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CONTESTING DEMOCRACY

POLITICAL IDEAS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE

JAN-WERNER MÜLLER

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The state is an important instrument; hence the struggle to control it. But it is an instrument, and nothing more. Fools will use it, when they can, for foolish ends, and criminals for criminal ends. Sensible and decent men will use it for ends which are decent and sensible.

R. H. Tawney, 'We Mean Freedom', 1946

It is fatal for a capitalist government to have principles. It must be opportunistic in the best sense of the word, living by accommodation and good sense.

John Maynard Keynes

It is obvious that the vitality nurtured on impassioned battles of ideas cannot be maintained in the successful democracy's atmosphere of levelling and compromise. We cannot have it both ways ... The problem is whether or not more eagerness, a more universal and lively interest, discussions on principles and the personal efforts of the citizen can be kindled whilst maintaining security and a sufficient community of values.

Herbert Tingsten, 'Stability and Vitality in Swedish Democracy', 1954

Our victims know us by their scars and by their chains, and it is this that makes their evidence irrefutable. It is enough that they show us what we have made of them for us to realize what we have made of ourselves. But is it any use? Yes, for Europe is at death's door.

Jean-Paul Sartre

The basic lesson is that no people should be written off – and so many have been, from Germans to Malaysians – as lacking the desire for freedom.

István Bibó

Post-war reconstruction in Europe presented formidable, in fact unprecedented, tasks. They were, above all, material. But the challenges were also moral and symbolic. While the Holocaust was to remain marginal to thinking about the war at least until the 1960s, the meaning of mass violence and atrocity was immediately debated by political thinkers across the continent. After all, from the late 1930s to the late 1940s more people had been 'killed by their fellow human beings than ever before in the history of humankind'.[1]

Mass death in the Second World War was not seen in the same way as in the First: there was no heroic myth of the trenches – but there were no Sassoons or Remarques of the Second World War either.[2] As the German historian Reinhart Koselleck – himself a Wehrmacht soldier who had spent years in Russian captivity – was to observe: death was 'no longer understood as an answer but only as a question, no longer as providing meaning, only calling out for meaning'.[3]

Hannah Arendt predicted that 'the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe – as death became the fundamental problem after the last war'.[4] She also insisted that the experience of totalitarianism had constituted a profound break in European history; that the past no longer shone a light on the present; and that consequently a world that had witnessed the Nazis trying to do things nobody had thought possible also needed fundamentally to re-evaluate its political thinking.

Yet the answers that many European intellectuals felt compelled to offer to the 'problem of evil' failed precisely to take seriously totalitarianism as a caesura in European political experience. Their diagnosis of the times was entirely conventional in that they held the cataclysms of the twentieth century to have originated in the rise of 'the masses'. Tellingly, a book like Ortega's *Revolt of the Masses* remained *the* philosophical bestseller in a number of West European countries from the early 1930s until the late 1950s. The story about the fateful entry of the masses into politics had begun with the French Revolution; it could now simply be extended further and further and include the Second World War – which, after all, had been started by a man who seemed to have come from nowhere and seemed perfectly to represent 'mass man'. The German historian Friedrich Meinecke, writing in 1946 about the causes of the 'German catastrophe', claimed that the masses were still 'advancing' – after having explained 'Hitlerism' (away) as a form of 'mass Machiavellianism'.[5] Arendt put forward the idea that the emergence of the masses had been a precondition of totalitarianism, with the masses characterized by a feeling of being 'superfluous' and 'selfless', in the sense of having no proper self. She also insisted that 'the chief characteristic of the mass man is not brutality and backwardness, but his isolation and lack of normal relationships'.[6] Not everybody was as comparatively charitable to 'mass man'.

In response to the war, then, West European intellectual life went through a kind of Indian summer for defences of high culture as a barrier to barbarism; Meinecke, for instance, thought there should be 'Goethe communities' organized all across Germany. In fact, though, with a further erosion of traditional hierarchies and patterns of deference during the Second World War, 'masses' could now quite plausibly refer to everyone – not just workers and the lower classes, as had still been the case in the interwar period.[7] Whatever power the aristocracy might have had left after 1918 now vanished for good; the last remnants of the European old regimes were finally going. Some of the quasi-aristocratic rhetoric they had inspired even in the age of democracy persisted for just a bit longer.

To be sure, high cultural pessimism was not the only response to the war. The longing for a real tabula rasa – as nothing less than a moral necessity – was widespread on the continent. That a more moral politics was possible seemed to have been proved by the experience of solidarity within the various European resistance movements. The French Resistance newspaper *Combat* chose as its motto: 'From Resistance to Revolution'.

Existentialism promised the cleanest break with the past. It also emphasized the most radical notion of freedom: human beings could create themselves from scratch – there was only existence, and no predetermined 'human essence'. True, there was history, and Europeans had just experienced it in its most terrible form. But even with *that* past, and in the absence of any assurance of progress, there remained the individual possibility of self-transcendence, of choosing oneself in new kinds of action and of facing any situation in a moral manner.[8]

Did that sound abstract or slightly adolescent? Despite or because of that, existentialism was enormously influential as a cultural style. But it did not successfully translate into any party politics. Jean-Paul Sartre, its leading philosopher, was for a brief period involved in a kind of anti-party party consisting of sections of the middle class and workers, the Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire. The RDR searched for a neutral 'third way' (but different from the fascist 'Third Way') between Western liberal capitalism and Eastern Communism – in existentialist fashion refusing to be determined by the world's split into two camps. Like many of the idealistic associations emerging from the Resistance it had foundered by the late 1940s – not because of any obvious intellectual weaknesses, but because, under the conditions of the incipient Cold War, the political odds were massively in favour of choosing one of only two possible ways.

To be sure, the atmosphere of the immediate post-war period had seemed no less revolutionary than the years 1918 and 1919. Capitalism appeared discredited because of the Great Depression; in the eyes of many intellectuals, it had at least paved the way for fascism (while even non-Marxists saw merit in the view that fascism had been a tool in the hands of capitalists to preserve their power).

Unlike after the First World War, however, there was no great strike wave (and no factory councils sprang up): there appeared still fewer instruments for radical change than thirty years earlier.[9] The vanguard parties officially committed to revolution – in particular French and Italian Communists, who derived enormous moral prestige from their leading roles in the Resistance – eventually supported the emerging liberal-democratic orders. In Italy this support was explicitly justified by the party's theorists, while the French, remaining ideologically closer to Moscow than any other Western European Communists, de facto acted as a 'party of order' (which, as we shall see in the next chapter, became all too apparent in 1968).

Another difference with the interwar period was obvious or was made obvious to everyone who somehow failed it to see it: Europe as a whole was no longer the master of its own fate. Continent-wide and national ideals of self-determination could still capture the political imagination – but would quickly meet their limits with the strategic plans of the superpowers. The cruel fact was that, from the perspective of traditional ethnic nationalists, the preconditions for national self-determination seemed much more favourable, as European states virtually every-where had become more homogeneous: unlike after the First World War, hardly any borders were moved, but millions of people were officially expelled or pressured to move.[10] Ironically, as we saw in the last chapter, the Nazis were profoundly anti-nationalist, but they ended up remaking a continent with more clearly defined and demarcated national collectives. It would be wrong to think, however, that this in itself provided stability in the post-war period. What provided stability (as well as the dread of nuclear annihilation, making this yet another Age of Anxiety, in Auden's phrase) was something else: the Cold War.

Stability was to become a major goal – in fact the lodestar – of the post-war Western European political imagination. Party leaders, no less than jurists and philosophers, sought to build an order designed, above all, to prevent a return to the totalitarian past. The past, in their view, had been about limitless political dynamism, unbound masses and attempts to forge a completely unconstrained political subject – the purified German *Volksgemeinschaft*. In response, Western Europeans fashioned a highly *constrained* form of democracy, deeply imprinted with a distrust of popular sovereignty – in fact, even distrust of traditional parliamentary sovereignty.

This was a new kind of democracy, whose novelty, however, was often obscured by the fact that its innovative institutions were publicly justified with highly traditional moral and political languages. Not just conventional cultural pessimism about the masses gained yet another lease on life; religiously inspired natural law thinking also underwent a major renaissance after the war (as did Christianity more broadly). Intellectuals hoped it would provide

immutable ethical foundations for right political conduct – as opposed to the relativism, if not outright nihilism, which supposedly had characterized fascism and, as many intellectuals now asserted, liberalism. Often the deployment of such traditional languages crucially depended on misinterpretations of the fascist experience. Legal positivism, for instance, was accused of having paved the way for Hitler, as it had no substantive moral content – when in fact it had been enemies of legal positivism such as Schmitt or Idealists such as Gentile who had been most useful for the masters in Berlin and Rome.

Despite the various quests for 'third ways', it proved highly seductive to present the post-war era not as the beginning of something new, but as a moral return to something safely known. But no known set of institutions in any way 'returned' and neither was 'liberalism' in any nineteenth-century sense (as a matter of ideas, let alone in terms of a social base) revived after 1945. What emerged instead might best be described as a new balance of democracy and liberal principles, and constitutionalism in particular, but with both liberalism and democracy redefined in the light of the totalitarian experience of mid-twentieth-century Europe.[11] While many of the central institutions and values of the post-war period could be seen as functional equivalents of certain liberal ideas, the inherited political languages of liberalism were almost universally rejected as relativistic, or simply unsuitable for the age of mass democracy.

In other words, in post-war Western Europe a new, chastened Weberian politics triumphed: not charismatic, but firmly centred on the executive and pragmatic leaders; not geared towards generating meaning, but based on more than economic success (namely, moral foundations, such as natural law); not animated by a comprehensive liberal vision, but attempting to integrate citizens through shared values rooted in a rejection of the fascist past and the Communist threat from the East in the present. By contrast, in what were first 'people's democracies' and then 'people's republics' (we will have occasion to discuss the difference further below) across the Iron Curtain, a deradicalized Leninism persisted: without mass terror and other imperatives of 'war communism'; but still fully committed to the idea that the vanguard party – whose leading role came to be inscribed in the various constitutions – was uniquely qualified to make and lead a socialist people to a Communist commune state, where the subordination of man to man had finally ceased. Democratization kept being invoked, but not once did it mean party pluralism; rather it conjured up active participation in a single political project, or at least reducing the gap between the people and the party-state.

The 'people's democracies' and 'socialist democracies' were in many ways not new: Stalinism provided the initial template. By contrast, what emerged in Western Europe was not a restoration of any previously existing liberal order but

was emphatically a post-post-liberal order, a set of institutions and attendant justifications (and less explicit moral intuitions) deeply imprinted with antitotalitarianism.[12] This constellation – and new intellectual synthesis – cannot be summed up as any kind of established 'ism'. It was never formulated by a single thinker – though it had its thinkers, some of whom are almost entirely forgotten today.

New quasi-liberal institutions and decidedly non-liberal, if not outright anti-liberal, political idioms – this, then, is the great paradox of the relationship between political thought and political institutions in the late 1940s and 1950s. It was clearly revealed in the triumph of one political movement in the Western half of the continent: Christian Democracy, the most important ideological innovation of the post-war period, and one of the most significant of the European twentieth century as a whole.[13] It is often said that the decades after 1945 in Western European finally witnessed the full flowering of Social Democracy. But this was hardly so. In some countries Social Democracy had been flowering all along: Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Denmark. But in the core countries of continental Western Europe – Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries and France – it was actually Christian Democracy which proved central to constructing the post-war domestic order, and the welfare and modern administrative state in particular.[14] Its leaders were willing to innovate politically, while its intellectuals could present innovation in the guise of largely traditional languages. In the *longue durée* of European history, post-war Christian Democracy brought about the reconciliation of Catholicism to the modern world. It also achieved peace (or at least truce) between different confessions – in a country like Germany arguably for the first time since the Reformation. The leading scholar of the movement has spoken of Christian Democratic parties' 'undeniable dullness'. But dullness was just the point: Christian Democracy promised a decent enough form of public life, while allowing citizens to turn away from politics if they so desired. Many citizens desired nothing more.

Christian Democracy also played a central role in realizing the idea of supranational European integration, not least because Catholics had long been wary of the nation-state and traditional notions of sovereignty. It was easy to give up parts of what was feared in the first place. And as in domestic politics, there was a tendency to leave politics – here in the form of international negotiations – entirely to high-minded elders.

The Decent State

The truly unusual path in Western Europe was actually taken by Britain, where the Labour Party had come to power just after the war.[15] The government

under Clement Attlee was exceptional in both aims and methods: universal provision, national insurance and nationalizations of industry; all were means to what the influential social theorist Richard Titmuss called 'the search for equity' through extending the power of the state which had been vindicated by the victory over Nazism – when almost everywhere else in Europe state authority had been eroded by the war.[16] As the Labour Party intellectual Dick Crossman put it: 'The National Health Service is a by-product of the blitz.'[17]

The main beneficiaries of the welfare state turned out to be the middle class. But this was justified as a legitimate outcome in a free democracy, where workers simply were not in the majority. As the sociologist T. H. Marshall wrote:

> It may look at first sight as if the bourgeoisie had, as usual, filched what should have gone to the workers. But in the circumstances, that was bound to happen in a free democracy and is bound to go on happening in the Welfare State. For the Welfare State is not the dictatorship of the proletariat and is not pledged to liquidate the bourgeoisie.

This proved really just another way of saying that the welfare state was there to stay, because it could not be construed as a victory in some form of class war – in which case there would have remained an incentive to reverse that victory. Rather, it benefited (almost) everyone. Not least, it reconciled the middle classes (who had suffered traumas such as inflation in the interwar period and had been particularly tempted by extremist solutions) to post-war democracy: after all, they received most of the welfare benefits (and often were themselves employed in the large new welfare bureaucracies).[18]

Such reconciliation was made easier by the fact that the welfare state was justified not so much by way of long-standing socialist ideals, but rather as a form of – a major word in the 1940s and 1950s – decency. Its architects – William Beveridge, above all – were actually liberals, devoted to an evolution of the existing state, rather than to revolutionary breaks. On the other hand, the Labour Party itself soon seemed to be running out of programmatic ideas. It had simply been assumed that 'wartime standards of corporate solidarity and devotion to a common cause would survive into peacetime' and that no new public justifications for further institutionalizing 'solidarity' were required.[19] As the introduction to the *New Fabian Essays* from 1952 stated, 'the election of the Labour Government in 1945, and the rapid completion of the Fabian programme, had been followed by a dangerous hiatus both of thought and action.'[20]

Socialism had been implemented from above to constrain capitalism, but it had not been presented – or accepted – as a new way of life (in contrast to Sweden, for instance). It stood in the collectivist tradition of the Fabians, who,

as we saw in the second chapter, had long been accused of ordering people around for their own good, rather than letting them participate in making decisions about what was good for them. Crossman claimed that 'the impression was given that socialism was an affair for the Cabinet, acting through the existing Civil Service. The rest of the nation was to carry on as before, while benefits were bestowed from above . . .'[21]

The British welfare state thus ended up short on 'theory' and extensive public justifications. Beveridge himself came to disown the term, which he associated with the 'Santa Claus state' (he preferred the expression 'social service state').[22] Nevertheless, it proved very popular, but less because of principles than because of practical success. As Crossman lamented:

> the continental Marxists certainly blunted their capacity for practical reforms by forcing their politics into conformity with a rigid doctrine. The Labour Party has gone to the other extreme. It capsulated its theory into a number of measures. Once these reforms had been accomplished, its only guide for future action was a tradition, which could be interpreted in any number of contradictory ways . . . but tradition, and the Conservative Party which is its guardian, is democracy's brake on social change. The dynamics can only be provided by a party which challenges the *status quo* on grounds of principle and uses theory to expose the inadequacy of tradition as a guide to action.[23]

The Christian Democratic Moment

Christian Democracy often did speak the language of tradition. This is the main reason why in retrospect it is easy to miss the momentous turn in European history – and also in the history of the Catholic Church more generally – that mid-twentieth-century Christian Democracy constituted. After 1789 there had been a continuous counter-revolutionary tradition (though in many different national versions); and while repeated attempts had been made to reconcile the church with the modern world (the French Catholic thinker Lamennais had even spoken of 'baptizing the Revolution'), the Vatican had remained locked in a battle with liberal democracy. Clericalism and anti-clericalism had deeply split many European countries, sometimes even turning into separate and explicitly opposed ways of life: French anti-clericals would aggressively defend the ideals of lay education and ostentatiously eat meat on Fridays and *tête de veau* on 21 January (the day of the beheading of the king); in Italy the conflict between the Vatican and the newly unified state led to the Pope forbidding Catholics to vote in national elections, resulting in a kind of continuous cold culture war.

