation by the end of the eighteenth century, but only a miniscule fraction of the population was fully included in

2. Throughout this book the terms liberalization, political competition, competitive politics, public contestation, and public opposition are used interchangeably to refer to this dimension, and regimes relatively high on this dimension are frequently referred to as competitive regimes.

it until after the expansion of the suffrage in 1867 and 1884. Switzerland has one of the most fully developed systems of public contestation in the world. Probably few people would challenge the view that the Swiss regime is highly "democratic." Yet the feminine half of the Swiss population is still excluded from national elections. By contrast, the USSR still has almost no system of public contestation, though it does have universal suffrage. In fact one of the most striking changes during this century has been the virtual disappearance of an outright denial of the legitimacy of popular participation in government. Only a handful of countries have failed to grant at least a ritualistic vote to their citizens and to hold at least nominal elections; even the most repressive dictators usually pay some lip service today to the legitimate right of the people to participate in the government, that is, to participate in "governing" though not in public contestation.

Needless to say, in the absence of the right to oppose the right to "participate" is stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where public contestation exists. A country with universal suffrage and a completely repressive government would provide fewer opportunities for oppositions, surely, than a country with a narrow suffrage but a highly tolerant government. Consequently, when countries are ranked solely according to their inclusiveness, not taking into account the surrounding circumstances, the results are anomalous. Nonetheless, as long as we keep clearly in mind the fact that the extent of the "suffrage" or, more generally, the right to participate indicates only *one* characteristic of systems, a characteristic that cannot be interpreted except in the context of other characteristics, it is useful to distinguish between regimes according to their inclusiveness.

Suppose, then, that we think of democratization as made up of at least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate. (Figure 1.1) Doubtless most readers believe that democratization involves more than these two di-

mensions; in a moment I shall discuss a third dimension. But I propose to limit the discussion here to these two. For the point has already emerged, I think: developing a system of public contestation is not necessarily equivalent to full democratization.

To display the relationship between public contestation and democratization more clearly, let us now lay out the




FIGURE 1.1 Two Theoretical Dimensions of Democratization

two dimensions as in figure 1.2.³ Since a regime may be located, theoretically, anywhere in the space bounded by the two dimensions, it is at once obvious that our terminology for regimes is almost hopelessly inadequate, for it is a terminology invariably based upon classifying rather than ranking. The space enclosed by our two dimensions could of course be cut up into any number of cells, each of which might be given a name. But the purposes of this book make an elaborate typology redundant. Let me instead provide a small vocabulary—a reasonable one, I hope—that will en-

3. An array of 114 countries along these two dimensions will be found in appendix A, table A-1.

able me to speak precisely enough about the kinds of changes in regimes that I want to discuss.

Let me call a regime near the lower left corner of figure 1.2 a closed hegemony. If a hegemonic regime shifts upward, as along path I, then it is moving toward greater public contestation. Without stretching language too far, one could say that a change in this direction involves the liberalization




FIGURE 1.2 Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization

of a regime; alternatively one might say that the regime becomes more competitive. If a regime changes to provide greater participation, as along path II, it might be said to change toward greater popularization, or that it is becoming inclusive. A regime might change along one dimension and not the other. If we call a regime near the upper left corner a competitive oligarchy, then path I represents a change from a closed hegemony to a competitive oligarchy. But a closed hegemony might also become more inclusive without

liberalizing, i.e., without increasing the opportunities for public contestation, as along path II. In this case the regime changes from a closed to an inclusive hegemony.

Democracy might be conceived of as lying at the upper right corner. But since democracy may involve more dimensions than the two in figure 1.2, and since (in my view) no large system in the real world is fully democratized, I prefer to call real world systems that are closest to the upper right corner polyarchies. Any change in a regime that moves it upward and to the right, for example along path III, may be said to represent some degree of democratization. Polyarchies, then, may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or, to put it in another way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation.

You will notice that although I have given names to regimes lying near the four corners, the large space in the middle of the figure is not named, nor is it subdivided. The absence of names partly reflects the historic tendency to classify regimes in terms of extreme types; it also reflects my own desire to avoid redundant terminology. The lack of nomenclature does not mean a lack of regimes; in fact, perhaps the preponderant number of national regimes in the world today would fall into the mid-area. Many significant changes in regimes, then, involve shifts within, into, or out of this important central area, as these regimes become more (or less) inclusive and increase (or reduce) opportunities for public contestation. In order to refer to regimes in this large middle area, I shall sometimes resort to the terms near or nearly: a nearly hegemonic regime has somewhat more opportunities for public contestation than a hegemonic regime; a near-polyarchy could be quite inclusive but would have more severe restrictions on public contestation than a full polyarchy, or it might provide opportunities for public

contestation comparable to those of a full polyarchy and yet be somewhat less inclusive.⁴

The need to use terms like these later on in this book testifies to the utility of classification; the arbitrariness of the boundaries between "full" and "near" testifies to the inadequacy of any classification. So long as we keep firmly in mind that the terms are useful but rather arbitrary ways of dividing up the space in figure 1.2, the concepts will serve their purpose.

4. The problem of terminology is formidable, since it seems impossible to find terms already in use that do not carry with them a large freight of ambiguity and surplus meaning. The reader should remind himself that the terms used here are employed throughout the book, to the best of my ability, only with the meanings indicated in the preceding paragraphs. Some readers will doubtless resist the term polyarchy as an alternative to the word democracy, but it is important to maintain the distinction between democracy as an ideal system and the institutional arrangements that have come to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation of an ideal, and experience shows, I believe, that when the same term is used for both, needless confusion and essentially irrelevant semantic arguments get in the way of the analysis. At the opposite corner, hegemony is not altogether satisfactory; yet given the meaning I have indicated, the term hegemonic seems to me more appropriate than hierarchical, monocratic, absolutist, autocratic, despotic, authoritarian, totalitarian, etc. My use of the term "contestation" in "public contestation" is well within normal (if infrequent) English usage; in English contestation means to contest, which means to make something the subject of dispute, contention, or litigation, and its most immediate synonyms are to dispute, challenge, or vie. The utility of the term was, however, first suggested to me by Bertrand de Jouvenel's "The Means of Contestation," *Government and Opposition* 1 (January 1966): 155-74. Jouvenel's usage is similar to my own, as is the identical French term he used in the original, meaning: *débat, objection, conflit, opposition*. In the same issue of this journal, however, Ghita Ionescu ("Control and Contestation in Some One-Party States" pp. 240-50) uses the term in its narrower but currently quite common meaning as "the anti-system, basic and permanent postulates of any opposition on the grounds of fundamental, dichotomic differences of opinion and ideologies" (p. 241). Clearly this is a more restricted definition of the concept than the one I use here and that, I believe, Jouvenel uses in his essay.

The Question Restated

The question with which this chapter opens can now be restated as follows:

- 3/ 1. What conditions increase or decrease the chances of democratizing a hegemonic or nearly hegemonic regime?
2. More specifically, what factors increase or decrease the chances of public contestation?
3. Even more specifically, what factors increase or decrease the chances of public contestation in a highly inclusive regime, that is, a polyarchy?

Qualifications

This book, then, is about the conditions under which systems of public contestation are likely to develop and exist. Because public contestation is an aspect of democratization, this book is necessarily to some extent about democratization, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter. But it is important to keep in mind that the focus here excludes a number of important matters that would be considered in an analysis of democratization.

3/ It is convenient to think of democratization as consisting of several broad historical transformations. One is the transformation of hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into near-polyarchies. This was, in essence, the process at work in the Western world during the nineteenth century. A second is the transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies. This was what occurred in Europe in the three decades or so that spanned the end of the last century and the First World War. A third is the further democratization of full polyarchies. This historical process can perhaps be dated to the rapid development of the democratic welfare state after the onset of the Great Depression; interrupted by the Second World War, the process seems to have renewed itself

1800
1890-1920
1960

in the late 1960s in the form of rapidly rising demands, notably among young people, for the democratization of a variety of social institutions.

This book is concerned with the first and second of these transformations but not the third.⁵ Whether it prospers or fails, the third wave of democratization will surely prove as important as the others. Since it will take place only in the most "advanced" countries and will help to shape the character of life in the "advanced" countries in the twenty-first century, to many people in these countries the third wave may well seem more important than the others. Yet most of the world still lies beyond the possibility of this particular transformation. Of the 140 nominally independent countries existing in 1969, about two dozen were highly inclusive and had highly developed systems of public contestation: they were, in short, inclusive polyarchies. Perhaps another dozen or fewer were near-polyarchies within reasonable reach of full polyarchy. It is in these three dozen countries that the third wave must occur. Whether some nonpolyarchies can overleap the institutions of polyarchy and arrive somehow at a fuller democratization than now exists in the polyarchies, as ideologues sometimes promise, seems remote, in the light of the analysis that follows. For most countries, then, the first and second stages of democratization—not the third—will be the most relevant.

The focus of this book is, in fact, even narrower than an analysis of the first two stages of democratization. I have referred to "regimes" and "systems of public contestation." But so far I have not specified the level of the polity at which regimes and public contestation may be effective. Let me then emphasize at once that the analysis here deals with national regimes, that is, regimes taken at the level of the

5. I have dealt with some aspects of the third in *After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

country, or, if you will, the legally independent state, or, to use less appropriate terms, the nation or the nation-state. Doubtless some of the analysis could be applied to subordinate levels of political and social organization, such as municipalities, provinces, trade unions, firms, churches, and the like; perhaps some of it might even be relevant to the polities that are emerging at more inclusive levels—international organizations of various kinds. But the argument is specifically developed only with respect to national regimes.

Again, this would be a grave omission in a book about democratization. Even from the perspective of public contestation, the omission is important. For casual observation suggests that countries differ in the extent to which they furnish opportunities for contestation and participation in the processes not only of the national government but of various subordinate governmental and social organizations as well. Now to the extent that gross differences in the general characteristics of subnational units appear to be associated with differences in the nature of the national regime (for example, whether it is a polyarchy or not), I shall try to take these into account in the analysis.