Christian Democracy had emerged from and against these drawn-out *Kulturkämpfe*. The church had begun in the late nineteenth century to organize politically against the threats from liberal, anti-clerical governments.[24] Simultaneously, it sought to rise to the challenge of socialism by presenting its own solution to the social question. Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum* constituted the manifesto of what came to be known as 'social Catholicism' – which was explicitly anti-socialist. The Pope affirmed that 'the first and most fundamental principle . . . if one would undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property'. He also stressed the importance of family and voluntary associations, alongside a principled suspicion of the state. Overall the idea of social harmony – foreshadowing the ideals of corporatism we came across earlier – proved central to this vision:

> Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic. Each needs the other: capital cannot do without labour, nor labour without capital. Mutual agreement results in the beauty of good order, while perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and savage barbarity.

Arguably, this was one step towards accepting parts of 'social democracy' in the sense of workers' economic rights – without, however, thereby necessarily legitimating political democracy. The encyclical *Diuturnum* from 1881 had still affirmed categorically that 'to make [political power] depend on the will of the people is, first, to commit an error of principle and, further, to set authority upon a foundation both fragile and inconsistent'. Improving the workers' lot was one thing, trusting them to make political decisions another. In fact, the church cast a wary eye on the Catholic parties that had formed in the late nineteenth century. Rome kept affirming that what mattered was 'Christian action', not Christian party politics, and sometimes Catholic parties found themselves attacked as signs of 'modernism' per se. In one sense this suspicion was understandable: the Catholic (and therefore universal) faith could not just be one party among (or like) all the others, let alone a mere interest group.[25] Pluralism as such had to be a problem for an institution with genuinely universalist aspirations.

In actual fact, even the words 'Christian Democracy' did not necessarily indicate a commitment to democracy, but were merely supposed to signal 'popular' or 'among the people'. Participation in elections to advance one's interests was one thing, actually endorsing the idea of popular sovereignty another. Catholics continued to play by the rules of democracy not because

they believed in them, but because it was more advantageous to be inside the game than outside.

As with so much else, the First World War and its aftermath proved a watershed. In Italy Pope Benedict XV lifted the ban on Catholics participating in the political life of the Italian nation-state, and in 1919 Don Sturzo, a Sicilian priest, appealing to *tutti i liberi e i forti*, founded the Partito Popolare Italiano, Italian Catholics' first sustained experiment in mass politics. The party immediately became the second largest after the Socialists; it played a somewhat unfortunate role during the rise of Fascism, with some of its politicians joining the first Mussolini government alongside Liberals. The Vatican itself maintained a highly ambiguous relationship with the PPI: its secretary had initially called it the 'least bad' of all Italian parties. But eventually the Holy See turned against Sturzo and supported factions that were unquestioningly prepared to collaborate with Mussolini.[26] The PPI was dissolved in 1926, and its main leaders and theoreticians had to go into some form of exile. Alcide De Gasperi, the last party secretary and the first Christian Democratic post-war prime minister, found shelter in the Vatican library; Sturzo himself lived in New York for most of the *ventennio nero* (the two 'black decades' of Fascist rule).

In the end, the interwar years proved disastrous for Christian Democratic parties in most European countries – in Italy and Germany in particular. Much more fruitful were developments in Catholic thought. Of special importance proved to be the personalist movement in France, often associated with Emmanuel Mounier and the group around his magazine *Esprit*. Personalists sought to distance themselves simultaneously from both Communism and liberal individualism, condemning these supposedly opposed ideologies as forms of materialism. Liberal individualism, in particular, was held responsible for what Mounier derided as *le désordre établi* – his designation for the corrupt parliamentary politics of the Third French Republic; as he put it, 'on the altar of this sad world, there is but one god, smiling and hideous: the Bourgeois.'[27] As an alternative to the materialist twins of liberalism and Communism, Mounier tried to reconcile Catholicism and a soft version of socialism: the 'person' – as opposed to the isolated 'individual' – always realized himself or herself in community, while also retaining a spiritual dimension which could never be absorbed into politics in this world. Practically, personalists called for a society with a flourishing group life (not unlike what the English pluralists had advocated), as well as decentralization of decision-making. While this might sound rather harmless by way of concrete proposals, the rhetoric (and personal expectations) of Mounier were never anything less than revolutionary and aggressively anti-liberal. Hence Mounier could briefly see a place for the personalists in the Vichy regime (whose leader had also

affirmed that 'individualism has nothing in common with respect for the human person') and support Soviet Marxism after the war.[28]

The intuition about decision-making having to be as decentralized as possible – now worked up into the theory of 'subsidiarity' – also appeared in the 1931 encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, which was explicitly directed against both Communism and market liberalism. Pope Pius XI admonished that 'it is not rightful to remove from individuals what they are able to achieve with their endeavour and industry in order to give it to the community, it is unjust to assign to a larger and higher society what can be done by smaller and lower communities'. The church condemned fascism as a form of atheistic statism. But by and large it took a favourable view of the Catholic corporatist (and authoritarian) regimes of the interwar period.

Fascism, as we saw in the last chapter, was completely discredited with the war. The Catholic authoritarian regimes now distanced themselves from whatever fascist tendencies they had harboured – in short, they became *more* Catholic. While Franco and Salazar soldiered on for a few more decades (and retained many admirers in other countries), it is not an exaggeration to say that the war had also put an end to the long counter-revolutionary tradition in Western Europe. This was most obvious in the original context of counter-revolution, that is, France: the Vichy regime's failed 'National Revolution', under the shadow of occupation, had also discredited the long-held dreams of royalist and religious right-wing movements.

The main change, however, was that Christian Democrats in post-war Europe were no longer in the business of grudgingly and resentfully accommodating the modern world – Christian Democrats really became democrats. Don Sturzo insisted in 1945 that in the past liberty had been 'badly understood by clericals', but now had to be 're-linked to the Christian tradition of popular sovereignty and to the democratic regime'.[29] Christian Democrats also embraced human rights as indispensable to a proper Catholic view of the world – a development which can hardly be understood without the role of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain.[30] Maritain had been born into a prominent republican family and started his intellectual life as a philosophy student at the Sorbonne, supporting Colonel Dreyfus against the forces of the right. In 1901 he had met fellow student Raïssa Oumansoff, daughter of Russian Jewish immigrants. So began a lifelong intellectual and spiritual collaboration which had few parallels in the twentieth century – not least in its dramatic moments. In 1903, on a sunny summer day in the Jardin des Plantes, the lovers vowed to commit suicide together within a year if they could not find answers to life's apparent meaninglessness. Eventually they did find an answer: Catholicism.

Maritain became a fervent Catholic – and clearly a right-wing one. In the 1920s, he moved close to the proto-fascist Action Française and was perceived by some as the unofficial philosophical spokesman of this stridently nationalist and royalist movement. In 1926 the movement was condemned by the Vatican; the Pope accused the AF of instrumentalizing Catholicism for political purposes, while actually being atheist. For a while, Maritain tried to mediate between the Vatican and the movement's leader, Charles Maurras; then he abandoned the Action Française for good. He remained highly critical of the modern world, however, and of Protestantism and liberalism in particular. His beliefs shaped the emerging personalism, and for a while he acted as a mentor to Mounier and the *Esprit* group.[31] Unlike many European Catholics, he refused to endorse Franco's actions in the Spanish Civil War as a kind of modern crusade. He also began to work out a philosophical rapprochement between Catholicism and modern conceptions of human rights and democracy.

American and Canadian universities had begun to invite Maritain for lecture series in the mid-1930s. When the war broke out, he found himself in North America and decided to stay; the Gestapo searched his house outside Paris in vain. He spent the following years on the East Coast, teaching at Princeton and Columbia. He remarked that there existed in the United States a fundamental tension between the structures (or 'logic') of advanced industrial civilization and the generous, humanist spirit (or 'soul') of the American people. He was convinced that the soul would emerge victorious over capitalism.[32]

Partly inspired by the example of the US, Maritain began to propagate what he saw as the inner connections between democracy and Christianity more openly. In 1942 he authored a pamphlet *Christianity and Democracy* that was dropped by Allied planes over France. There he claimed that 'democracy is linked to Christianity and that the democratic impulse has arisen in human history as the moral manifestation of the inspiration of the Gospel'.[33] More boldly, he declared that 'democracy is the only way of bringing about a moral rationalization of politics. Because democracy is a rational organization of freedoms founded upon law.' And on an even more emphatic note, he announced that 'democracy carries in a fragile vessel the terrestrial hope, I would say the biological hope, of humanity'.

True, Maritain's intellectual-political *aggiornamento* was highly selective: it did not let go of elements which had constituted core elements of Catholic political thought at least since the late nineteenth century. He was sceptical of the state and of the notion of sovereignty in particular. Rousseau, the apparent originator of the idea of popular sovereignty, but also Luther kept being blamed for the cataclysms of the mid-twentieth century. Maritain argued that 'political philosophy must eliminate Sovereignty both as a word and as a concept – not because it is an antiquated concept . . . not because the concept of Sovereignty

creates insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of international law; but because, considered in its genuine meaning ... this concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead us if we keep using it'.[34]

For Maritain, 'sovereign' meant 'separate' and 'transcendent' – and neither kings nor peoples could properly be separate from the body politic. Only God was sovereign. At the same time, the notion of 'person' was precisely to signal openness to the transcendent. Maritain's 'theocentric' humanism, which he wanted to realize in a pluralist and personalist democracy, sought to do justice to 'man in the wholeness of his natural and supernatural being'. But theocentric did not mean theocratic: Maritain insisted that 'a new Christian temporal order, while founded on the same principles (analogically speaking) as that of the Middle Ages, will imply a *secular Christian*, not a consecrated, conception of the temporal order'.

What underpinned Maritain's views was a strong Thomist notion of natural law which ultimately derived from divine law and which specified human beings' proper ends. Freedom for Maritain therefore meant not licence or arbitrarily following one's desires, but the full realization of these ends. It is against this background that he insisted on the importance of workers' rights and even general rights of subsistence, because they were indispensable for such a proper realization of the person.

Maritain's conceptions did not remain confined to debates among Catholic philosophers: he was a central player in drafting the UN Declaration of Human Rights. De Gaulle persuaded him to serve as French ambassador to the Vatican after the war. The Holy See itself would eventually ratify many of his ideas, and it was highly fitting that he was presented by the Pope with the 'Message to the Philosophers' at the closing of the Second Vatican Council. However, Maritain – who after the death of his wife in 1960 had lived in a monastic order near Toulouse – now thought that the church was going too far in its 'modernism'. His harsh criticisms of its more liberal positions were greeted with anger and incomprehension by many of his followers – was he disowning his life's philosophical work? Even so, unrepentant right-wing Catholics like Carl Schmitt would consistently denounce him as 'Cauche-Maritain' (Night-Maritain), while conservatives such as the Hungarian thinker Aurel Kolnai never found his efforts expended in 'dressing up poor Thomas Aquinas in the rags of a laicist apostle of democracy' very credible.[35] East of the Iron Curtain, the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski attacked the whole neo-Thomist tendency as a desperate measure to justify and preserve private property rights.[36]

However, for the newly formed Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe Maritain's thought constituted an important reference point, although the French Thomist had not necessarily been in favour of founding explicitly Christian parties; Christianity, he felt, should be something like the 'yeast' of

political life. Maritain's philosophy proved particularly significant for a group of left-leaning Christian Democratic thinkers involved in the drafting of the Italian constitution.[37] At their centre were the intellectuals Giorgio La Pira (who was to become mayor of Florence) and Giuseppe Dossetti from the Catholic University in Milan, who were nicknamed *professorini* (young, or fledgling, professors). They had avidly read the personalists, criticized individualism and, above all, endorsed the point that the person was always embedded in community; in La Pira's words: 'the human person unfolds through organic belonging to the successive social communities in which it is contained and via which it steadily develops and perfects itself'.[38]

Dossetti, an expert in ecclesiastical law, had fought in the Resistance and served on the Committee of National Liberation. In 1945 he was made vice-secretary of the Democrazia Cristiana and tried to open the party to personalist, pacifist and even socialist ideas. He had been deeply impressed by the Labour Party's 1945 election victory in Britain; he and his allies had studied Beveridge and Keynes (who they wrongly believed to have been Labour politicians); and they were hoping for an Italian version of a personalist, labour-based 'substantial democracy', which realized Christian solidarity throughout the state, society and the economy.[39] Their central beliefs about the economic reordering of post-war Italy could be summed up in their slogan 'First the person and then the market'.[40] What this meant in terms of political institutions and policies often remained unclear, however, and, as we will see in a moment, any more left-leaning visions of Christian Democracy were soon sidelined in favour of more market-friendly versions. At least there were some symbolic victories for the *professorini*: article 3 of the Italian constitution read, in perfect personalist language: 'it is the Republic's duty to remove obstacles of an economic or social order physically constricting the freedom and equality of citizens and thus impeding the full development of the human person'.[41]

A Bargain of Ideas

It was not personalist philosophers – nor even the general revival of Christianity – that ensured the party-political success of Christian Democracy after 1945. It was a particular electoral alliance of the middle class and the peasantry (an alliance supportive of and benefiting from European integration, too). Perhaps more importantly still, Christian Democrats became the quintessentially anti-Communist parties of the era, helped by the fact that the traditional right had been so thoroughly discredited alongside fascism. One reason why human rights proved so attractive to Catholics was that the language of personal rights could be deployed against the threat of 'godless Bolshevism'.

To be sure, Christian Democrats had not been completely unaffected by the revolutionary atmosphere of the mid-1940s. For instance, the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU)'s initial party programmes were almost socialist in some of their aspirations – including large-scale nationalizations and the co-determination of workers and employers; they sought to appeal not least to Catholic unions and the worker-priest movement. Georges Bidault, the founder of the French version of Christian Democracy, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, summed up this approach as 'to govern in the centre, and pursue, by the methods of the right, the policies of the left'.[42]

By the early 1950s, however, this slogan seemed not nearly as plausible as it had been in the late 1940s. The CDU now emphasized the importance of small business, small peasant holdings and (ideally not so small) families. In fact, rather than pursuing any 'policies of the left', as in Bidault's phrase, the German Christian Democrats brokered a compromise between economic liberals and socially conservative Catholics who might have had socialist leanings: if the former accepted traditional morality, the latter would live with the market. This intellectual bargain also needed particular 'in-between figures' capable of speaking to both sides and of credibly representing free-market and Catholic ideals at the same time. In Germany, Oswald von Nell-Breuning, who had been the main author of *Quadragesimo Anno* and later served as an adviser in Ludwig Erhard's liberal Economics Ministry, performed precisely such a role. He and others forged what turned out to be both an intellectually and electorally highly successful formula.