Yet it might seem reasonable to insist that the analysis ought to go a good deal further. A full description of the opportunities available for participation and contestation within a country surely requires one to say something about the opportunities available within subnational units. The extraordinary attempt in Yugoslavia to grant a large measure of self-government in subnational units means that the opportunities for participation and contestation are greater in that country, despite the one-party regime, than, let us say, in Argentina or Brazil. An inclusive view of the matter, then, would require one to pay attention to all the possibilities suggested in figure 1.3. Indeed a number of recent critics of incomplete democratization in polyarchies contend that while polyarchies may be competitive at the national level a great

many of the subnational organizations, particularly private associations, are hegemonic or oligarchic.⁶

Important as the task is of moving beyond the description of the national regime to the subnational units, at present the attempt to examine a fairly large number of countries would I think require an analysis so complex and would encounter problems of data so overwhelming as to make the

		The National Regime	
		Low	High
Subnational Organizations	High	III	I
	Low	IV	II

- I. Fully "liberalized" or "competitive" regimes
- II. Competitive at the national level, hegemonic within subnational organizations
- III. Competitive within subnational organizations, hegemonic at the national level
- IV. Fully hegemonic polities

FIGURE 1.3 A Hypothetical Ordering of Countries According to the Opportunities Available for Contestation

enterprise highly unsatisfactory. In principle, to be sure, subnational organizations could be located along the two dimensions illustrated in figures 1.1 and 1.2. Yet the problem is not simply to locate countries in the hypothetical space suggested by figure 1.3. For one thing, that space has to do with only one of the two main dimensions: contestation. Ob-

6. Cf. in particular Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966); Henry S. Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); and to some extent also Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

viously a similar procedure would be required for the other main dimension: participation. What is more, even within a country, subnational units often vary in the opportunities they provide for contestation and participation. For example, in many modern countries these opportunities are much greater in municipal governments than in trade unions, and greater in trade unions than in business firms. Consequently, one would have to break subnational units into a number of categories: business firms, trade unions, municipal governments, churches, educational institutions, etc.⁷ At this stage, these requirements are, unfortunately, little short of utopian, and it is for this reason—pragmatic rather than theoretical—that I have decided to restrict my attention to the national level.

Assumptions

When hegemonic regimes and competitive oligarchies move toward polyarchy they increase the opportunities for effective participation and contestation and hence the number of individuals, groups, and interests whose preferences have to be considered in policy making.

From the perspective of the incumbents who currently govern, such a transformation carries with it new possibilities of conflict as a result of which their goals (and they themselves) may be displaced by spokesmen for the newly incorporated individuals, groups, or interests.

The problem of their opponents is the mirror image of the problem of the incumbents. Any transformation that provides opponents of the government with greater opportunities to translate their goals into policies enforced by the

7. The already classic study by Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), concentrates on the deviant case of a trade union in which contestation and participation are high. To describe and explain that deviant case within the context of a single country was a very sizable undertaking.

state carries with it the possibility of conflict with spokesmen for the individuals, groups, or interests they displace in the government.

Thus the greater the conflict between government and opposition, the more likely that each will seek to deny opportunities to the other to participate effectively in policy making. To put it another way, the greater the conflict between a government and its opponents, the more costly it is for each to tolerate the other. Since the opposition must gain control of the state in order to suppress the incumbents (at which point opposition and government have changed roles), we can formulate the general proposition as an axiom about governments tolerating their opponents:

AXIOM 1. The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of toleration decrease.

However, a government must also consider how costly it would be to suppress an opposition; for even if toleration is costly, suppression might be very much more costly and hence obviously foolish. Therefore:

AXIOM 2. The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of suppression increase.

Thus the chances that a more competitive political system will emerge, or endure, may be thought of as depending on these two sets of costs:

AXIOM 3. The more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime.

Axiom 3 can be illustrated graphically as in figure 1.4. The lower the costs of toleration, the greater the security of the government. The greater the costs of suppression, the

greater the security of the opposition. Hence conditions that provide a high degree of mutual security for government and oppositions would tend to generate and to preserve wider opportunities for oppositions to contest the conduct of the government.




FIGURE 1.4

The question posed a moment ago can therefore be restated:

What circumstances significantly increase the mutual security of government and oppositions and thereby increase the chances of public contestation and polyarchy?

But before I try to answer that question, let me first consider a prior one: does polyarchy matter?

2. DOES POLYARCHY MATTER?

Some readers might be inclined to think that differences in national regimes do not matter much. For example, one might share the view of those like Gaetano Mosca who argue that every regime is, after all, dominated by a ruling minority. As an astringent challenge to the belief that portentous consequences for the people of a country must necessarily follow a transformation of the regime, Mosca's skepticism has a good deal to be said for it. Moreover, what appear superficially to be changes of regime are sometimes not really changes in regime at all, but simply changes in personnel, rhetoric, and empty constitutional prescriptions.

Yet few people seem able to adhere consistently to the view that differences in regimes—for example, differences between polyarchy and inclusive hegemony—are at base negligible. In fact, I have the impression that this view is most often espoused by intellectuals who are, at heart, liberal or radical democrats disappointed by the transparent failures of polyarchies or near-polyarchies; and that, conversely, intellectuals who have actually experienced life under severely repressive hegemonic regimes rarely argue that differences in regime are trivial. Perhaps the most telling examples are furnished by Italian intellectuals like Mosca and Croce who spent their lives attacking the sorry and patently defective parliamentary regime that existed in Italy before Fascism.