Over time Christian Democratic parties turned themselves into genuine mass parties, following the model of the Social Democrats, but broadening their electoral appeal still further and fashioning themselves into what the erstwhile socialist legal theorist Otto Kirchheimer – now a political scientist at Columbia University – called 'catch-all parties'. Even in Italy De Gasperi did not want to shape a party that understood itself as exclusively Catholic (or, even worse, was perceived as the political arm of the Vatican); instead, the Democrazia Cristiana, in De Gasperi's mind, was to become a genuine *partito nazionale* cutting across classes and regions, thus actually modelling itself on the Fascist Party (while in Germany the Nazis had arguably been the first *Volkspartei* cutting across class and region).

True, in order to highlight the contrast with Communism, party leaders kept affirming that democracy necessarily had to rest on Christian foundations, and that the only alternative to Christian Democracy was totalitarianism. But more and more, the Christian Democratic parties were losing the odour of incense which had clung to the movement earlier in the century.[43] By the early 1970s, the Austrian Christian Democrats could declare with a straight face that their

party was open to 'Christians and all those who from other motives believe in a humanistic view of man'. In other words, atheists may apply, too.

While in France the political space available for the Mouvement Républicain Populaire was eventually closed by Gaullism, the Italian Democrazia Cristiana became the most successful party machine in post-war Western Europe. It was effectively a state party, or at least a party colonizing areas of the state, continuously in power to keep out the Communists, always employing in varying positions the same personnel representing the different party factions or *correnti*, and throughout relying on clientelism (and sometimes corruption) – something that thinkers like Dossetti had predicted would happen if the DC failed to offer Italy genuine ethical renewal. The 'libertas' in the DC's coat of arms appeared to signify mostly freedom *from* Communism and freedom *to* plunder the state. The party always held on to – of all ministries – the post office, because it provided the amplest opportunities for patronage. Some drew the consequences early on: Dossetti, always as much a religious mystic as a politician, dissolved his left-wing faction in the party, founded a monastic order called the Piccola Famiglia dell'Annunziata and became a priest.

And yet, for all its increasingly conspicuous failings, it is important to remember what the DC did not do – it resisted pressure from the Vatican to keep the option of a more authoritarian Catholic state open (after all, Salazar's Estado Novo remained attractive for Rome). De Gasperi was perhaps no Don Sturzo, that is, no great believer in an egalitarian version of Catholic social doctrine – but the point is that he was no Franco either.

Also, for all the sordid and not so sordid material reasons that ensured the triumph of Christian Democracy, it has to be remembered that some body of thought had to be available publicly to justify Christian Democratic politics – and, in particular, thoughts which credibly spoke to believers, while reassuring non-believers that religious parties had genuinely accepted pluralism and that they would not reignite a *Kulturkampf*. The very vagueness of a philosophy such as personalism probably ensured its broad appeal (leading Jean-Paul Sartre to claim in 1948 to a Swiss writer, 'you personalists have won . . . everybody in France now calls themselves a personalist'). More specifically, its professed anti-liberalism could help Catholics build bridges to modern democracy without feeling that they had betrayed their own convictions. Maritain's thought in particular provided reasons from within the Catholic tradition to embrace liberal politics – in fact, if not in name – while also reassuring non-believers that Catholics would not revert to some form of authoritarianism if they gained the majority. It was a delicate philosophical balancing act. It did not necessarily make for profound philosophy. But it made West European politics more moderate.

Like the CDU in Germany, Democrazia Cristiana turned out to be much more pro-market in economics than one might have thought in the late 1940s. However, like the CDU, it was consistently conservative in questions of morality. Already in 1946, at the first congress of the DC, Guido Gonella declared in a rousing speech:

> an invisible and silent bomb has destroyed the family unit. The family, if it is not already dispersed, is more likely to unite around the radio, which is a deafening and dulling window on the world, than around the domestic hearth . . . The family is a fortress which cannot be defended from inside the fortress. Certainly we must also issue forth and fight the enemy in open battle.[44]

But Christian Democrats were clearly losing this particular battle. They could try to combine their belief in modernization and traditional morality rhetorically, as when the leader of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, Franz Josef Strauß, declared that 'to be conservative today means to march at the head of technological progress'. But in reality the trends of the time were summed up in the opening scene of Fellini's *La dolce vita*, when a gigantic Christ statue is flown across Rome, followed by paparazzi and watched by some scantily clad women sunbathing on a roof below: the symbols of traditional Christianity (and morality) were still there, but life on the ground was changing inexorably. The fusion of technology and tradition seemed less and less coherent.

Longer-lasting (and more coherent) was the specifically Christian Democratic approach in international affairs: the founders of the European Community – Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman – were all Christian Democrats. Not by accident did they hail from the margins of their respective nation-states; all had been marked by the sometimes brutal homogenization of the 'late' nation-states Italy and Germany: De Gasperi had studied in Vienna and served in the pre-1918 Austrian Reichsrat; Adenauer had been mayor of Catholic Cologne – very much on the margins of the Reich; Schuman's family had fled Lorraine from the Germans to Luxembourg.[45] All could, if they desired to do so, speak German with each other. National sovereignty was neither a value in itself for them nor a precondition for creating political meaning, in the way it had been for Max Weber. On the contrary, it was something to be feared. These leaders advocated subsidiarity and a Europe united in its 'Christian-humanist' heritage (the particulars of which were not to be discussed all that much, as long as they added up to anti-Communism). They believed in supranationalism as something done by well-connected elites of high-minded planners and bureaucrats – the kind of diplomacy that had been foreshadowed by Keynes' dealings after the First World War, but which,

for the most part, had so spectacularly foundered in interwar Europe. Jean Monnet, the French bureaucrat-cum-intellectual who was one of the major architects of European integration, famously claimed: 'We are not connecting states, we are connecting people.' But in fact they were first of all connecting well-intentioned, but not necessarily internationally well-connected, politicians and civil servants.

Thus the creators of the European Community followed an indirect way of gaining legitimacy for their project: rather than having the peoples of the initial member states vote for supranational arrangements, they relied on technocratic and administrative measures agreed among elites to yield what Monnet time and again called 'concrete achievements' – which were eventually to persuade citizens that European integration was a good thing.[46]

In retrospect, the official approach has often been derided as European integration by stealth. At the time, however, it appeared as a credible response to the dangers of popular sovereignty, of which Christian Democrat leaders, even as leaders of people's parties, would remain particularly wary. On the other hand, some architects of integration did seek to instil real political passion for Europe in their people. Adenauer told the members of his cabinet in February 1952 that 'the people must be given a new ideology. It can only be a European one.'[47] And De Gasperi claimed in a speech to the Italian Senate:

> some said that the European federation is a myth. It's true, *it is a myth in the Sorelian sense.* And if you want there to be a myth, then please tell us what myth we need to give to our youth concerning relations between one state and another, the future of Europe, the future of the world, security, and peace, if not this effort toward unification? Do you prefer the myth of dictatorship, the myth of power, the myth of one's nation's flag, even if it is accompanied by heroism? But then, we would create once again that conflict that inevitably leads to war. I tell you that this myth is a myth of peace.[48]

Nevertheless, European integration was from the beginning a political end mainly pursued by taking seemingly small economic and administrative steps, and not so much by promoting Sorelian myths (even if the Sorelian notion that continuously moving is everything – and the end nothing – sometimes seemed to sum up what Euro-enthusiasts were really saying).

In retrospect all these changes seem momentous, in particular the devaluing of national sovereignty and the creation of (relative) social peace among classes, but also among confessions. At the time, however, the Christian Democratic moment was often deplored as a 'restoration' of traditions which had failed at least once already. Critics levelling this charge did have a point: measured

against the hopes of many political thinkers in the Resistance, the post-war landscape looked profoundly dispiriting: there was too much capitalism, and too little direct participation in democracy. Younger generations felt this even more acutely. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who had been a member of the Hitler Youth and then served as a field nurse in the final phase of the war, was deeply shocked when he learnt more and more about German atrocities and what he called 'the fact of collectively realized inhumanity', as he listened to the reports of the Nuremberg trials on the radio. Habermas explained later that 'we believed that a spiritual and moral renewal was indispensable and inevitable'. The apparent failure of such renewal then led to a fundamental sense of distrust vis-à-vis the post-war polity: 'if only there had been some spontaneous sweeping away, some explosive act, which then could have served to begin the formation of political authority. After such an eruption we could have at least known what we couldn't go back to.'[49]

The 'Euthanasia of Politics'?

The 1950s and 1960s are often characterized by the concept of 'consensus politics'. This seems a highly plausible diagnosis: the centre expanded, as the extreme right had been discredited by fascism, while the post-war left became more and more moderate, shedding almost all remnants of Marxist theory. True, the notion of consensus hides persistent disagreements on policy, which remained rooted in different political principles (and different political imaginations). But there really were shared goals: in particular, the vocabulary of 'stability' became ubiquitous after 1945.

Tellingly, 'stability' had entered political language only in the nineteenth century and was itself imported from the sphere of technology, and engineering in particular. In the post-war world stability was to be ensured not least by 'the politics of productivity' – the co-operation of employers and unions for the sake of higher productivity and greater wealth all round. One reason that both former class enemies seemed able to collaborate was the stress on 'technocracy': conflict could be reduced significantly, because there really were technically correct solutions to social and economic problems; it simply made no sense to keep fighting about them. What automatically fell by the wayside were ideals of industrial democracy and worker self-administration: there seemed no point in giving decision-making power to unqualified workers, as opposed to qualified experts. Workers should remain content as unions obtained the best possible deal for them. As the British union leader Hugh Clegg put it, 'the trade union . . . is industry's opposition – an opposition which can never become a government'.[50]

The means for attaining stability, then, seemed uncontentious. Keynes talked about the 'euthanasia of politics' in economic policy-making;[51] the Swedish analyst Herbert Tingsten claimed as early as 1955 that 'as the general standard of values is commonly accepted, the functions of the state become so technical as to make politics appear as a kind of applied statistics'.[52] Consensus was justified by the overriding importance of stability, and stability in turn was justified in the language of security. The German Christian Democrats' most famous election slogan simply demanded, 'No experiments'; another imaginative one ran, 'Safe is safe' (*Sicher ist sicher*). Even when there was change – as with the entry of the German Social Democrats into government in 1966 for the first time since 1930 – change was presented as a means of gaining even more stability. The Social Democrats thought the best they could do by way of an election slogan in 1966 was: 'Sicherheit ja!'

The craze for large-scale planning was the clearest expression of this belief in the capacity of governments to steer, stabilize and secure entire societies. It cut across left and right. Most famously there was Jean Monnet, who insisted that 'the plan, like life, is continuous creation' and that 'the only alternative to modernization is decadence'.[53] Even in the country where planning was viewed somewhat warily because of its associations with both Communism and Nazism – West Germany – 'plans' proliferated: from the Green Plan to the Federal Youth Plan to the Golden Plan (for the Olympics).[54]

Planning had to be 'scientific', of course. The Labour politician (and two-time prime minister) Harold Wilson demanded in 1963 that 'in the Cabinet room and the boardroom alike, those charged with the control of our affairs must be ready to think and to speak in the language of our scientific age'. They were supposed to be helped in that endeavour by the social sciences – sociology and economics in particular – which had become supremely self-confident in the post-war period and seemingly capable of vanquishing the three evils which Keynes had already identified in the interwar period as the greatest threats to liberal democratic stability: 'risk, uncertainty, and ignorance'.[55]

In actual fact, planning was to be least practised in Britain (even if there was a great deal of talk about 'democratic planning'). As both idea and practice, planning could be separated from the welfare state (which kept expanding in the UK). British unions supported the latter, they resisted the former. Planning could also be separated from nationalization; observing the development of the latter made G. D. H. Cole revert to his Guild Socialist principles and claim that nationalization policies constituted a 'bad cross between bureaucracy and big business'.[56]

Unlike in the major continental European countries, there was also a noticeable British philosophical opposition to technocracy, and to planning in

particular. Its protagonists could speak self-assuredly in the name of national tradition. Ernest Barker, who still retained pluralist sensibilities – but now thought only those with the right national character could sustain pluralism – criticized what he called 'the managing and manipulating state'; he felt disturbed by 'the nervous tension in planning . . . which hardly accords with our instincts or the general tradition of our life'. The gentleman-scholar remained fundamentally opposed to the technocrat-planner, and what Barker saw as the quintessentially English 'anti-professional modes of government' appropriate to a state conceived as a gentlemen's club. Amateurism, he held, would also prevent 'life from being too hugely serious' and leave 'a space for fun'.[57]

Nevertheless, there appeared on the continent an unashamed endorsement of technocracy, or, put differently, of Weber's steely casing – because there seemed actually to be security in that casing. And while it might not have been exactly Barker's 'space for fun', in the new age of consumerism it at least proved comfortable. Never mind that critics such as the French Communist poet Louis Aragon derided it as a 'civilisation de frigidaires'.[58]

It was tempting to conclude that industrial society, or what the French sociologist Raymond Aron called 'scientific' and 'rationalized' society, could now somehow stabilize itself – without too much help from the state. The German legal theorist Ernst Forsthoff, a pupil of Schmitt, announced in the late 1960s that 'the hard core of the social whole is no longer the state, but industrial society, and this hard core is characterized by the notions of full employment and increase of the GNP'.[59] Whether or not Forsthoff was right in this diagnosis, there was a widespread sense that Western Europe was modernizing rapidly, and that modernization would spell the end of long-standing ideological conflict, or, more bluntly, class warfare. The German sociologist Helmut Schelsky diagnosed a 'levelled-down middle-class society'. Harold Wilson, when asked to which class he belonged, claimed: 'Well someone who started at elementary school in Yorkshire and became an Oxford don – where do you put him in this class spectrum? I think these phrases are becoming more and more meaningless'.[60] The language of class conflict was fading.

And even 'the masses' disappeared. While it is impossible to say when exactly they ceased to be central to European intellectual debates, there can be little doubt that by the early 1960s the value-neutral 'society' or 'industrial society' had taken their place.[61] For a while at least, sociology, with its highly abstract concepts – rather than cultural criticism – tended to be the basso continuo of political thinking.

It has to be remembered, though, that modernization proceeded under auspices which did not seem modern at all: a paternalistic form of politics – embodied in figures such as the German chancellor Adenauer, who governed

until the age of eighty-seven, De Gasperi, who was already sixty-four when he became Italian prime minister, the French president Charles de Gaulle and the German president Theodor Heuss – often referred to simply as 'Papa Heuss'. Most of them – de Gaulle being an obvious exception – sought a dedramatization of politics. These old men – self-consciously anti-charismatic and conventionally bourgeois in their appearance – could not have marked a greater contrast with the fascist and, in general, pre-war cult of youth.[62] For most people it was a very reassuring contrast.

The Post-War Constitutional Settlement: Disciplining Democracy

It would be a mistake, however, to think that stability was supposed automatically to follow from the 'politics of productivity', from planning and from consumerism. Political institutions were expected to play a role, and the post-war period saw crucial innovations in what Hans Kelsen had called 'constitutional techniques'. One of the most important in twentieth-century Europe as a whole was the creation of constitutional courts. These were not simply a copy of the American Supreme Court. Instead this particular conception of judicial review dated from thirty years earlier – Kelsen had included it in the Austrian constitution which he had crafted after the First World War (he himself had served on the court until 1930, when anti-Semitic attacks forced him out).[63] Austria had been only the third country to have such judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes (after the US and Australia), and the first to centralize tests for constitutionality and task a specific separate court with it. Kelsen defended judicial review as a form of checks and balances; he did not concede that it might be inherently undemocratic, as many opponents were to claim. In the early 1930s, in a major controversy with Carl Schmitt, the Austrian jurist argued that only such a court could be the ultimate 'guardian' of a constitution. Schmitt, on the other hand, assigned this role to the president, in a manner that was closer to Max Weber's thinking.[64] At the time, German political elites had gone with Schmitt rather than Kelsen.

After 1945, even in countries which had traditionally been highly suspicious of judicial review – above all, France, with its aversion to *gouvernement des juges* – the idea of testing for constitutionality was accepted eventually. Constitutional courts appeared to limit or even contradict traditional notions of popular sovereignty – but, in a post-war age that was suspicious of the dangers of potentially totalitarian democracy, having more checks and balances was precisely the point. What was unexpected was that constitutional courts also contradicted executives. As Adenauer, one of the architects of the West German

Basic Law, complained after the court had began to go against his plans to rearm the country: 'This is not how we imagined it.'[65]

Constitutional courts were also instrumental in the rise of so-called militant democracy – a concept that had first been defined by the German exile political scientist Karl Loewenstein in 1938, at a time when one European country after another had been taken over by fascist and authoritarian movements using democratic means to disable democracy.[66] Loewenstein had argued that democracies were incapable of defending themselves against such movements if they continued to subscribe to 'democratic fundamentalism', 'legalistic blindness' and an 'exaggerated formalism of the rule of law'.[67] Part of the new challenge was that, according to Loewenstein, fascism had no proper intellectual content, relying on a kind of 'emotionalism' with which democracies could never compete on its own terms. Consequently, democracies had to take legal measures against anti-democratic forces, such as banning parties. They should also restrict the rights to assembly and free speech.[68] As Loewenstein argued, 'fire should be fought with fire', and that fire, in his view, could be lit only by a new, 'disciplined' democracy.[69]

One country in particular in post-war Europe was prepared to fight fire with fire: the Federal Republic of Germany. The West German Constitutional Court invoked the idea of militant democracy to ban the quasi-Nazi Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party in the 1950s; in the 1970s the concept was evoked in support of draconian measures against those guilty of (suspected) association with terrorists. Critics charged from the beginning that this anti-extremism could easily be instrumentalized against legitimate opposition (especially left-wing opposition), while, at the same time, it did little to help deal with the Nazi past. If anything, its implicit equation of Soviet Communism (and its alleged foreign agents) and Nazism seemed to relativize the evils of the latter.

Militant democracy was most pronounced in West Germany, but the imperative of democratic self-defence became pervasive across Western Europe. In Italy the Christian Democrats sought to establish a 'protected democracy' – *una democrazia protetta* – that was to restrict civil liberties but was also to justify electoral laws benefiting major parties.[70] But the initiative failed in the Italian Senate, most likely because the Vatican had an interest in preventing a ban on right-wing parties and thereby keeping its political options open.[71] While the Italian constitution had explicitly prohibited the re-establishment of the Fascist Party, the Italian Social Movement, a de facto successor to Fascism, established itself as a minor party. Once more, the theory and the reality of militant democracy differed markedly – and the reality, for the most part, favoured the right.

For all these failings, though, there emerged after the war a new constitutional settlement, with a particular 'constitutionalist ethos'.[72] It was informed

by the perceived lessons of the interwar period: whereas fascists (and Stalin) had tried to create new peoples, the point now was to constrain existing ones. Neither major political thinkers nor actual political leaders were interested in 'people-making' of any kind; the latter in particular were content with the peoples they found and to let them be (or let men make themselves in the market, so to speak). The fact that the war had brought about more homogeneous state populations and that class divisions were decreasing among them obviously helped.

In concrete terms the imperative of constraining peoples translated into weakening parliaments and, in particular, restricting the ability of legislatures to delegate power – preventing them, so it was hoped, from the kind of democratic suicide the Weimar Republic and the French Third Republic had committed: never again should an assembly abdicate in favour of a Hitler or a Pétain. Thus what the German lawyer Hugo Preuss – father of the Weimar constitution and responsible for involving Weber in its drafting – had described as the danger of 'parliamentary absolutism' was to be banished once and for all.

At the same time, many of the functions of the ever expanding post-war welfare and regulatory states were delegated to administrative agencies, but these were in turn made subject to strong judicial and administrative oversight. The latter was to alleviate the kind of liberal anxieties about the rule of law which Lord Hewart had voiced in the 1920s (and which had been exacerbated for continental observers of the neo-feudal Third Reich: there, as we saw in the last chapter, power had been delegated to numerous unaccountable and self-radicalizing agencies).[73] Karl Loewenstein concluded in 1966 that the task of checking the bureaucracy which Weber had assigned to parliament was now effectively fulfilled by courts, while 'parliamentarism, which in the nineteenth century seemed to be the ultimate in political wisdom, has . . . undergone such widespread devaluation'.[74]

Constitutional courts in turn were to protect this new order as a whole, especially by safeguarding individual rights. These were also to be out of reach for parliaments and grounded in natural law or other systems of absolute values (which directly contradicted one of Kelsen's major philosophical positions, namely that democracy necessarily entailed a form of value relativism).[75] Even sceptical liberals would affirm the necessity of such supposedly unshakeable foundations of objective values as a direct lesson of the past. Isaiah Berlin answered the question 'what has emerged from the recent holocausts?' by saying, 'something approaching a new recognition in the West that there are certain universal values which can be called constitutive of human beings as such'.[76]

European integration was part and parcel of the new 'constitutionalist ethos', with its inbuilt distrust of popular sovereignty, and the delegation of

bureaucratic tasks to agencies which remained under the close supervision of national governments.[77] Member countries consciously gave powers to unelected institutions domestically and also to supranational bodies in order to 'lock in' liberal-democratic arrangements, and to prevent any backsliding towards authoritarianism.[78]

Two fundamental decisions by the European Court of Justice reinforced this sense of 'Europe' as another set of constraints on electoral democracy. Landmark cases in 1963 and 1964 established that European Community law was to have supremacy over national laws and that it took direct effect in member states – that is, EC legislation could be invoked by individual citizens in national courts and be enforced against member states. The court confidently announced that 'by creating a Community of unlimited duration . . . the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields, and thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves'. In 1969 the judges even added the opinion that fundamental human rights were in fact 'enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court' – when in fact the original treaties had made no mention of such rights. This discovery or, rather, invention of rights was prompted by the fear that the German and Italian constitutional courts could oppose European law in the name of basic rights contained in national constitutions. Thus, in line with the general West European trend towards review by a special court, the European Court of Justice had more or less bootstrapped itself into a position of extraordinary judicial power (and was, for the most part, accepted as possessing that power both by national courts and by national governments).

A central element of the post-war constitutional settlement, then, was that outside Britain the idea of unrestricted parliamentary supremacy ceased to be seen as legitimate. The flipside of the weakening of parliaments was a strengthening of executives, a process which went furthest under General de Gaulle, who turned the Assemblée Nationale into the weakest legislature in the West. Justifications of democracy centred less on having one's views effectively represented in parliament than on ensuring the regular turnover of responsible political elites through elections.

It was very much the notion of democracy which Joseph Schumpeter – Weber's sardonic adversary in the café debate on the Russian Revolution – put forward at mid-century. Like Weber, Schumpeter, who had briefly (and disastrously) acted as Austrian finance minister after the First World War, held that there was no such a thing as a coherent popular will; he also denied that participation in politics mattered in the least for ordinary people; but unlike Weber he attributed no particular dignity to the public realm. Competition for votes among elites was a good thing, the rest of democratic ideology an illusion, as was Weber's hope for

politics as a sphere independent of the economy and capable of creating collective meaning. Many post-war thinkers shared such assumptions, with leading Labour Party intellectual Tony Crosland, for instance, claiming that 'all experience shows that only a small minority of the population will wish to participate', while the majority would always 'prefer to lead a full family life and cultivate their garden'.[79]

Politics, then, was not supposed to be a major source of meaning; in fact it was not supposed to be a source of meaning at all. But with such expectations for meaning (and possibly personal fulfilment through politics) also went any sense of the public realm as a site of collective freedom – or so Hannah Arendt (and other critics who could not be suspected of either Nazi or Soviet sympathies) complained. European liberals emphasized 'negative freedom', that is, absence of interference in one's life. It was supposedly the only kind of freedom that could not be turned into a totalitarian nightmare in the name of ideals centred on 'positive freedom' understood as individual or collective self-direction. But for critics this seeming self-restriction – promoted not least to mark the difference from socialism in the East – made for a diminished form of democracy. In the eyes of observers like Arendt, such a restrictive liberalism actually reinforced 'mass man's' isolation and, perversely, made a return to totalitarianism more likely. There were also some self-designated 'classical liberals' tormented by the fear of a return to totalitarianism: not because of the post-war order's restrictive liberalism – but because of the very consensus politics that promised stability.

Liberals in the Wasteland

Friedrich von Hayek, a distant cousin of Wittgenstein, had grown up in the Vienna of the early twentieth century when it had been a laboratory for many of the century's most important intellectual trends.[80] He spent some time in New York in the 1920s, supposedly having arrived with exactly twenty-five dollars and ready to do the proverbial dishwashing in a restaurant on Sixth Avenue if a research position had not finally opened up at New York University. He left Austria in 1931 for the London School of Economics, the first foreigner to be appointed there.

In Britain he quickly made a name for himself with a number of direct attacks on Keynes, but he was widely perceived to have lost the battle that he had fought with Keynes in specialized academic journals. Their heated exchange apparently did not damage the respectful personal relationship between the two gentlemen-economists: Keynes made sure Hayek was put up properly when the LSE had to be evacuated to Cambridge during the war; and they even did fire watch together on the roof of King's College Chapel.

1 Lecturing German youth on what's what: Max Weber (with hat) at a conference in Burg Lauenstein (Thuringia) in 1917, which was intended as a place for different generations of German intellectuals to meet (and which Weber later called a 'department store for Weltanschauungen') . It was at this gathering that Weber directly (and passionately) confronted a number of young left-wing intellectuals (or littérateurs) who opposed the War. The writer Ernst Toller *(centre, back)* was one of them. Eventually Toller was put on trial for his role in the Bavarian council republic. Weber, despite all his misgivings about Toller's politics, was to come to his defence. Toller was spared the death penalty.

2 A workers' home in Red Vienna (also more or less functional as a fortress for class warfare): Karl-Marx-Hof, 1927–30, Heiligenstädter Strasse, in the 19th district of the city. The complex contained more than 1,300 apartments; balconies and private toilets were distinct innovations – sometimes perceived as luxuries – for workers' homes. The Hof remains the longest residential building in the world.

3 The intellectual joins the battle: 'Commissar Lukács thanks the proletariat for its help in overcoming the counter-revolution', or so the official caption of this still from a newsreel tells us. Lukács is reported to have lectured his soldiers: 'If blood can be shed, and who would deny that it can be, then we are permitted to shed it. But we can't allow others to do it for us. We must take full responsibility for the blood that is shed. We must also provide an opportunity for our blood to be shed ... In short, terror and bloodshed are a moral duty, or, more plainly, our virtue.'

4 Stalin touted his constitution as the 'most Democratic in the World':
fold-out poster by El Lissitzky, 'The Stalin Constitution', from *USSR
in Construction* (1937). Another 1937 El Lissitzky poster bore the
inscription, 'Stalin's Constitution is the Soviet People's Happiness'. The
supposed 'Happiness' only came to an end in 1977: Stalin's constitution
turned out to be the Soviet Union's longest lasting.

5 Fascism finally has its doctrine and Italy its Encyclopedia: Mussolini, caught fumbling with his tie, looks anxious, but the others – (*from left to right*) Giovanni Treccani (the publisher), Calogero Tumminelli (the editor), Giovanni Gentile (the main philosopher of Fascism) and Ugo Spirito (who would later turn from Fascism to Communism) – seem rather confident.

6 No political thinker did more to reshape the Catholic Church's attitude towards liberal democracy and human rights: Jacques Maritain consults with Pope Paul VI in 1964. While a great proponent of Christian Democracy, Maritain was no friend of Christian Democratic parties; in the mid-1960s he declared: 'until today – and despite (or because of) the entry on the scene, in different countries, of political parties labeled "Christian" (most of which are primarily combinations of electoral interests) – the hope for the advent of a Christian politics has been completely frustrated'.

NOUS SOMMES TOUS DES JUIFS ET DES ALLEMANDS

7 French students defy the bourgeois Right's lingering anti-Semitism – and, inadvertently, bring about a bit of European integration: 'Nous sommes tous des juifs et des allemandes' (we are all Jews and Germans), poster depicting 'Red Danny' – Daniel Cohn-Bendit (1988 reprint of the 1968 original).

8 The fourth 'M': Herbert Marcuse, maybe or maybe not looking like a messiah, lectures at the Free University in Berlin, 1967. He is surrounded by what Jacques Maritain might well have called 'prophetic shock minorites'.

9 Human Rights as a post-ideological – or perhaps post-political – consensus reconciling Left and Right: Jean-Paul Sartre (*centre*), André Glucksmann (*left*) and Raymond Aron (*right*) attend a government conference at the Elysée Palace on 26 June 1979. Glucksmann, the flamboyant New Philosopher, had brought the twentieth century's greatest French socialist philosopher and the twentieth century's greatest French liberal together to support Un Bateau pour le Vietnam, a group which provided assistance for Vietnamese refugees.

10 The general and the special intellectual unite forces for a common cause: Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault protesting about the treatment of Arab immigrants in the Goutte d'Or quartier in the 18th arrondissement of Paris, 1971. This after Foucault had observed of one of Sartre's major works: 'The critique of dialectical reason is the magnificent and pathetic effort of a man of the nineteenth century to think the twentieth. In this sense, Sartre is the last Hegelian, and I would even say the last Marxist.' Foucault certainly thought he would have the last laugh in the battle over defining the role of the intellectual in twentieth-century European politics.

Hayek now branched out into popular political pamphleteering. In 1944 appeared his bestseller *The Road to Serfdom* – which was adapted for an American audience by the *Reader's Digest* under the heading 'One of the Most Important Books of Our Generation', and even became the subject of a 'radio dramatization'. Hayek declared that the creation of the welfare state would necessarily lead down the road of totalitarianism. While the Nazis had lost the war, they could still win the battle of ideas, if Western European states – and Hayek's beloved Britain in particular – elected socialist governments. Hayek insisted that socialism, no matter how humane and well intentioned its leaders, necessarily meant the establishment of a central authority in charge of planning. There were two problems with such an authority: a practical one and a moral one. First of all, Hayek argued,

socialism . . . overlooks that the modern society is based on the utilization of widely dispersed knowledge. And once you are aware that we can achieve the great utilization of available resources only because we utilize the knowledge of millions of men, it becomes clear that the assumption of socialism that a central authority is in command of this knowledge is just not correct. I think the nicest form to put it is to say that socialism, protesting against production for profit and not for use, objects to what makes the extended society possible. Profit is the signal which tells us what we must do in order to serve people whom we do not know. By pursuing profit, we are as altruistic as we can possibly be, because we extend our concern to people who are beyond our range of personal conception.[81]

While he was trying to say nice things about socialism, Hayek could not help pointing out that it was plagued by a crucial moral problem: a central authority could never just benevolently distribute goods; it would have to make choices about priorities and values and thus ultimately need to impose one vision of the good life on society, rather than allowing citizens to co-ordinate their activities spontaneously. In short, there could be no such thing as a non-totalitarian socialism.