Although during the seventy years between unification and Fascism the Italian polity traversed the classic path from competitive oligarchy to inclusive polyarchy, the defects of *trasformismo* in political affairs and the general *incivismo* of Italians in public life were too glaring to enable the parliamentary regime to win much support. Yet even this highly defective regime was, Mosca saw, different in important essentials from Fascism—and what is more, unworthy though it may have been, better than Fascism. In his last speech to the Italian Senate in 1925, Mosca confessed that he spoke

with a certain emotion because, let us be frank, we take part in the funeral rites of a form of government. I should not have thought it possible that I would be the one to deliver the funeral oration on the parliamentary regime . . . I, who have always taken a harsh attitude toward it, I am today obliged to lament its departure . . . One may say in all sincerity: the parliamentary regime was better.

But he was not permitted to drink the bitter potion in one grand gesture of regret, for he lived until 1941 and thus witnessed all but the final disintegration of that wretched new order. As for Croce, who first welcomed Fascism, he was finally to admit that all during the time he had been pouring out his contempt for the parliamentary regime,

it had never seemed to him even remotely possible that Italy could let herself be robbed of the liberty that had cost her so much and that his generation had considered a permanent acquisition.

And by 1945, Gaetano Salvemini, who as an intellectual of radical persuasion had been a fierce critic of Giolitti's Italy, had no doubt that for all its defects the parliamentary regime was far better in actuality and in potential than what came later. "As for the results of the Fascist dictatorship in contrast with those of Italian democracy in the making," he

concluded, "they are here before our very eyes. Let us hope that the Italians will not be the only ones to learn from that frightful experience."¹

Although eyewitness testimony of this kind does not prove the point, it cautions against accepting the easy notion that changes of political regime do not matter very much. To analyze in a responsible way the extent to which, and the conditions under which, changes of regimes "matter" would, I fear, require a book, and I intend to forgo that effort in this one. Moreover, if theory and data are far from satis-

1. The quotation from Mosca is in James Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 225–26. That from Croce is in Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p. 37; Croce's early acceptance of fascism is discussed in Sartori, *Croce Etico-Politico e Filosofo della Liberta* (Florence: Universita degli Studi, n.d.), pp. 191 ff. Salvemini's statement is from the introductory essay to A. William Salamone, *Italy in the Giolittian Era: Italian Democracy in the Making, 1900–1914* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945, 1960). Salvemini's brief essay in effect argues that representative government as it was emerging in Italy compared not too unfavorably with England and the United States. His judgment is summed up by his statement that "Italian democracy would have needed still another generation of trial and error before becoming not a 'perfect democracy' but a 'less imperfect democracy.' The crisis that followed the First World War, however, was fatal to the democratic process." (p. xx) Salvemini goes on to say:

Looking back at the work of the crusader after thirty years, I find that I have nothing to regret. I must acknowledge, however, that I would have been wiser had I been more moderate in my criticism of the Giolittian system. My knowledge of the men who came after Giolitti in Italy as well as of countries in which I have lived during the last twenty years has convinced me that if Giolitti was not better, neither was he worse than many non-Italian politicians who followed him. For while we Italian crusaders attacked him from the Left accusing him of being—and he was—a corrupter of Italian democracy in the making, others assailed him from the Right because he was even too democratic for their taste. Our criticism thus did not help to direct the evolution of Italian public life toward less imperfect forms of democracy, but rather toward the victory of those militarist, nationalist, and reactionary groups who had found even Giolitti's democracy too perfect.

factory for determining the conditions most favorable to the development of different regimes, they are in an even more deplorable state with respect to the differences in the consequences (in the recent argot of political science, "outputs") of different regimes. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for thinking that a transformation of a regime from a hegemony into a more competitive regime or a competitive oligarchy into a polyarchy does have significant results.

1. To begin with, there are the classic liberal freedoms that are a part of the definition of public contestation and participation: opportunities to oppose the government, form political organizations, express oneself on political matters without fear of governmental reprisals, read and hear alternative points of view, vote by secret ballot in elections in which candidates of different parties compete for votes and after which the losing candidates peacefully yield their claim to office to the winners, etc. In the well-established polyarchies, these freedoms have long since lost the attraction of a new cause, let alone any revolutionary appeal. Familiar, imperfectly achieved, clearly insufficient to insure a good society, trivialized over many generations by rhetorical overkill, they are easily taken for granted as an inheritance of quite modest significance. Their value no doubt appears greater to those who have lost them or have never had them. It was liberties of this kind that critics of the pre-Fascist parliamentary regime in Italy like Mosca, Croce, and Salvemini took so much for granted that they failed to foresee how oppressive Italy would become under a new regime. It was largely to expand freedoms of this kind that the liberalizing forces were moving in Czechoslovakia before their revolution was halted and reversed by the Soviets. To gain liberties like these for Spain is the one goal that many of the oppositions to Franco's dictatorship have shared.