Hayek insisted that he was no anarchist, but that states should simply establish a framework of general and predictable laws – at times going so far as calling for a uniform minimum income for all citizens. Keynes would take him to task for the apparent indeterminacy of where general laws ended and arbitrary state intervention started:

you agree that the line has to be drawn somewhere, and the logical extreme is not possible. But you give us no guidance whatever as to where to draw it.

It is true that you and I would probably draw it in different places. I should guess that according to my ideas you greatly underestimate the practicability of the middle course. But as soon as you admit that the extreme is not possible, and that a line has to be drawn, you are, on your own argument, done for, since you are trying to persuade us that so soon as one moves an inch in the planned direction you are necessarily launched on the slippery path which will lead you in due course over the precipice.[82]

The British social theorist R. A. Tawney was also eager to show respect for Hayek's work. According to Tawney, 'he writes, as Burke was said to speak, with the expression of a man confronted by assassins. His honesty and competence are beyond question.'[83] But he insisted that the most important insight was that 'it all depends' on what he called 'the debatable land between economics and politics'. Planning, he argued, 'like parliaments and public education, is not a simple category. Its results depend, not upon the label attached to it, but on the purposes which it is designed to serve, the methods which it employs in order to realise them, and the spirit which determines the choice of both.'

The Road to Serfdom ended up playing a minor role in the 1945 general election in Britain when its ideas appeared to have been picked up by Winston Churchill. The Tory war hero argued in one of his election speeches that:

socialism is inseparably interwoven with totalitarianism and the object worship of the state. It will prescribe to every one where they are to work, what they are to work at, where they may go and what they may say . . . They would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt very humanely directed in the first instance.[84]

The press promptly charged that Churchill was using 'Second-Hand Ideas from an Austrian Professor'.[85] He lost the election, and the Labour government seemed to go down the very road that the Austrian professor had warned about. Hayek, on the other hand, took what for an academic was an altogether less travelled path. He proceeded to found the Mont Pèlerin Society – a self-described 'nonorganisation of individuals',[86] but de facto an elite advance troop in the war of ideas, especially equipped to engage in close intellectual combat on the debatable land between economics and politics. Hayek demanded that 'we must raise and train an army of fighters for freedom'. He advocated a focus on intellectuals – professors, bureaucrats, teachers and journalists – as 'second-hand dealers in ideas', who, according to him, would always end up shaping public opinion in the long run. He also insisted that the young could be easily

influenced, as long as they were given something to be enthusiastic about. Hence his urgent call for the construction of a 'liberal utopia'.

At the first meeting of the society in Switzerland, however, it was far from clear what exactly the right first-hand ideas for a liberal utopia were meant to be. Some argued for laissez-faire, some thought a renewal of Christianity was most important, some sang the old lament about mass society. One participant suggested that the association should be named the Acton–Tocqueville Society – an idea that was opposed with the observation that a mid-twentieth-century club for the refashioning of classical liberalism could not possibly be named after two nineteenth-century Catholic aristocrats. Karl Popper put forward the notion of the Pericles Society and pleaded for the inclusion of democratic socialists. In the end, having failed to find agreement, the founding members decided to name the Society simply after the place where the meeting had been held.

Until this point it all sounded rather second hand, but at least the 'fighters for freedom' were well financed. Hayek kept raising money for the Society from various American funds, while in Britain the chicken magnate Antony Fisher, wanting to repeat what the Fabian Society had done for the Labour Party, established the Institute of Economic Affairs in 1955. This think tank was essentially devoted to the promotion of Hayekian ideas – again, specifically among 'second-hand dealers in ideas', as opposed to political parties.

For now Hayek and his followers had little success with their crusade in Britain (or in the US for that matter). The only place where economic liberalism seemed to have experienced a lasting renaissance was Germany. There intellectuals of the so-called Freiburg School were close to the economics minister Ludwig Erhard – the father of the German 'economic miracle' – while also serving as members of the Mont Pèlerin Society.[87] In fact, when the society appeared to break up into different factions in 1960, Erhard offered to serve as a mediator.[88]

However, some representatives of German economic liberalism complained that Hayek had stolen the label 'neoliberal', when in fact he was nothing but a 'palaeoliberal', a man of the eighteenth century who sought the reinstatement of laissez-faire.[89] The social philosophers Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow (Rüstow occupied Max Weber's chair in Heidelberg after the war) maintained that the old liberalism had been wrong to believe in a primacy of the market. States had to regulate markets tightly; in particular, they had to break up monopolies and ensure – even, if necessary, engineer – economic competition. Beyond that, Rüstow argued, governments had to engage in what he termed 'liberal interventionism' aimed at improving the concrete situation of individuals – or what he called their *Vitalsituation*. The ideal 'vital situation' was that of independent property owners – small peasants, for instance – which stood in

starkest contrast to the degraded life of the 'urban masses'.[90] Given that Europe could not possibly return to the world of the smallholder, new ways would have to be found to encourage self-reliant economic agents. Markets, then, were not natural; they had to be guaranteed and often unclogged by states (which, to be sure, always faced the danger of being captured by particular interests). But neither was there anything natural or given about proper market participants; they might have to be as much the creation of states.

Thus German neoliberalism absorbed some of the cultural pessimism typical of the interwar and immediate post-war periods. It also had a curiously authoritarian conception of the state: it wanted governments to engage in a kind of popular pedagogy to educate 'the masses' about the virtues of a free economic order.[91] But it was also much more social than caricatures of neoliberalism later assumed. The term 'politics of society' or *Gesellschaftspolitik* – a concept unknown to earlier versions of liberalism – encapsulated the idea that the state should mould society for the sake of freedom, while the phrase 'social market economy' was partly justified by appealing to the ideal of property-owning workers and entrepreneurs competing within a just framework set by the state. It was the compromise formula on which liberals and Catholics could agree and which served the German Christian Democrats so well.

Hayek, on the other hand, objected to the very term 'social' in 'social market economy' and fell out with Röpke (who had also tried to interest him in Christian personalism – unsuccessfully).[92] He persisted in what, with the triumph of the post-war welfare and administrative state, seemed an increasingly quixotic quest. One day, though, he would emerge from what for now appeared to be an ideological wasteland.

Decolonizing the European Mind

Western Europe (as opposed to the continent as a whole) appeared internally pacified – it was divided up into nation-states that at least for the moment seemed to have no claims on each other (and had they tried, the superpowers surely would have stopped them). But European nation-states had also been making claims on the rest of the world for centuries. Fascism had discredited imperialism, and not just the continental-religious type of empire. After 1945 Western Europe began to disengage from the world – not least to build its own Community more effectively. But it also went into almost immediate denial about its imperial past. Moreover, there was no inner connection between the particular post-war European model of democracy and what Europeans were doing in and to the rest of the world. It was indicative that the European Convention of Human Rights, which came into force in 1953, was, for the most part, to apply only to Europeans.

Britain was the sole major European empire to extend the Convention to its dependencies (although it categorically refused a right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, treating the Convention as largely symbolic).[93] Belgium did not extend the Convention to the Congo, and France did not ratify it until 1975.[94] Effectively, how empires behaved when decolonizing was very much left to their own conscience.

Impressive as they might have looked in terms of colouring the map, European empires had long been 'a vast confidence trick'.[95] On the eve of the Second World War, the British Empire in Africa involved 1,200 British colonial administrators ruling over a population of forty-three million black Africans, backed by around 900 Colonial Service police and military officials.[96] Imperial control could not have been accomplished without the collaboration of local elites to do what Orwell called 'the dirty work of Empire', and at least some form of acquiescence, or, put differently, rudimentary belief in legitimacy.

The Second World War changed all that, both because of the way it had progressed and because of the programmes which the victors had announced. For one thing, the early Japanese victories in the Far East destroyed the myth of white superiority, in particular symbolically charged events like the fall of colonial Singapore. As a British governor in the South Pacific had realized even before this disaster, 'the Heaven-born Big-White-Master theory of colonial administration began to crack up'.[97]

But programmes also mattered – even if they were disingenuous – because leaders became trapped by their own lip service to ideals. After all, the Allies fought in the name of anti-racism and anti-imperialism. As a member of parliament had announced on 3 September 1939 in the House of Commons, it was a war 'in its inherent quality, to establish, on impregnable rocks, the rights of the individual, and it is a war to establish and revive the stature of man'. And even Churchill, for it was he who had thus defined the war aims, could not easily backtrack from this.

Yet a surprising number of British politicians in particular persisted in the belief that all this would somehow not apply to them. But the leaders were taken at their word – and the great confidence trick could no longer be performed when people (or peoples) had lost confidence. As the Javanese nationalist leader Sukarno asked in October 1945:

> Is liberty and freedom only for certain favoured peoples of the world? Indonesians will never understand why it is, for instance, wrong for the Germans to rule Holland if it is right for the Dutch to rule Indonesia. In either case the right to rule rests on pure force and not on the sanction of the population.[98]

Colonialism as fascism – or fascism as colonialism brought back to Europe: this was a compelling thought and it was articulated by thinkers as different as Hannah Arendt and the poet (and politician) Aimé Césaire, who hailed originally from Martinique.[99] The latter diagnosed in his highly influential 1951 *Discourse on Colonialism* that 'a poison has been instilled into the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds towards *savagery*'. Nazism treated Europeans like Africans: 'and then one fine day the bourgeoisie is awakened by a terrific reverse shock: the gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers around the racks invent, refine, discuss'. Césaire extended this assessment to Europe's present and future:

> Whether one likes it or not, at the end of the blind alley that is Europe, I mean the Europe of Adenauer, Schuman, Bidault, and a few others, there is Hitler. At the end of capitalism, which is eager to outlive its day, there is Hitler. At the end of formal humanism . . . there is Hitler.[100]

Many in Europe concurred with the call by Frantz Fanon – originally also from Martinique – to 'leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them'. Fanon also most forcefully articulated the belief that violence might be a moral necessity and a precondition for creating a proper political identity. This view was famously endorsed by Jean-Paul Sartre in his preface to Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*:

> he shows perfectly clearly that this irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury nor the re-emergence of savage instincts nor even a consequence of resentment: it is man recreating himself. I believe we once knew, and have since forgotten, the truth that no indulgence can erase the marks of violence; only violence itself can eliminate them. And the colonized are cured of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms. Once their rage explodes, they recover their lost coherence, they experience self-knowledge through recreating themselves . . .[101]

And Sartre affirmed that 'aside from Sorel's fascist chatter, you will find that Fanon is the first since Engels to focus again on the midwife of history'.[102] The Algerian War (1954–62) – and the theses of Fanon, whom *Time* magazine derided as a 'prisoner of hate' – deeply split intellectual opinion in metropolitan France and elsewhere. For many observers such conflicts appeared to externalize the violence that, at least for the moment, had been expunged from Europe itself.

With the exception of Britain, empires not only disappeared from the map, they also vanished quickly from the political imagination. To some degree

decolonization helped the left in countries like France to become reconciled to the very idea of 'Europe' – both as a civilization and in the concrete form of the newly created European Community (though it was of course tacitly assumed that 'Europe' meant Western Europe). During Vichy, French fascist leader (and active collaborator) Jacques Doriot had announced that France had to prove itself worthy of 'Europe' – that is, a Nazi European *pax Germanica*.[103] Decolonization was a precondition that 'Europe' might again be associated with and worthy of an egalitarian universalism. According to the French sociologist Edgar Morin, for instance, it was only through decolonization that the idea of Europe itself became 'purified' for his generation.[104] In a sense, Sartre, for all the shocking claims about violence in his preface to Fanon's book, had been right: Europe, too, had to be decolonized. By the 1970s it had become thinkable that both left and right (mainly in the form of Christian Democracy) could sign up again to something like a common European project.

The New Class Takes Over

Western Europe appeared like a (slightly bland) island of the blessed, sheltered from the harsh winds of world history by the United States. Certainly, the Cold War posed a kind of permanent apocalyptic threat, but it also offered a curious kind of protection. Obviously, Central and Eastern Europe had not been so lucky. Their post-war regimes initially followed the model of 'people's democracies' – 'popular front'-style governments by anti-fascist, strongly left-leaning and, crucially, pro-Soviet coalitions that undertook expropriations and consolidated homogeneous nation-states, mostly by expelling the German minorities. Stalin thought such a model moved the countries under his control closer to his kind of socialism, but also preserved a sense of national independence (though not too much of it: both notions of Slav unity and feelings of socialist brotherhood were to make what were also sometimes called 'new democracies' toe the Soviet line). To be sure, in 1945 many people in Central and Eastern Europe felt that both the interwar authoritarian regimes and Western capitalism had shown themselves to be conclusive failures – and that it was time for a revolutionary change. Nowhere did Communists come to power through democratic means, but it would be wrong to think that all experiments in establishing 'people's democracies' therefore obviously lacked legitimacy at the beginning.[105] It was just not always certain which way they were going – whereas intimidation and rigging elections, the course Stalin and his local followers eventually chose, left no uncertainty.

Almost all emerging Communist leaders had either spent the war years in Moscow or resisted the Nazis in their own countries. Younger converts to Communism had been deeply marked by the fear of what it would be like to

live in Hitler's New Europe as 'subhumans'. Especially for this group, Stalin's victory over Nazism seemed to prove the historical truth of Soviet-style Communism. The Czech Communist intellectual Zdeněk Mlynář described the peculiar mentality of those who were around twenty at the end of the war and who turned into fervent Stalinists:

> My generation was made prematurely aware of politics by the stormy events of that period; at the same time we lacked political experience. The only experience we had was of the war years and the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, and during some of this time we were still children. One of the chief results of this was a black-and-white vision of the world, with the enemy on one side and his adversary on the other ... Thus our unique experience drummed into us the notion that the victory of the correct conception meant quite simply the liquidation, the destruction, of the other ... We were children of the war who, having not actually fought against anyone, brought our wartime mentality with us into those first postwar years, when the opportunity to fight for something presented itself at last.[106]

As in Stalin's Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European regimes also played on the register of democratic values: they invoked 'national fronts' of nominally independent parties and unions working together for socialism; they called for continuous mass participation as the only genuine form of democracy. In 1949 in Hungary 200,000 agitators were sent around the country to mobilize six million electors. Even though the outcome of the election was then a foregone conclusion, leaders were anxious about the actual numbers and keen to put on a convincing theatrics of democratic participation.[107] The 'people's democracies' of Central and Eastern Europe presented themselves as being in direct *democratic* competition with the West. Georg Lukács declared at a conference of European intellectuals in Geneva in September 1946,

> Europe today struggles for its new face. Formally, this struggle is between different types of democracy. The real issue revolves around the question of whether democracy remains legal and political in form, or becomes the real life-form of the people. And behind this problem lies the nature of political power. Should it be confined to the two hundred families or transferred to the working masses? In my view, only an ideological and political identity with the masses can create the new Europe.[108]

Not long after, Stalin switched tactics and tried to make all 'people's democracies' follow the Soviet model – which is to say, Stalinism.

The illusion that Stalin's Soviet Union was furthest ahead on the way towards an 'ideological and political identity with the masses' was shattered by Khrushchev's 'secret speech' at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. It is often overlooked that Khrushchev mainly denounced Stalin out of prudence and to pre-empt an investigation into his own conduct. He only really condemned Stalin for 'ignoring the norms of Party life' and for 'trampling on the Leninist principle of Collective party leadership', while sparing the Stalinist system more broadly. He exalted the role of the Leninist party (and its 'indissoluble unity with the masses') as the right model in contrast to 'all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and the people'. In other words, people had to be reminded of who the real hero was: the party.[109]

Still, Soviet citizens could not fail to notice that things did begin to change, and that the public justifications the regime offered to its people changed with them. Khrushchev did not arraign his opponents at show trials and kill them, but rather sent them to be the heads of remote cement factories.[110] Some space opened up for intellectual and artistic dissent, although this was mostly the result of intra-Kremlin feuds. In 1962 Alexander Solzhenitsyn was able to publish, with Khrushchev's personal permission, his short story 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich', an unvarnished account of a day in the camps (though a rather bearable day, compared to the accounts of Ginzburg, for instance, or what Solzhenitsyn himself would describe in the *Gulag Archipelago* a decade later).

The principle of 'socialist legality' had been officially proclaimed in 1953 (which did not immediately raise high hopes: it had also been used by Stalin's prosecutors in the trials of the 1930s). With this new emphasis on juridical formalism came attempts at constitutional clean-ups – in particular, the offices of head of state and of party secretary were to be properly separated. Rule in the name of (manufactured) collective and, in the case of Stalin, individual charisma gave way to rule that at least in theory adhered to legal procedures and therefore could be called, in Weber's sense, 'rational' – even if central planning made for high levels of economic irrationality. The latter did not go unnoticed, but the solution Khrushchev imagined – 'more democracy' understood as narrowing the gap between the bureaucracy and the people by periodically replacing party officials – only contributed to his downfall. The leaders of the coup against him promised 'stability of cadres' instead of 'democratization campaigns'.[111]

The Polish poet Czesław Miłosz had written that 'when one considers the matter logically, it becomes obvious that intellectual terror is a principle that Leninism-Stalinism can never forsake, even if it should achieve victory on a world scale'. In a sense, the point still held true, except that intellectual terror became more intermittent and affected ordinary people less and less. A bargain

seemed to take shape (though that is in many ways too positive a term, given that the people, as opposed to the party, had little to bargain with): acquiescence or, even better, political resignation in return for material goods, at least something that could look like implied consent for the sake of consumption. Professions of heartfelt ideological identification were demanded less and less. The personality cult was effectively over; if anything, it was replaced with a half-hearted 'cult of the state', which now at least got to share some of the party's (fading) charisma.[112] What under Stalin could plausibly be called an 'ideocracy' – the domination of and through ideas – gave way to what the Franco-Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis would later label 'stratocracy', that is, domination by the military and a bureaucracy that accumulated power for power's sake (and, of course, for its own personal benefit). Speaking Bolshevik was still required, but especially younger people could easily see that they were simply confronted with an elaborate (and tedious) façade – what the Bulgarian intellectual Tzvetan Todorov, looking back on his youth in the 1950s, called a 'pseudo-ideocracy'.[113] In other words, hardly anybody believed in it – and everybody knew that hardly anybody believed in it. Stalinism seemed to be gone for good; after a 1956 trip to the USSR Isaiah Berlin reported his interlocutors as saying that 'a return to those horrors was unthinkable', although he added, 'save in so far as in Russia nothing was unthinkable'.[114]

And sometimes the unthinkable did happen in the world of Communism: Yugoslavia proved that Stalin could be rebuffed in the name of nationalism, while still claiming that one was building proper socialism. The country's leader, Marshal Tito, erstwhile leader of the only fully successful resistance movement against the Nazis, thereby also shattered the notion of a global, unified Communist movement by de facto committing the sin of 'factionalism' at the level of states.[115] It was a momentous event in the history of Communism: for the first time a Comintern-trained leader, a man promoted by the Kremlin, successfully defied the Soviet Union and Stalin's (and his successors') claim to a monopoly on truth.[116]

Subsequently, Yugoslavia became the subject of many Eastern and, especially, Western hopes – which largely turned out to be illusions. The country prided itself on the practice of worker self-management – in a sense trying to make good on the promises of genuine soviets which the Soviet Union had failed to keep. However, self-management was essentially imposed from above to shore up popular support at a time when the regime felt extremely threatened by Stalin and the 'socialist brother countries', whose economic and political systems the Yugoslavs now denounced as 'state capitalism'.[117]

The prime theoretician of the specifically 'Yugoslav road to socialism' was Milovan Djilas, a Serb Montenegrin from a remote mountain village. His

father had been an officer, his grandfathers and great-uncles had been outlaws in the rugged little country on the Adriatic. He had fought as a Communist partisan, had met Stalin in Moscow in 1944, and was widely seen as Tito's potential successor. In the early 1950s, by then vice-president and a member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, he wrote a number of penetrating analyses of the way Yugoslavia was developing. His calls for more democracy earned him expulsion from the government and loss of all party positions in 1954 (his party number had been four). He subsequently gave an interview to the *New York Times*, hoping that outside attention would yield some personal security. However, rather than celebrity translating into political protection, Djilas' sensational revelations resulted in trial, conviction and time in prison. There he penned a novel and translated Milton's *Paradise Lost* on toilet paper.

He managed nonetheless to have a manuscript smuggled out of Yugoslavia to New York: *The New Class*, which pinpointed the emergence of a stratum of privileged bureaucrats who had betrayed the revolution to amass spoils. According to Djilas, 'the Communists were unable to act differently from any ruling class that preceded them. Believing that they were building a new and ideal society, they built it for themselves in the only way they could.'[118] In particular, he claimed, the relationship of the New Class to the means of production was one of political control, which the party bureaucrats would ceaselessly try to increase, in order to satisfy their vanity and desire for material goods. Summing up his indictment, Djilas argued that 'in contrast to earlier revolutions, the Communist revolution, conducted in the name of doing away with classes, has resulted in the most complete authority of any single new class. Everything else is sham and an illusion.'[119]

Saving the Honour of Socialism

It was only consistent that Djilas would support what turned out to be the most powerful challenge to these New Class dictatorships: the Hungarian uprising (or revolution – to name it is to make a judgement) of October and November 1956. Hungary's Stalinist regime had been exceptionally repressive; an attempt at a somewhat more moderate course under the reform Communist Imre Nagy after 1953 had failed, with Nagy being dismissed as prime minister and even excluded from the party. By 1956 discontent was widespread even within the party. The Petőfi Circle (named after Hungary's national poet, who had played a major role in the 1848 war of independence against the Habsburg Empire) acted as a kind of officially sanctioned inner opposition, encouraged by Khrushchev's secret speech. Its members, together with increasingly radicalized students, supported reform in Poland; they also called for the reinstatement of Nagy.

On 23 October, when the student demonstrations had swelled to mass rallies, the Petőfi Circle demanded: 'The Central Committee and the government should adopt every method possible to ensure the development of Socialist democracy by specifying the real functions of the Party, asserting the legitimate aspirations of the working class and introducing factory self-administration and workers' democracy.'[120] This was not the language of counter-revolution or quasi-fascist nationalism, as asserted by an increasingly panicky government. Demonstrations by workers and students appeared uncontrollable short of outright violent repression; the government was paralysed (which led Lukács to comment: 'nothing is worse than a weak-handed tyranny!').[121] In this highly combustible situation Nagy – just readmitted to the party – was pushed to address the huge crowds gathered outside the parliament building; when he started with the customary 'Comrades!', he was greeted with shouts of 'We're not comrades, we're not comrades.' He found no way to break out of party jargon. In the end he sang the national anthem. People sang with him. As two Marxist observers pointed out, a highly trained Bolshevik of thirty years' experience, a man who had worked closely with Bukharin, did not seem to know what to do with a genuinely revolutionary situation.[122]

Eventually Nagy was appointed prime minister. He edged towards party pluralism and was prepared to recognize all the parties that had been legal before Stalinist repression began in earnest in 1946 (it was decided to exclude the revival of fascist parties). Meanwhile, workers took over factories and formed their own councils; then they went on general strike. Nagy began to appoint non-Communists to his cabinet, while reiterating his commitment to building socialism in a neutral Hungary, outside the Warsaw Pact.

Someone else was appointed by Nagy: Georg Lukács. The philosopher had been purged from his university post in the late 1940s and had to engage in 'self-criticism' – not for the first time, as we saw, and, as it turned out, not for the last time. He now entered Nagy's government as minister of education and the arts – three and a half decades after having been a people's commissar in Kun's regime. The Soviet emissaries Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov reported back to Moscow that 'chosen . . . was . . . Lukács, who is a famous philosopher, and although he caused a lot of confusion in the field of philosophy, is more trustworthy politically and authoritative among the intelligentsia.'[123] Lukács felt that Nagy was lacking any kind of coherent programme and that in any event 'Uncle Imre' was not a 'real politician.'[124] Lukács voted against withdrawing the country from the Warsaw Pact. Nagy, however, announced Hungary's neutrality, upon which the workers' councils resumed work. The Soviets invaded. Lukács never even set foot in his own ministry.

For all its brevity, there was one undeniable fact: this had been the first anti-socialist revolt (or, as some theorists put it, anti-totalitarian or at least anti-bureaucratic revolution) in which the working class had played a central role. This was clearly seen by the Hungarian politician and political theorist István Bibó, initially a member of the smallholders' party, who observed that 'a party made up largely of bureaucrats and policemen [was] *standing against* the entire working class'.[125] Bibó was an intellectual known for his careful historical analyses and principled calls for moderation (some would dub him the Isaiah Berlin of *Mitteleuropa*). He had been appointed minister of state and ended up as the last major politician left in the parliament building next to the Danube when the Soviets closed in. He holed up on the second floor with a machine gun and sought desperately to make contact with the United Nations and the great powers. On the afternoon of 4 November, mistaken for a simple clerk, he was able to get out a declaration that 'Hungary does not wish to pursue an anti-Soviet policy. On the contrary, Hungary's full intent is to live in the community of free Eastern European nations which want to organize themselves on the principles of liberty, justice and freedom from exploitation.' Then he was arrested, imprisoned and put on trial. He escaped execution and, after an amnesty, was allowed to work as a librarian. Imre Nagy and other leaders – as well as Lukács – were flown to Romania. Nagy was tried. He claimed that the trial violated socialist legality. His last words in public were:

I have attempted . . . to save the honour of the word 'socialism' in the basin of the Danube . . . In this trial . . . I have to sacrifice my life for my ideas. I willingly sacrifice it. After what you have done to these ideas, my life has no value any longer . . . One thing alone would repulse me: to be rehabilitated by those who will murder me.[126]

He received the death sentence and was shot in June 1958. Lukács was permitted to return to Hungary in 1957. He later claimed that the Romanian guard assigned to work on him ideologically eventually had to be sent to a psychiatric clinic.

What did '56 mean? Some observers thought the result of a successful uprising and secession from the Soviet bloc might have been the creation of a real council democracy, or at least a dual power of parties on the one hand and councils on the other (without this dual power becoming unstable in the way it had in Russia in 1917).[127] Hannah Arendt saw 1956 as evidence that a people freed from the constraints of government would not be lawless, but form councils and committees to organize their affairs – the old dream of self-management appeared to be alive in the ruins of Budapest.

And indeed the programme which János Kornai and other young econo-
mists were working on for Nagy was to contain elements of 'market socialism'
as well as 'workplace democracy'. Kornai and his colleagues also insisted that
nationalizations and welfare programmes were not to be scaled back.[128] This
matched the 'Draft of a compromise solution of the Hungarian question',
which Bibó had worked out: his constitution was to be based on a dual rejec-
tion of fascism and Stalinism by the Hungarian people; it was to contain full
civil liberties and democracy. But Bibó also dismissed the idea of reversing
the land and factory expropriations of the 1940s – an implicit admission that
even the worst kind of state socialism had meant some measure of moderniza-
tion, in that it had broken the power of the reactionary landed magnates.
Potentially, then, there might have been a unique combination of socialism
and worker self-management in industry, economic liberalism in agricul-
ture, parliamentary democracy and, finally, some form of 'anti-imperialist
nationalism'.[129]

However, things simply moved too quickly for any real institutional
blueprint to emerge, or for any obvious social consensus – other than an anti-
Stalinist one – to crystallize. The aspirations of a genuinely popular movement
from below outran the (in any event highly improvised) goals of reform
Communists at the top.[130] Thirteen days were too short for a revolution, when
the one self-declared revolutionary superpower would not stand for it – even
though, as critical Marxists pointed out, what had happened in Budapest was
probably as close as the dry party slogan 'self-education of the masses in the
revolutionary process' would ever get to reality.[131]

The crushing of '56 did not mean that nothing would change. In one sense,
the triumph of consensus politics in Western Europe now also found at least a
small parallel in the East – which is not to suggest that there was 'convergence'
between East and West, as a number of analysts began to argue in the late 1950s.
Hungary's post-1956 government offered consumerism – albeit a drab version
compared to Western Europe – in exchange for political acquiescence or (from
the regime's point of view, even better) cynicism. It was stability at almost any
price, and one price – from the perspective of the vanguard party – was ideolog-
ical apathy. János Kádár, the post-insurrection leader who served at Moscow's
discretion, announced what amounted to the exact opposite of a principle of
totalitarian mobilization: 'He who is not against us is for us.' Kádár even went on
record as claiming that 'people don't exist just so that we may test out Marxism
on them.'[132] As much as possible, he removed politics from people's lives.
Analysts in the West began to speak of 'welfare Communism', or, in a more
homely phrase, of 'goulash Communism', sometimes going so far as to claim that
the regime had achieved 'legitimation through compromise', when in fact it had

merely pacified society.[133] The shrewd Kádár himself carefully avoided calling what he was doing a 'model', so as not to provoke Moscow.[134]

But welfare Communism was costly, and increasingly the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would rely on Western credits to keep up the implicit social contract. None could solve the problem of what Kornai had called the 'softening of the budget constraint' – the fact that there was no market to punish inefficient enterprises, and hence no constraint on spending. There appeared to be an irresolvable conflict between efficiency considerations and the ethical principles of a truly socialist economy.[135]

Ironically, just as some of the 'people's republics' more or less openly retreated from totalitarian aspirations, disillusionment spread among the intellectual supporters of Communism in the West. After 1956, one heard much less of arguments along the lines that 'over the dream of a socialism without defect, Russian socialism had the immense advantage of existing' or of ledgers that compared 'the misfortunes of the people imprisoned by the Russians' with the victims of Western colonialism. Sartre could still write: 'must we call this bloody monster that tears at its own flesh by the name of Socialism? My answer is, quite frankly, yes.'[136] For more and more people on the left the frank answer had to be: no.

The Skull that Would Never Smile Again

The limits of Moscow's tolerance of its satellites – and, above all, the capacity of Communism to change itself – were to be tested once more: the 'Prague Spring' in 1968 was the last major effort at a reform of Soviet-style socialism from within, before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Under the leadership of Alexander Dubček the Czechoslovak Communist Party set out to construct what they optimistically referred to as 'a new model of socialist society, deeply democratic and adapted to Czechoslovak conditions' – or, as the catchphrase went, 'socialism with a human face'. Market elements were introduced and price controls loosened, as theorized by the leading reform economist Ota Šik. In retrospect Dubček insisted that 'neither my allies nor I ever contemplated a dismantling of socialism, even as we parted company with various tenets of Leninism . . . We also believed that socialism could function better in a market-oriented environment.' And yet, as he had to realize soon enough, the Soviets might not stand for it:

> This proposal, I should say, was immediately viewed by the Soviets as the beginning of a return to capitalism. Brezhnev made this accusation directly during one of our conversations in the coming months. I responded that we needed a private sector to improve the market situation and make people's

lives easier. Brezhnev immediately snapped at me, 'Small craftsmen? We know about that! Your Mr. Bata used to be a little shoemaker, too, until he started up a factory!' Here was the old Leninist canon about small private production creating capitalism 'every day and every hour'. There was nothing one could do to change the Soviets' dogmatic paranoia.