2. Broadened participation combined with political competition brings about a change in the composition of the po-

litical leadership, particularly among those who gain office by means of elections—mainly, then, members of parliament. As new groups are granted the suffrage, candidates closer in their social characteristics to the newly incorporated strata win a greater share of elective offices. Thus when the narrow suffrage of a competitive oligarchy has been extended to the middle classes, the number of party leaders and members of parliament drawn from the middle classes has increased. Something of the same kind has occurred when the working classes have been enfranchised, particularly in countries where labor or socialist parties have acquired a large share of working-class votes.² When Reconstruction provided southern Negroes with the suffrage after the American Civil War, black Southerners for the first time began to hold office; when Reconstruction came to an end, blacks dis-

2. There is a wealth of evidence about these changes, but so far as I am aware no comparative analysis. Systematic, long-range studies include Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," in Dwaine Marvick, ed., *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 57-90; and W. L. Guttsman, *The British Political Elite* (London, MacGibbon and Key, 1963). For the changes brought about in Britain after 1832, the evidence is ample but apparently unsystematic. However, compare Sir Lewis Namier's data on members of Parliament from the boroughs in 1761 in *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 84 ff., with W. Ivor Jennings, *Parliament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), table II, p. 38, and with Guttsman, *The British Political Elite*. For changes in the occupational and social class composition of the Italian parliament from 1909 to 1963 (universal suffrage was introduced in 1913 and proportional representation in 1919), see S. Somogyi, L. Lotti, A. Predieri, and G. Sartori, *Il Parlamento Italiano, 1946-1963* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1963), pp. 160-62, 168-69, and 197-200.

For differences in Argentina between the socioeconomic levels of parliamentarians from the conservative parties that had dominated parliament before universal suffrage in 1911, and from the Radical and Socialist parties that had a majority of seats after the elections of 1916, see Darío Canton, "Universal suffrage as an Agent of Mobilization" (paper presented to the VIth World Congress of Sociology, Evian, France, September 1966), p. 24.

appeared from public life. When they began to regain the suffrage after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they once again began to win public offices.³

This is not to say that political leadership and parliaments ever become a representative sample of the various socioeconomic strata, occupations, or other groupings in a society. They never do. In contemporary legislative bodies, middle-class and professional occupations are numerically over-represented; blue collar occupations are numerically under-represented (even among representatives of labor, socialist, and communist parties) as are many other categories—farmers and housewives, for example.⁴ Even if the “political

3. Negro suffrage and its results under Reconstruction are discussed in C. Vann Woodward, *The Burden of Southern History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 98–103. For the recent period, data from the Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, show that by the summer of 1968 the percentages of Negroes registered to vote had enormously increased. The percentages, with corresponding percentages of whites registered shown in parentheses, were: Alabama, 56.7 (82.5); Arkansas, 67.5 (75.2); Florida, 62.1 (83.8); Georgia, 56.1 (84.7); Louisiana, 59.3 (87.9); Mississippi, 59.4 (92.4); North Carolina, 55.3 (78.7); South Carolina, 50.8 (65.6); Tennessee, 72.6 (81.3); Texas, 83.1 (72.3); Virginia, 58.4 (67.0). For these states as a whole the totals were 62.0 (78.1). Southern Regional Council, Voter Education Project, “Voter Registration in the South, Summer, 1968” (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1968). By the summer of 1969, some 473 black officials had been elected in southern states, including 17 mayors and 200 city councilmen. “Black Elected Officials in the Southern States,” a memorandum to selected members of the American Political Science Association, August 12, 1969, from Emory F. Via, Director, Labor Program, Southern Regional Council, Inc.

4. On Britain, see W. L. Guttsman, “Changes in British Labour Leadership,” in *Political Decision-Makers*, pp. 91–137. For data on candidates for and members of the House of Commons in the 1950s and 1960s, see J. Blondel, *Voters, Parties, and Leaders* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), pp. 135–45, and Peter G. J. Pulzer, *Political Representation and Elections, Parties and Voting in Great Britain* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 67 ff.

For the postwar Italian parliament, see Sartori et al., *Il Parlamento Italiano*, pp. 93–97. For Belgian members of parliament in 1964, see F. Debuyst, *La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mécanismes d'Access et Images* (Brussels: CRISP, 1966), pp. 90–

class” is never a fair sample of a country’s social and economic categories—and many advocates of representative democracy would argue that it need not and should not be⁵—a broadening of the suffrage together with political competition does nonetheless make parliaments in particular and political leadership in general considerably less unrepresentative in the purely statistical sense.

3. As a system becomes more competitive or more inclusive, politicians seek the support of groups that can now participate more easily in political life. The response of politicians to the existence of new opportunities for participation and public contestation are manifold and have far-reaching effects. I have just described one of these: to offer candidates whom the voters feel are in some sense “closer” to themselves. Another is to adapt rhetoric, program, policy, and ideology to what are thought to be the desires or interests of the groups, segments, or strata not hitherto represented. Thus the rise of socialist and labor parties in Western Europe is intimately tied to the grant of the suffrage to urban and rural working strata. When, as was true in many countries that are now polyarchies, political parties were relatively free to organize before the suffrage had been broadened, among the first demands of socialist and labor parties was universal suffrage. Once the working classes had the vote, naturally these parties initially directed most of their efforts to mobilizing these strata.

Competition and inclusiveness bring about changes in the party system itself. The most drastic and visible changes occur, of course, when a one-party hegemonic regime is rapidly replaced by a polyarchy: the hegemony of the single

109. Debuyst also has tables comparing the professional backgrounds of members of the national legislatures in Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, and the U.S. (Senate) (p. 110), and the percentages in various European socialist and communist parties of M.P.’s from lower middle or working-class occupations or party functionaries (p. 113). 5. E.g., Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), chap. 4, pp. 60–91.

party suddenly gives way to two or more competing parties, as in Italy, Germany, and Japan at the end of World War II. Countries in which opportunities for participation and contestation expand over a lengthier period of time display somewhat similar developments in slow motion. When the suffrage moves beyond the notables and their clients, the old parties and factions based mainly on the social connections among the notables—on ties of family, class, residence, life style, and tradition—are displaced or supplemented by parties more effective in appealing to the middle classes. The process is repeated again when the working classes are granted the suffrage. In Britain, the old Whigs gave way to the Liberals after the Reform Act of 1832; the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 facilitated the formation and growth of the Labor party. In Norway, the struggle over the mobilization of the peasantry in the 1860s and 1870s led to the development of electoral and parliamentary coalitions of the Left and the Right. The struggle over manhood suffrage and its achievement in 1900 produced new parties. While the old Right became the Conservative party, the old Left alliance fragmented into its main components of Liberals, rural Christian fundamentalists, and farmers, while the Labor party acquired a large share of the working classes.⁶ Although the details vary from country to country, a similar pattern seems to emerge wherever polyarchy has evolved over a considerable period of time.

The parties also change in structure and organization. As has often been pointed out, the need to mobilize a bigger electorate triggers off the development of "modern" party organizations. For as the electorate grows, the traditional, mainly informal arrangements that worked well enough with a tiny group of voters (many of whom were in any case

6. Cf. Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism" in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 70–115, esp. pp. 75–81.

under the thumb of the notables) are simply inadequate. If a party is to survive in the new competition, it must reach out to its members, followers, and potential voters with organizations at the level of ward, section, cell, and the like. Many of these now familiar forms of party organization were initially developed in the country where mass suffrage was first established—the United States—but they rapidly appear wherever political competition takes place in the midst of a broad suffrage. In Britain, for example, the formation of local Conservative and Liberal associations, and the famous Birmingham Caucus followed hard on the heels of the broad suffrage created in 1867 and the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872.⁷

The change in the organization of parties and their increasing penetration of urban and rural areas trips off still further changes in political life. Political competition and participation are both heightened. As the nationally organized parties reach out to mobilize their voters, the number of uncontested or nonpartisan elections declines. And the competition for members, adherents, and voters increases the politicization of the electorate, at least in the initial stages; participation in elections, for example, is likely to be higher in constituencies where there are competing parties.⁸

7. See, for example, Pulzer, *Political Representation*. On the origin of the Conservative party's "handmaid," the National Union, as an organization for wooing the newly enfranchised urban workers, see R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London: Heinemann, 1955), pp. 146 ff. On the Liberal associations and the Birmingham Caucus, see Sir Ivor Jennings, *Party Politics*, vol. 2, *The Growth of Parties* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 134 ff.

8. Again, comparative cross-national data are lacking. In Britain, the number of constituencies without a contest in parliamentary elections was 57% in 1835, 43% in 1868, and 23% in 1880. Pulzer, *Political Representation*, pp. 61–62. In Norway, as the Labor party established units to mobilize voters at the local level (communes), opponents found it necessary to do likewise; thus from 1900 onward the number of rural communes with nonpartisan plurality elections declined (from 78% in 1901 to 2% in 1959), while the number with two or more competing party lists increased. Turnout at elections was markedly lower in communes with nonpartisan plurality elec-

4. In any given country, the greater the opportunities for expressing, organizing, and representing political preferences, the greater the number and variety of preferences and interests that are likely to be represented in policy making. In a given country at a given time, therefore, the number and variety of preferences and interests represented in policy making are likely to be greater if the political regime is a polyarchy than if it is a mixed regime, and greater under a mixed regime than under a hegemony. Hence in any given country the transformation of a hegemony into a mixed regime or a polyarchy, or a mixed regime into a polyarchy, would be likely to increase the number and variety of preferences and interests represented in policy making.⁹

5. The consequences for government policies of lower thresholds for participation and public contestation are, unfortunately, obscure. Cross-national studies confront extraordinary difficulties in this area. Even studies of variations among the fifty American states in policies, politics, and socioeconomic variables have not so far produced unambiguous findings on the extent to which variations in policies are related to variations in political competition and participation—though of course the range of variation on all these variables must be markedly narrower than among countries.¹⁰ Because of the powerful impact on govern-

tions than with proportional representation and party lists. Cf. Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data on Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway," in Stein Rokkan, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Political Participation* (Bergen: The Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1962), pp. 111–58, esp. tables 2, 2.1, and 2.2, pp. 144–45. See also Torstein Hjøllum, "The Politicization of Local Government: Rates of Change, Conditioning Factors, Effects on Political Culture," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 2 (1968): 69–93, tables 1 and 2, pp. 73–74.