Still, this outcome had not been easily predictable. Czechoslovakia in the early 1960s had faced an undeniable political and economic crisis.[137] Once a highly developed part of the Habsburg Empire – far richer than Italy – it now had the lowest living standards in the Eastern bloc. Many highly trained younger people, professionals in particular, could work only in positions for which they were vastly overqualified. De-Stalinization was explicitly rejected: in 1957 the party newspaper *Rudé Pravo* editorialized: 'the ambiguous word "de-Stalinization" stands only for the idea of weakening and giving way to the forces of reaction . . .'[138]

In a new constitution promulgated in 1960 the government declared that socialism had been achieved (changing the name of the country to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic); they also insisted that there were no longer 'class antagonisms' in what was now termed an 'all-people's state' – a concept inspired by Khrushchev and, arguably, by Stalin's project of Soviet people-making. This claim led to jurists demanding real 'socialist legality' instead of the violence associated with the Manichaean thinking described by Mlynář. He and others who had become fervent Stalinists in the 1940s were now in their mid-thirties or even early forties. Mlynář himself had travelled to Yugoslavia and been much impressed with self-management; he had been even more impressed during visits to Italy and to Belgium at the time of the Brussels World Exposition. His political cohort could see every day that state socialism had not kept its promises, and many of them sincerely sought to understand why. Sociology was rehabilitated as a discipline. Its practitioners promptly demonstrated that social stratification remained a fact.[139]

However, all remaining problems, or so the regime itself now suggested, would be addressed by pushing further the 'scientific-technological revolution' – a claim that seemed not completely implausible, given that the Soviets had recently sent the first satellite into space and appeared to be competing head to head with the West in at least some technologies. The party set up a number of research commissions, led by experts. The experts pointed out that technology was now really driving economic progress, and that technocrats ought to be seen as members of the progressive working class. The Marxist revolutionary would be an engineer or computer programmer; 'the liberated, unalienated free agent of history now wore a white collar'.[140]

Intellectuals felt and then furthered the changes. Karel Kosík had been a Stalinist in his youth and participated in the resistance against the Nazis; eventually he was imprisoned in Theresienstadt. He had studied in Leningrad and subsequently became a philosophy professor at Charles University in Prague. Now he promoted the idea of 'praxis' as central to a humanist Marxism; others began to engage with existentialism and Gramsci. Socialist realism in art was abandoned alongside Stalinist political thought. Ironically, a more subjective and humanist Marxism emerged with the ascendancy of the new technocratic intelligentsia.

After Dubček's ascent to power in January 1968, censorship was first relaxed and then effectively abolished – with Dubček insisting all along that the party's monopoly on power must not be abandoned: reform was in no way to threaten the 'party-state'; it was just about expanding 'space' or 'scope' for participation.[141] The party, whose leading role had been codified in the 1960 constitution (an example to be followed by many other socialist states), would now have to earn its position and serve as the vehicle to advance progress. It was to attract the best and the brightest to solve society's problems; it would become an instrument of cognition, rather than coercion.[142] After all, there was still the fact that unlike anywhere else in Central and Eastern Europe Communists had actually won elections (though not in Slovakia) after the war. This fostered the illusion that somehow Communism could still enjoy full popular legitimacy.

Mlynář went further. He co-authored the Communist Party's 'Action Programme' of April 1968 and called for a synthesis of socialist economics and full-fledged pluralist democracy, though carefully hedging his bets with the corollary that all groups and interests could eventually be 'united' again. This vision was to be realized in some form of corporatism, with state-guided interest representatives articulating the demands of workers in industry, agriculture and services.[143] According to Mlynář, the party itself was to retain its leading role for now, but rather than being the 'universal "caretaker" of society', it was to revert to its charismatic role in order to 'inspire socialist initiative . . . and to win over all workers by systematic persuasion and the personal example of communists'.[144] The party should have been ready to contest (and win) free elections towards the end of the 1970s. By contrast Lukács, in the course of '56, had assumed that a thoroughly renewed Communist Party might get 10 per cent of the votes.[145]

Dubček seemed to calculate that Moscow would not intervene as long as the country made no move to leave the Warsaw Pact; this, he thought, had been Hungary's crucial mistake. In the eyes of many observers, the 'controlled liberalization' from above did strengthen whatever legitimacy the Communist Party might have had at that point.[146] Unlike in Hungary – and unlike Poland

in the early 1980s – people did not organize themselves *against* the state, because the real opposition appeared to be between the old party elite on the one hand and the 'party masses' and the 'non-party masses' on the other, as Kosík put it.

And yet there was no way Moscow would countenance the possible loss of power by a Communist Party. On 21 August Warsaw Pact troops rumbled through the streets of Prague. Mlynář much later, in a conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, described what happened to the leadership – including their beliefs about socialism:

> We . . . were in a conference room together with Dubček, when bursting into the room there came soldiers of the Soviet Taman division and one of them took his place behind each of us and aimed a Kalashnikov submachine gun at our backs. One's concept of socialism at such a moment moves to last place, but unconsciously at the same time you know that it has a direct connection of some sort with the automatic weapon pointing at your back.[147]

Dubček was forced to implement what euphemistically came to be known as 'normalization'; then he was pushed out, expelled from the party and made to work in the Czech forestry service. Kosík had to leave the party and was prohibited from publishing anything; the secret police repeatedly seized even his research notes. Mlynář was also expelled, almost exactly a quarter-century after he had joined the party; he devoted himself to the study of beetles in the National Museum. And Šik, Dubček's deputy in the summer of 1968, emigrated to Switzerland; he claimed that the West was moving closer to a 'state-bureaucratic' form of economy, while the East remained caught in Soviet-style 'state monopoly capitalism', and that only the third way of a genuine democratic socialism was legitimate.[148] Others became more sceptical. The Hungarian Kornai – now part-time at Harvard – insisted that 'history does not provide such supermarkets in which we can make our choice as we like'.[149]

In response to events in Prague, Leonid Brezhnev announced that the 'weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, and they cannot look indifferently upon this'. This naked reaffirmation of Soviet power – soon known as the 'Brezhnev doctrine' – led the Czech writer Milan Kundera to conclude rather apocalyptically:

> What was actually at stake behind the smokescreen of political terminology (revolution, counter-revolution, socialism, imperialism, and so on, and so forth) was nothing less than a shift in the borders between two civilizations: the Russian imperium had once and for all conquered a piece of the West,

a piece of Europe ... Some day Russian mythographers will write about it as a new dawn in history. I see it (rightly or wrongly) as the beginning of Europe's end.[150]

But the political terminology *did* matter; and the events of 1968 signalled not the decline of Europe, but the beginning of Communism's end. The Prague Spring was the last instance of 'reform Communism' or 'revisionism' with any real credibility in East or West. In 1974, after having been forced out of Poland, Leszek Kołakowski declared categorically apropos the Marxist revisionism of which he had been a leading proponent in the 1950s: 'This skull will never smile again.'[151]

The Hungarian revolt had largely – but by no means completely – discredited ideological fellow-travelling in the West. The crushing of the Prague Spring, as a kind of late 'offshoot of Khrushchevism', ended all hopes that a governing Communist Party could reform itself – as long as there was an unreformed Soviet Union.[152] Many Western socialists now gave up on all 'people's democracies'. The British socialist Ralph Miliband, for instance, who had continued to view the Soviet Union favourably on a visit there in 1961, wrote to a friend in 1968, apropos the 'Czech business' (and also apropos student unrest in France), that 'I haven't got a proper grip' and that 'I am ... very muddled.' But for many left-wing observers the muddle disappeared as soon as they observed Czech 'normalization' unfolding. Miliband now declared the Eastern bloc as consisting of 'bureaucratic collectivist' states.[153] The conscious or often only half-conscious assumption of so many on the Western left – that these polities, for all their momentous failings, might somehow be moving towards socialism – was shattered.

'Reform Communism' had to be a structural contradiction, as long as there was no account of how a Leninist vanguard party should undo itself on the road to Communism – and there was no such account by the late 1960s, and there would be no such account until the very end of the Soviet Union. Thus the 'leading party' itself could not exorcise what Imre Nagy had called 'the Bonapartist spirit of minority dictatorship' – unless, like some of the Czech reformers, it saw a one-time election in the past as providing enough legitimacy to reach some more or less unknown point in the future when realized socialism had become so irresistibly attractive that somehow the electionless period in between could be justified.[154]

But this was clearly a bit of a stretch. None of these vanguard parties – half self-appointed, half Soviet-appointed – could ever claim to be a charismatic institution. In the immediate post-war period anti-fascism had given them some credibility initially – but, with that gone, there remained the worst of

traditionalism and 'bureaucratism'. And it seemed to be getting worse still. In Poland Adam Michnik drew the conclusion that 'there is no such thing as non-totalitarian ruling communism', although the post-1956 development of Hungary might have suggested that there was indeed such a thing; there was just no such thing as *non-authoritarian* Communism: terror could be dispensed with, but not the police state. This is precisely the lesson Mlynář drew in retrospect: the best one could get, he thought, was something like Kádár's Hungary, a version of how Khrushchevism might have developed, with extra doses of cynicism – but 'in that case there was hardly any point in starting at all'.[155] Václav Havel put the point simply: 'the fun was definitely over'; and now began an 'era of gray, everyday totalitarian consumerism'.[156] The claim that Georg Lukács made until the very end of his life was hardly self-evident any longer: the worst form of socialism was better than the best form of capitalism.[157]

Czechoslovak reform Communism had always had a strong technocratic trait – with its faith in comprehensive social engineering (or, rather, re-engineering) by experts, and economists and sociologists in particular. True, there were calls for workers' councils and self-management, but given the ideological constraints (unlike in Hungary), what else could reformers have said? There was thus little similarity with the other, Western '68 – to which we now turn – the '68 that was politically inconsequential in comparison with the Prague Spring, but that was the clearest expression of a rebellion against technocracy, what Lukács had called the 'cybernetic religion' which imagined machines increasingly running the world all by themselves. But it was also directed more specifically against post-war consensus politics, against the notion of democracy as tightly constrained parliamentarism, and the seemingly ever more powerful administrative state. Prague had been about a reform movement for a modicum of pluralism and constitutionalism. By contrast, the Western '68 was, in a deep sense, anti-constitutionalist.

129. Hitler's definition of the state simply read: 'the state has nothing at all to do with any definite economic conception of development. It is not a collection of economic contracting parties in a definite delimited living space for the fulfillment of economic tasks, but the organization of a community of physically and psychologically similar living beings for the better facilitation of the maintenance of their species and the achievement of the aim which has been allotted to this species by Providence. This and nothing else is the aim and meaning of a state.' *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Mannheim (London: Pimlico, 2001), 137.

130. Quoted in Davide Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World War*, trans. Adrian Belton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 59.

131. Richard Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia* (London: Penguin, 2004), 574–7.

132. Quoted in Piper, *Rosenberg*, 598.

133. Hannah Arendt, 'The Seeds of a Fascist International', in Arendt, *Essays*, 140–50; here 144. This essay had first appeared in 1945.

134. Alexandre Kojève, 'Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy', in *Policy Review*, no. 123 (2004), 3–40 (translation modified).

135. Browning and Siegelbaum, 'Frameworks', 261.

136. Quoted in Kershaw, *Hitler*, vol. 1, 125.

137. Gunnar Heinsohn, *Warum Auschwitz?* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1995) and Roberts, *Totalitarian Experiment*.

138. Quoted in Overy, *Dictators*, 589.

139. Quoted by Fest, *Hitler*, 1046.

140. Thomas Mann, 'Schicksal und Aufgabe', in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 12 (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1960), 918–39. One may well question the use of medical metaphors in coming to terms with fascism (Croce calling Fascism a 'moral illness' is another notable instance), not only because they naturalize political phenomena, but because they might remain caught in the very language which they aim to oppose.

Chapter 4: Reconstruction Thought: Self-Disciplined Democracies, 'People's Democracies'

1. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, 'Violence, Normality, and the Construction of Postwar Europe', in Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (eds), *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–14; here 1.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Quoted in *ibid.*

4. Hannah Arendt, 'Nightmare and Flight', in Arendt, *Essays*, 133–5; here 134.

5. Friedrich Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen* (Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus, 1946), 21.

6. Arendt, *Origins*, 317.

7. Paul Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000), 305.

8. Beauvoir, *Force*, 162 and 47.

9. Charles S. Maier, 'The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe', in *American Historical Review*, vol. 86 (1981), 327–52.

10. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

11. For this point see also Marcel Gauchet, *L'Avènement de la démocratie* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).

12. Paolo Pombeni, 'The Ideology of Christian Democracy', in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 5 (2000), 289–300; here 299.

13. Martin Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age, 1945–1973', in *Contemporary European History*, 13 (2004), 67–88; here 81.

14. This generalization needs to be relativized with regard to France: there the 'welfare state' – if that expression is appropriate at all – emerged in a more incremental fashion from traditions of mutualism, solidarism, Catholic social doctrine, but also pro-natalist campaigns. In other words, there was no great moment of foundation and rationalization. Pierre Laroque, who established *sécurité sociale* in 1945, was hardly a 'French Beveridge', but rather a technocrat who had to make crucial concessions in his institutional designs not to socialists but to Christian Democrats. See Paul V. Dutton, *Origins of the French Welfare State: The Struggle for Social Reform in France 1914–1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Philip Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). In another sense, however, this generalization needs to be relativized for all Western European countries: from a longer-term perspective, socialism *was* the ultimate cause of the post-war welfare states – without its threat, there would have been no Christian Democracy in the first place.

15. There were also, however, some leading Labour figures who understood themselves as Christian Democrats. See, above all, Stafford Cripps, *Towards Christian Democracy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946).

16. Conway, 'The Rise', 76–7.

17. R. H. S. Crossman, 'Towards a Philosophy of Socialism', in R. H. S. Crossman (ed.), *New Fabian Essays* (London: Turnstile Press, 1952), 1–32; here 16.

18. Judt, *Postwar*, 76–7.

19. José Harris, 'Political Thought and the State', in S. J. D. Green and R. C. Whiting (eds), *The Boundaries of the State in Modern Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15–28; here 23.

20. R. H. S. Crossman, 'Introduction', in Crossman (ed.), *New Fabian Essays*, ix–xiv; here xi.

21. Crossman, 'Towards', 28.

22. José Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 452.

23. Crossman, 'Towards', 3.

24. This and the following are largely based on Stathis Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1996).

25. As Antonio Gramsci observed, 'it is no longer the Church that determines the battlefield and weapons; it has instead to accept the terrain imposed on it by the adversaries'.

26. John Pollard, 'Italy', in Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69–96.

27. Quoted in Samuel Moyn, 'Personalism, Community, and the Origins of Human Rights', in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (ed.), *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 86–106; here 89.

28. Quoted in *ibid.*, 94. The personalists have been taken to task for these affinities by Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), and John Hellman, *The Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997); for a subtle and sympathetic, but not uncritical, contemporary appreciation of personalism: Paul Ricoeur, 'Une Philosophie personaliste', in *Esprit*, vol. 18 (1950), 860–87.