9. I have developed this point at greater length in the introduction to *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming 1971).

10. The first statistical analyses found that political variables like voter participation and party competition had little relation to state policies; the most powerful explanatory factor was the level of socioeconomic development as indicated, for example, by per capita

mental policies of such factors as a country's level of socioeconomic development, the characteristics of its social and economic systems, and its traditions, it may well be that the character of the regime has little independent effect on most governmental policies.

We probably need to look elsewhere to find the impact of regime on policy, in particular, on the extent to which the government adopts policies that involve severe physical coercion for relatively large numbers of people. The lower the barriers to public contestation and the greater the proportion of the population included in the political system, the more difficult it is for the government of a country to adopt and enforce policies that require the application of extreme sanctions against more than a small percentage of the population; the less likely, too, that the government will attempt to do so.

The evidence on this point is impressionistic. However, so far as I know, no polyarchy has ever undertaken policies involving anything like the degree and extent of coercion used during the forced collectivization of farming in the USSR in 1931–32, when millions of people were deported to Siberian labor camps or died from execution or starvation. Stalin's purges in the thirties sent many more millions to prison, torture, and death.¹¹ Hitler's policy of extermination

income. Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), and Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics* 25 (1963): 265–89. See also Ira Sharkansky, *The Politics of Taxing and Spending* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. 121–45. More recent analysis indicates, however, that political variables do have effects. Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," *American Political Science Review* 53 (September 1969): 858–66; Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," *ibid.*, pp. 867–78; and Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *ibid.*, 54 (June 1970): 508–22.

11. We shall probably never have reliable data on these matters. In his famous letter, the Russian physicist Andrei D. Sakharov indicates the figure of up to 15 million deaths attributable to Stalin is accepted

of Jews and all political opponents is too well known to need emphasis. Changes of leadership and basic policies in hegemonic regimes frequently entail considerable bloodshed. When Indonesia shifted from a procommunist to an anti-communist dictatorship in October 1965, it is estimated that at least a quarter of a million people lost their lives over the space of a few months.¹² In late 1969, some 116,000 persons suspected of communist sympathies had been incarcerated.¹³

I do not mean to argue that such massive coercion inevitably occurs in hegemonies nor, certainly, in mixed regimes, but only that the risk is significant, whereas it does not incur in polyarchies. The seeming exception that most readily comes to mind actually supports the point. In chapter 6 I shall argue that in order for the white people to coerce Negroes in the American South, the South had to develop a dual system, a kind of polyarchy for whites and hegemony for blacks. It is important to keep the distinction in mind, not for the sake of logic chopping, definitional purity, or "saving" polyarchy at all costs, but precisely because of the

by many Russian intellectuals. *New York Times*, July 22, 1968, p. 15. In his meticulously detailed but hostile account, Robert Conquest estimates that collectivization produced "about 5½ million deaths from hunger and from the diseases of hunger," while "some three million seem to have ended up in the newly expanding labour camp system." Conquest cites "the most careful estimates" of the labor camp population as "mainly at the 5 million level" in 1933-35, and at 6 million in 1935-37; he accepts "a figure of about 8 million purges in the camps in 1938." Of those in the camps in 1936-38, he estimates that "about 3 million" died. *The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 23-24, 333, 335-36.

12. Donald Hindley, who conducted interviews in Indonesia from May to December 1967, states that, "In all, perhaps 250,000 persons were killed, an equal number herded into prisons and hastily constructed concentration camps." In a footnote, however, he states that "informed foreign observers have estimated the number of dead as high as one million." "Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search for a Political Format," *Government and Opposition* 4 (Winter 1969): 79.

13. *New York Times*, June 22, 1970, p. 8.

empirical generalization that it reinforces: if the freed Negroes had been allowed to participate in the system of public contestation in the South, they could not have been subjected to systematic repression by coercion and terror, I believe, for they were much too large a minority. It was only by excluding them forcibly from the polyarchy that the system of coercion and terror could be maintained in the South. And precisely to the extent that black people were excluded, polyarchy in the United States was not fully inclusive.¹⁴ It was, in fact, less inclusive than most other polyarchies after the First World War, for following the general adoption of universal suffrage no other country with a polyarchal regime (with the exceptions of Switzerland and the transitory polyarchy in Argentina) contained an excluded group of comparable size. (It would not be entirely unreasonable to define polyarchy as requiring a degree of inclusiveness greater than that met by the United States, in which case this country would have to be classified as a near polyarchy.)

The example of the United States suggests a final point about the consequences of regimes for policy. I do not believe that polyarchies are more considerate than other regimes toward people who are effectively excluded from the rights of citizens. Among these excluded groups were (and to some extent still are) black people living in the American South, but for every polyarchy foreigners living outside the boundaries of the particular country are excluded. Though there is no reason to think they are worse, countries with polyarchal regimes are probably no better than other countries in responding to the interests of people beyond their boundaries.

6. One could speculate about other possible consequences of differences in regimes. It is possible, for example, that

14. Southern Negroes were 10.3% of the total population of the United States in 1900, 8.4% in 1920, and 6.8% in 1950. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 7 and 12.

over long periods of time differences in regime may have effects on beliefs, attitudes, culture, and personalities. As we shall see in chapter 8, these are usually treated as intervening or independent variables affecting regimes. But it is also reasonable to suppose that there is a reciprocal interaction between factors of this kind and the character of a regime: if these factors affect the chances of a particular type of regime, over time the nature of the regime influences beliefs, attitudes, culture, and perhaps even personalities that are likely to develop in a country. There are fascinating and important possibilities along these lines, but so many alternative hypotheses are plausible and yet impossible to appraise in the light of satisfactory evidence that I shall not take the matter any further in this book.

The thrust of the argument is, however, clear enough. It seems reasonably evident that different regimes do have different consequences. Although some people may deny the importance of these consequences, at least the advocates of polyarchy and their opponents both agree that the consequences are significantly different and important. If the consequences of polyarchy were no different from those of non-polyarchy, or if the consequences were unimportant, there would be no reason to advocate a polyarchy rather than a one-party dictatorship—or the converse. Probably most readers will also agree that the consequences—particularly the first—are important.

The source of the controversy over the relative value of polyarchy versus hegemonic or mixed regimes may not be so much in the results to be expected from public contestation and inclusion discussed above as in the consequences for other values. For example, it has been argued that one-party regimes are desirable in most African countries because a one-party regime expresses a natural consensus or solidarity or is necessary to achieve economic development, to build a nation out of the country's diverse subcultures, or to secure political stability. As S. E. Finer has convincingly shown,

some of these arguments are self contradictory—one cannot logically defend the single party as an expression of “natural” consensus and also argue that it is required in order to build national solidarity out of tribal diversity and disharmony; all the alleged advantages of one-party regimes seem to be belied by the facts.¹⁵

But it is not my purpose here to make a case for polyarchy. It is enough if I have shown that important consequences will follow from reducing the obstacles to public contestation and increasing the share of the population entitled to participate. A great many people will agree, I think, not only that these consequences are important but that they are also desirable, that the benefits often (if not always) outweigh the adverse consequences, and that the net gain in such cases is well worth striving for.

The conceptual scheme I employ in this book reflects a commitment (or as others might see it, a bias) in favor of polyarchy as against less democratized regimes. (What may not be apparent, since it is less relevant to the subject of this book, is a bias also in favor of greater democratization of polyarchies.) Nonetheless, I do not assume that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is invariably desirable. Let me make clear at once my conviction that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is frequently desirable; my belief furnishes one of the motives for examining the subject of this book and for formulating the central questions and the concepts as I do. Strictly speaking, however, one could deal with the questions posed in this book and employ the concepts set out here with no assumptions at all as to the desirability of any particular direction of change. In fact, even one who held the extreme position that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is *never* desirable would want to understand, I should think, the conditions required to prevent such a change. In this sense, the analysis is intended

15. S. E. Finer, “The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations,” *Government and Opposition* 2 (July–October 1967): 491–508.

to be independent of my commitments or biases in favor of polyarchy—though given the difficulties of data analysis at this stage I may not have wholly succeeded.

Finally, I want to make clear that I make no assumption that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is historically inevitable. Just as the outcome of the third wave of democratization remains in doubt and could even lead to a regressive narrowing of the opportunities for public contestation now available in polyarchies, so it would be absurd to suppose that some sort of historical law of development imposes on societies an inevitable transition away from political hegemony to public contestation—or, for that matter, in the opposite direction. Since modern nation-states have displayed movements in both directions, a few well-known cases are enough to falsify any simple law of unidirectional development. One might reflect, for example, on the histories of Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Japan. One of the implications of the analysis in this book is, as we shall see, that the conditions most favorable for polyarchy are comparatively uncommon and not easily created.

Returning now to the question posed at the end of the last chapter—what conditions significantly increase the chances of public contestation and polyarchy?—I shall explore in the chapters that follow the consequences of seven sets of conditions: historical sequences, the degree of concentration in the socioeconomic order, level of socioeconomic development, inequality, subcultural cleavages, foreign control, and the beliefs of political activists.

3. HISTORICAL SEQUENCES

One can conceive of historical processes as having two aspects relevant to our central question: the specific path or sequence of transformations of a regime and the way in which a new regime is inaugurated.

The Path to Polyarchy

Does the sequence matter?¹ Are some sequences more likely than others to lead to mutual security and thus to facilitate the shift toward a more polyarchal regime? The two figures introduced in the last chapter to represent the two dimensions of democratization with which we are concerned allow, of course, for an infinite number of paths. History has traced out some of these. But even if one were to limit his imagination by history and common sense, he would surely discover and invent more paths than anyone could deal with. A modest concern for a reasonably parsimonious and manageable theory impels me to try for a narrower

¹ This is also the central question in Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). However, as the subtitle suggests, Moore is concerned with different variables and longer historical sequences. Moreover, he chooses to ignore the experience of smaller countries on grounds I find 'unpersuasive' (p. xiii).