29. Don Luigi Sturzo, 'Has Fascism Ended with Mussolini?', in *Review of Politics*, vol. 7 (1945), 306–15; here 309.

30. My account is based mainly on Bernard Doering, *Jacques Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), and Jean-Luc Barré, *Jacques et Raïssa Maritain – les mendiants du ciel – biographies croisées* (Paris: Stock, 1995).

31. One of his earliest works from the time was translated into Italian by G. Battista Montini, later known as Pope Paul VI.

32. Jacques Maritain, *Réflexions sur l'Amérique* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1958).

33. Jacques Maritain, *Christianity and Democracy* (1944; New York: Scribner, 1950), 37.

34. Jacques Maritain, 'The Concept of Sovereignty', in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 44 (1950), 343–57; here 343–4.

35. Carl Schmitt, *Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 267; Aurel Kolnai, 'The Synthesis of Christ and Anti-Christ', in *Integrity*, vol. 5 (1951), 40–5; here 41.

36. Christian Heidrich, *Leszek Kolakowski: Zwischen Skepsis und Mystik* (Frankfurt/Main: Neue Kritik, 1995), 73.

37. Paolo Pombeni, *Il gruppo dossettiano e la fondazione della democrazia italiana (1938–1948)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979), 51–5.

38. Quoted in Paolo Pombeni, 'Anti-Liberalism and the Liberal Legacy in Postwar European Constitutionalism: Considerations on Some Case Studies', in *European Journal of Political Theory*, vol. 7 (2008), 31–44; here 36.

39. Carlo Masala, 'Born for Government: The Democrazia Cristiana in Italy', in Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (eds), *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2004), 101–17; here 104.

40. *Ibid.*, 107.

41. See Paolo Pombeni, 'Individuo/persona nella Costituzione italiana. Il contributo del dossettismo', in *Parole Chiave*, nos 10/11 (1996), 197–218. The left of the DC also managed to have their version of the first article of the constitution passed: the person-alist-sounding 'Italy is a democratic Republic founded upon work' prevailed over the 'Italy is a democratic republic of workers' proposed by Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti. See Canfora, *Democracy*, 182–4.

42. The name MRP also suggested the novelty of Christian Democracy in French history: it was explicitly republican, but also understood itself as a broader movement rather than a mere party. Critics, however, claimed that MRP really stood for 'Machine pour Ramasser les Pétainistes'. See Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, from the Great War to the War on Terror* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 288–90.

43. Peter Pulzer, 'Nationalism and Internationalism in European Christian Democracy', in Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (eds), *Christdemokratie im Europa im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001), 60–73; here 72.

44. Quoted by Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943–1980* (London: Penguin, 1990), 76–7.

45. Pulzer, 'Nationalism', 62.

46. Advocates of a more direct approach to European unity had immediately after the war called for a European constitutional assembly to draft a federalist European constitution. But almost all these advocates – many of whom had emerged from the resistance – had been quickly sidelined after 1945.

47. Quoted in Judt, *Postwar*, 275.

48. Quoted in Paolo Acanfora, 'Myths and the Political Use of Religion in Christian Democratic Culture', in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol. 12 (2007), 307–38; here 326.

49. Jürgen Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas*, ed. Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1992), 79.

50. Hugh Clegg, *Industrial Democracy and Nationalization* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), 22.

51. Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Savior, 1920–1937* (New York: Penguin, 1992), 228.

52. Herbert Tingsten, 'Stability and Vitality in Swedish Democracy', in *Political Quarterly*, vol. 26 (1955), 140–51; here 147.

53. Quoted in James, *Europe*, 245.

54. Gabriele Metzler, *Konzeptionen politischen Handelns von Adenauer bis Brandt: Politische Planung in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2005), 83.

55. Skidelsky, *Keynes*, 223.

56. Marquand, *Britain*, 147.

57. For the foregoing quotations see Stapleton, *Englishness*, 167–70.

58. Quoted in Conway, 'The Rise', 69.

59. Ernst Forsthoff, *Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1971), 164.

60. Dominic Sandbrook, *White Heat: A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties* (London: Little, Brown, 2006), 4.

61. See Nolte, *Die Ordnung*, and Metzler, *Konzeptionen*, 37.
62. Burleigh, *Sacred Causes*, 304.
63. See Theo Öhlinger, 'The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation', in *Ratio Juris*, vol. 16 (2003), 206–22.
64. Hans Kelsen, 'Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?', in *Die Justiz*, vol. 6 (1931), 576–628.
65. Christian Bommarius, *Das Grundgesetz: Eine Biographie* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2009), 219–26.
66. Karl Loewenstein, 'Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I', in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 31 (1937), 417–32.
67. *Ibid.*, 424.
68. Karl Loewenstein, 'Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights II', in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 31 (1937), 638–58; here 647.
69. *Ibid.*, 656–7.
70. Ginsborg, *History*, 142.
71. I am grateful to Giovanni Cappoccia on this point.
72. As is clearly and with much evidence argued in Peter Lindseth, 'The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920–1950s', in *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 113 (2004), 1341–415.
73. As early as 1936 Karl Loewenstein – the inventor of militant democracy – had observed: 'A fundamental transformation of legislative technique has accompanied the new method of legislation inasmuch as the differences between statute law and executory ordinance were almost completely obliterated. The government decrees usually contain only a proclamation of policy, in the broadest outlines, while details are regulated by unlimited delegation of powers to ministers, boards, commissioners, or subordinated authorities . . .' See 'Law in the Third Reich', in *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 45 (1936), 779–815; here 788.
74. Karl Loewenstein, *Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of our Time*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966), 48.
75. Kelsen, 'Foundations of Democracy'.
76. Isaiah Berlin, 'European Unity and its Vicissitudes', in Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas* (London: John Murray, 1990), 175–206; here 202.
77. Lindseth, 'The Paradox'.
78. Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe', in *International Organization*, vol. 54 (2000), 217–52.
79. C. A. R. Crosland, *Socialism Now* (London: Cape, 1974), 65–6.
80. The account of Hayek's life is mostly based on Alan Ebenstein, *Friedrich Hayek: A Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), and Hans-Jörg Hennecke, *Friedrich August von Hayek: Die Tradition der Freiheit* (Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, 2000).
81. Quoted in Ebenstein, *Hayek*, 313. This statement is from 1984, but sums up what Hayek always thought wrong with socialism.
82. Quoted in *ibid.*, 130.
83. R. H. Tawney, 'We Mean Freedom', in *Review of Politics*, vol. 8 (1946), 223–39; here 233.
84. Quoted in Ebenstein, *Hayek*, 137–8.
85. *Ibid.*, 138.
86. R. M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), xiii.
87. The other major exception was Italy's president Luigi Einaudi.
88. Hennecke, *Hayek*, 267.
89. Alexander Rüstow, 'Paläoliberalismus, Kommunismus und Neoliberalismus', in Franz Greiss and Fritz W. Meyer (eds), *Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kultur: Festgabe für Alfred Müller-Armack* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961), 61–70.
90. Alexander Rüstow, *Das Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus*, 2nd edn (Düsseldorf: Küpper, 1950), 91.
91. Philip Manow, 'Ordoliberalismus als ökonomische Ordnungstheologie', in *Leviathan*, vol. 29 (2001), 179–98.
92. Hennecke, *Hayek*, 210.

93. The Netherlands extended the Convention to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, at a time when major Dutch possessions had already been lost. Denmark extended it to Greenland in 1953.

94. A. W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

95. John Springhall, *Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 21.

96. *Ibid.*, 22.

97. Quoted in Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 14.

98. Quoted in Springhall, *Decolonization*, 29.

99. Observers within the Third Reich had already noted the revealing use of colonialist language – such as *Konzentrationslager* and *Strafexpedition* – by Hitler and his henchmen. See, above all, Victor Klemperer, *LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook*, trans. Martin Brady (London: Continuum, 2006).

100. Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 15.

101. Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Preface', in Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (1961; New York: Grove, 2004), xliii–lxii; here lv (translation modified).

102. *Ibid.*, xlix.

103. His speech to that effect can be seen in the later part of Marcel Ophüls' *The Sorrow and the Pity.*

104. Edgar Morin, *Penser l'Europe* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 140–7.

105. As the Hungarian intellectual Gáspár Miklós Tamás was to put it: 'It is true that the Communist party dictatorship was brought to the small East European countries by the victorious troops of Stalin, but we should admit that we were ready for it.' The notion of 'people's democracy' designated a transitional stage between bourgeois democracy and fully socialist democracy. In theory, it was to be characterized by 'the rule of the toiling people'; beyond this, the concept became highly contested, the main question being: could there be independent roads to socialism, or did everyone have to approximate the model of the USSR?

106. Zdeněk Mlynář, *Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism*, trans. Paul Wilson (New York: Karz, 1980), 1–2.

107. Árpád von Klimó, *Ungarn seit 1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 63.

108. Quoted in Kadarkay, *Lukács*, 385.

109. 'Speech by N. S. Khrushchev on the Stalin Cult delivered Feb. 25, 1956, at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party', in *Khrushchev Speaks: Selected Speeches, Articles, and Press Conferences, 1949–1961*, ed. Thomas P. Whitney (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 207–65; here 220 and 208. The revelations were a profound shock: people in Khrushchev's audience fainted; at other times they are said to have laughed hysterically. The West would send little balloons with copies of the speech attached across the Iron Curtain.

110. Robert Service, A *History of Twentieth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 331–55.

111. Priestland, 'Soviet Democracy', 121–3.

112. Moshe Lewin, 'Bureaucracy and the Stalinist State', in Kershaw and Lewin (eds), *Stalinism*, 53–74.

113. Todorov, *Hope and Memory*, 44.

114. Isaiah Berlin, *The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture under Communism*, ed. Henry Hardy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), 120.

115. David Pryce-Jones, 'Remembering Milovan Djilas', in *New Criterion*, vol. 18 (October 1999), 4–9.

116. Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 46–7.

117. *Ibid.*, 48–9.

118. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1957), 35.

119. *Ibid.*, 36.

120. Quoted by Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 61.
121. Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller, *Hungary 1956 Revisited: The Message of · a Revolution – a Quarter of a Century After* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 95.
122. *Ibid.*, 17.
123. 'Report from Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov in Budapest to the CPSU CC, October 27, 1956', in Csaba Békés *et al.* (eds), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002), 251–2; here 251.
124. Lukács, *Record of a Life*, 128.
125. Istvan Bibó, 'The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Scandal and Hope', in *Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination: Selected Writings*, ed. Károly Nagy, trans. András Boros-Kazai (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 331–54; here 337.
126. Quoted in Fehér and Heller, *Hungary*, 136.
127. *Ibid.*, 103–4.
128. János Kornai, *By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 101.
129. François Fejtö, *1956, Budapest, l'insurrection: La première révolution anti-totalitaire* (Brussels: Complexe, 2006), 176.
130. Tismaneanu, *Reinventing*, 70.
131. Fehér and Heller, *Hungary*, 89.
132. Quoted in Robert Service, *Comrades! A World History of Communism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 382.
133. Fehér and Heller, *Hungary*, ix.
134. Fejtö, *1956*, 172.
135. János Kornai, *The Dilemmas of a Socialist Economy: The Hungarian Experience* (Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute, 1979), 9.
136. Beauvoir, *Force*, 211–12.
137. Vladimir Kusin, *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia, 1956–1967* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
138. Quoted in James H. Satterwhite, 'Introduction', in Karel Kosík, *The Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Observations from the 1968 Era*, ed. James H. Satterwhite (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 1–11; here 4.
139. Jan Pauer, *Prag 1968: Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes* (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995).
140. Kieran Williams, *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 10.
141. *Ibid.*, 3.
142. *Ibid.*, 15.
143. *Ibid.*, 18.
144. 'The CPCz CC Action Program, April 1968', in *The Prague Spring 1968*, ed. Jaromír Navrátil *et al.* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1998), 92–5; here 92.
145. *Ibid.*, 27, and Fehér and Heller, *Hungary*, 109. Others began to demand a proper constitutional court, while plans were also made to create democracy through workers' councils – which led Kosík to warn that 'radical democracy' and worker representation were actually two different things. See Kosík, 'A Word of Caution on Workers' Councils', in Kosík, *Crisis*, 209–10.
146. Ekiert, *State*, 123.
147. Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism*, trans. George Shriver (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 40.
148. Ota Šik, *Argumente für den Dritten Weg* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1973).
149. Kornai, *Dilemmas*, 18.
150. Milan Kundera, *The Joke*, trans. Michael Henry Heim (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), x.

151. Leszek Kolakowski, 'My Correct Views on Everything: A Rejoinder to Edward Thompson's "Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski" ', in *Socialist Register* (1974), 1–20; here 20.
152. Tismaneanu, *Reinventing*, 114.
153. Michael Newman, *Ralph Miliband and the Politics of the New Left* (London: Merlin Press, 2002), 146 and 143.
154. Quoted in Tismaneanu, *Reinventing*, 72.
155. Quoted in Jacques Rupnik, *The Other Europe* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), 256–7.
156. Quoted in Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 12, and Barbara J. Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2003), 209.
157. Kołakowski is said to have replied to this claim: 'Ah, yes, the advantages of Albania over Sweden are self-evident.'

Chapter 5: The New Time of Contestation: Towards a Fatherless Society

1. Thomas Hecken, *1968: Von Texten und Theorien aus einer Zeit euphorischer Kritik* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2008), 135–48. In this costume drama, different people dressed up as, for example, Lenin or Robespierre. But Aron always appeared as Tocqueville.
2. Sunil Khilnani, *Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1993), 122.
3. The cunning of reason seemed to have ensured that anti-Americanism, which at the time appeared to be a distinctive feature of the Western European '68, turned out to be the supreme means of promoting Americanization.
4. Dutschke quoted by Gérard Sandoz, 'Etre révolutionnaire', in Rudi Dutschke, *Ecrits politiques (1967–1968)* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1968), 31.
5. It is important to emphasize that until about 1970 the widely desired 'revolution in consciousness' was certainly not to be brought about with violence. At the beginning, 'guerilla' only meant a 'refusal and sabotage guerilla', in Dutschke's phrase.
6. Ginsborg, *History*, 299.
7. Gino Martinoli, *L'università come impresa* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1967).
8. 'On the Poverty of Student Life: Considered in its Economic, Political, Psychological, Sexual and Especially Intellectual Aspects, with a Modest Proposal for its Remedy', in *Situationist International Anthology*, ed. and trans. Ken Knabb (Berkeley, Calif.: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981), 319–37; here 319 and 321.
9. Hervé Hamon and Patrick Rotman, *Génération: Les années de rêve* (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 400–1.
10. Quoted in Sassoon, *One Hundred*, 384.
11. De Gaulle's resolve was apparently strengthened by Massu telling him: 'Vous êtes dans la merde, il faut y rester encore.'
12. Ginsborg, *History*, 306.
13. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, *1968: Eine Zeitreise* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 83.
14. On this point see also Hecken, *1968*.
15. Robert Lumley, '1968/1989: Social Movements in Italy Reconsidered', in Levy and Roseman (eds), *Three Postwar Eras*, 199–215; here 201.
16. Gerd Koenen, 'Der transzendental Obdachlose – Hans-Jürgen Krahl', in *Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte*, vol. 2 (2008), 5–22.
17. Lukács, *Record*, 173. For Dutschke's extensive engagement with Lukács, see his *Versuch, Lenin auf die Füße zu stellen: Über den halbasiatischen und westeuropäischen Weg zum Sozialismus. Lenin, Lukács und die Dritte Internationale* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1974).